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Lecture notes in computer science

Quantum Communication Attacks on Classical Cryptographic Protocols

Ivan Damgård

Published Jan 1, 2011• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-20728-0_16

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Today's Classical cryptographic algorithms will fail against the quantum cryptosystems. In this paper, Security protocols are reviewed with analysis of intercept-resend, faked-state and light pulse attacks and eavesdropper strategies to gain the information transferred in between communication channel. The quantum cryptography is providing absolute security against the above stated attacking environment. That is the reason for using the concepts of quantum mechanics with cryptographic algorithms to achieve the utmost security. This paper is focusing on review to the key distribution techniques used for protecting the communication. We found that the communication is successfulif we use privacy amplification, authentication, and Bell's inequalities.
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