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Security and Communication Networks

A resilient identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol

Ibrahim F. Elashry, Yi Mu, Willy Susilo

Published Jan 23, 2015• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper presents a new security notion for key exchange (KE) protocols called resiliency. That is, if a shared secret between a group of parties is compromised or leaked, they can generate another completely new shared secret without the need to set up a new KE session. We present an identity-based authenticated KE protocol that satisfies the resiliency security property. We prove that if an l-bit shared secret key (SSK) is leaked, then two parties P1 and P2 can safely generate another shared secret SSK1 without the need to establish a new session. We adjust the unauthenticated adversarial model of the Canetti–Krawczyk to meet this security property and prove the security of the proposed protocol using the Canetti–Krawczyk model based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

DOI
10.1002/sec.1172

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This paper presents a new security notion for key exchange (KE) protocols called resiliency. That is, if a shared secret between a group of parties is compromised or leaked, they can generate another completely new shared secret without the need to set up a new KE session. We present an identity-based authenticated KE protocol that satisfies the resiliency security property. We prove that if an l-bit shared secret key (SSK) is leaked, then two parties P1 and P2 can safely generate another shared secret SSK1 without the need to establish a new session. We adjust the unauthenticated adversarial model of the Canetti–Krawczyk to meet this security property and prove the security of the proposed protocol using the Canetti–Krawczyk model based on the quadratic residuosity assumption. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Summary Authenticated key exchange protocols represent an important cryptographic mechanism that enables several parties to communicate securely over an open network. Elashry, Mu, and Susilo proposed an identity‐based authenticated key exchange (IBAKE) protocol where different parties establish secure communication by means of their public identities.The authors also introduced a new security notion for IBAKE protocols called resiliency, that is, if the secret shared key is compromised, the entities can generate another shared secret key without establishing a new session between them. They then claimed that their IBAKE protocol satisfies this security notion. We analyze the security of their protocol and prove that it has a major security flaw, which renders it insecure against an impersonation attack. We also disprove the resiliency property of their scheme by proposing an attack where an adversary can compute any shared secret key if just one secret bit is leaked.
Abstract This paper investigates the security model for authenticated key exchange protocols. We further enhance the enhanced Canetti‐Krawczyk (eCK) model by introducing a notion called strong key compromise impersonation (SKCI) resilience which is first identified in this paper. SKCI resilience guarantees that the adversary cannot masquerade as another party B to communicate with party A even if the static private key and the ephemeral private key of party A are compromised. We point out that the three‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol generically transformed from the two‐pass one secure in the eCK model cannot resist the SKCI attack. Finally, we introduce a new authenticated key exchange protocol SIG‐DH+ and prove that it satisfies our new definition. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Identity-based authenticated key exchange (ID-AKE) protocol is an important cryptographic primitive, which is used to establish a session key between two communication participants while authenticating each other. Indeed, most of the existing ID-AKE protocols do not concern with side-channel attacks in the sense that adversaries could obtain partial information of ephemeral/permanent secret keys of users. Recently, several leakage-resilient ID-AKE (LR-ID-AKE) protocols have been proposed to address such attacks. However, these LR-ID-AKE protocols have a restriction that the total leakage information during the life time of the LR-ID-AKE protocol must be bounded to some ratio of ephemeral/permanent secret keys. In this paper, the authors define a new adversary model, termed as identity-based continuous-leakage extended Canetti-Krawczyk (ID-CL-eCK) model. Using the key refreshing procedure (i.e., the multiplicative blinding technique) of permanent secret keys, the first LR-ID-AKE protocol resilient to continuous key leakage is proposed, and it possesses overall unbounded leakage property. Comparisons are given to demonstrate that the proposed protocol is better than the previously proposed ID-AKE protocols in terms of security models and leakage properties. Under the generic bilinear group model, security analysis is made to show that the proposed LR-ID-AKE protocol is secure against adversaries in the new ID-CL-eCK model.
Among the existing identity-based authenticated key agreement ID-AKA protocols, there are only a few of them that can resist to leakage of ephemeral secret keys, which is about the protection of the session secret key after the ephemeral secret keys of users are compromised. However, all these ID-AKA protocols with leakage of ephemeral secret keys resistance require expensive bilinear pairing operations. In this paper, we present a pairing-free ID-AKA protocol with ephemeral secrets leakage resistance. We also provide a full proof of its security in the extended Canetti-Krawczyk model, which not only can capture resistance to leakage of ephemeral secret keys but also can capture other basic security properties such as master key forward security and key compromise impersonation resistance. Compared with the existing ID-AKA protocols, our scheme is a good trade-off between security and efficiency. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Establishing a session key (SSK) is very important for real-world deployment in open networks, which enables secure communication between remote parties. In the past, some authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have been proposed to generate a SSK, but the certificate management issue is inhered in the traditional public key infrastructure and must be addressed. To tackle this issue, the identity (ID)-based concept is added to AKE, called ID-AKE. Indeed, the security of the existing AKE/ID-AKE protocols is gaining increasing importance due to some new types of attacks, namely, side-channel attacks. In such attacks, adversaries could obtain secret keys’ partial information during the execution of cryptographic protocols (including AKE/ID-AKE). To withstand such attacks, many leakage-resilient ID-AKE (LR-ID-AKE) protocols resisting side-channel attacks have been proposed. However, these existing LR-ID-AKE protocols have no efficient solution to revoke compromised users. In this article, the first LR-ID-AKE protocol with an efficient revocation mechanism, called LR-RID-AKE, is proposed. The proposed protocol is not only as secure as existing LR-ID-AKE protocols but also able to efficiently revoke compromised users from the system.
Recently,LaMacchia et al.proposed the extended Canetti-Krawczyk(eCK) model,which captures all security properties of authenticated key enchange protocols.Most of existing identity-based authenticated key exchange protocols are not secure in the eCK model.This paper proposes an identity-based authenticated key exchange protocol,and the security of proposed protocol can be proved in the eCK model.When compaer with other schemes,the proposed protocol achieves efficiency in terms of computation and communication.The proposal achieve strong security,and can be proved under the random oracle assumption and the Gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.