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Phainomenon

Ontology and the Mathematization of the Scientific Enterprise

Décio Krause, Newton C. A. da Costa

Published Oct 1, 2012• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Abstract In this basically expository paper we discuss the role oflogic and mathematics in researches concerning the ontology of scientific theories, and we consider the particular case of quantum mechanics. We argue that systems of logic in general, and classical logic in particular, may contribute substantially with the ontology of any theory that has this logic in its base. In the case of quantum mechanics, however, from the point of view of philosophical discussions conceming identity and individuality, those contributions may not be welcome for a specific interpretation, and an altemative system of logic perhaps could be used instead of a classical system. In this sense, we argue that the logic and ontology of a scientific theory may be seen as mutually inftuencing each other. On the one hand, logic contributes to shape the general features of the ontology of a theory; on the other hand, the theory also puts constraints on the possible understanding of ontology and, respectively, on possible systems of logic that may be the underlying logic ofthe theory.

DOI
10.2478/phainomenon-2012-0018

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Abstract In this basically expository paper we discuss the role oflogic and mathematics in researches concerning the ontology of scientific theories, and we consider the particular case of quantum mechanics. We argue that systems of logic in general, and classical logic in particular, may contribute substantially with the ontology of any theory that has this logic in its base. In the case of quantum mechanics, however, from the point of view of philosophical discussions conceming identity and individuality, those contributions may not be welcome for a specific interpretation, and an altemative system of logic perhaps could be used instead of a classical system. In this sense, we argue that the logic and ontology of a scientific theory may be seen as mutually inftuencing each other. On the one hand, logic contributes to shape the general features of the ontology of a theory; on the other hand, the theory also puts constraints on the possible understanding of ontology and, respectively, on possible systems of logic that may be the underlying logic ofthe theory.
Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
Based on a clear ontology of material individuals, we analyze in detail the factual semantics of quantum theory, and argue that the basic mathematical formalism of quantum theory is just okay with (a certain form of ) realism and that it is perfectly applicable to quantum gravity. This is basically a process about 'cleansing' the formalism from semantic assumptions and physical referents that it doesn't really need (we use the term 'semantics' in the sense of the factual semantics of a physical theory, and not in the sense of model theory of abstract mathematics or logic). We base our study on the usual non-Boolean lattice of projectors in a Hilbert space and probability measures on it, to which we give a careful physical interpretation using the mentioned tools in order to avoid the usual problems posed by this task. At the end, we study a possible connection with the theory of quantum duration and time proposed in [arXiv:2012.03994, arXiv:2107.06693], for which this paper serves as a philosophical basis, and argue for our view that quantum gravity may show that what we perceive as change in the classical world was just (an ontologically fundamental) quantum collapse all along.
Abstract. In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, namely, that which sees them as non-individuals, then there would be strong reasons to ask for a different mathematical framework for describ-ing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks (that is, worked on within standard mathematics), we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science (if touched).
This book discusses the ontology in the quantum world and argues that it should be interpreted as a historicized ontology. This perspective is advocated by the quantum histories interpretation. Inspired by the nomological interpretation from Bohmian mechanics and the corresponding understanding of the law of nature and logic, the ontology will be useful to solve the difficulties of confusing ontology and perplexing logical inference. Furthermore, this book proposes that the historicized ontology can be generalized to more complicated structures and fit naturally into temporal correlation. Core philosophical issues such as the law of nature, the ontology of events, history, and processes, and the metaphysics of history are coherently discussed, revealing the profound meaning behind the formalism of quantum histories. By providing a new framework for a historicized picture of ontology, it will effectively promote the debates in the philosophy of physics and the fundamental research in quantum mechanics. This book will appeal to scholars and students of the philosophy of science, metaphysics, and quantum theory.
The book investigates the ontology and logic of quantum physics. The first part discusses the relationship of theory and observation and different views on the ontological status of scientific theories. It introduces the fundamentals of quantum mechanics and some of its interpretations and their compatibility with various ontological positions. In the second part, implications of quantum mechanics on classical logic, especially on the distributive law and bivalence, as discussed by Garrett Birkhoff & John von Neumann (1936) and Hilary Putnam (1968), and their counterarguments are reconstructed and discussed. It is concluded that classical logic is sufficient for dealing with quantum mechanical propositions.