This article examines the implications of the holonomy interpretation of classical electromagnetism. As has been argued by Richard Healey and Gordon Belot, classical electromagnetism on this interpretation evinces a form of nonseparability, something that otherwise might have been thought of as confined to nonclassical physics. Consideration of the differences between this classical nonseparability and quantum nonseparability shows that the nonseparability exhibited by the classical electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation is closer to separability than might at first appear. 1 Introduction 2 Interpretations of Classical Electromagnetism 3 Quantum Nonseparability 4 The Holonomy Representation of the Classical Electromagnetic Field 5 Holonomy and Nonseparability: The Classical Electromagnetic Field 6 On Humean Supervenience 7 Conclusion
This article examines the implications of the holonomy interpretation of classical electromagnetism. As has been argued by Richard Healey and Gordon Belot, classical electromagnetism on this interpretation evinces a form of nonseparability, something that otherwise might have been thought of as confined to nonclassical physics. Consideration of the differences between this classical nonseparability and quantum nonseparability shows that the nonseparability exhibited by the classical electromagnetism on the holonomy interpretation is closer to separability than might at first appear. 1 Introduction 2 Interpretations of Classical Electromagnetism 3 Quantum Nonseparability 4 The Holonomy Representation of the Classical Electromagnetic Field 5 Holonomy and Nonseparability: The Classical Electromagnetic Field 6 On Humean Supervenience 7 Conclusion
Since its discovery in 1959 the Aharonov-Bohm effect has continuously been the cause for controversial discussions of various topics in modern physics, e.g. the reality of gauge potentials, topological effects and nonlocalities. In the present paper we juxtapose the two rival interpretations of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. We show that the conception of nonlocality encountered in the Aharonov-Bohm effect is closely related to the nonseparability which is common in quantum mechanics albeit distinct from it due to its topological nature. We propose a third alternative interpretation based on the loop space of holonomies which serves to solve some of the problems and we trace back the topological nonlocality and thereby the Aharonov-Bohm effect to their quantum mechanical origin. All three discussed interpretations are, of course, empirically equivalent. In fact, they present us with an instructive case study for the thesis of theory underdetermination by empirical data.
In quantum mechanics, quantum nonseparability is at the core of philosophical debates regarding its meaning. In the context of the process matrix formalism, causal nonseparability characterises quantum processes (connecting the inputs and outputs of different local quantum operations) that are incompatible with any definite causal structure among interacting parties. One talks about indefinite causal orders. A famous example of causally nonseparable processes is called the quantum switch (QS). It is extensively studied in the literature in virtue of its simple architecture and its various implementations in laboratories.The present work will discuss the possible interpretations of the QS's causal nonseparability under the assumption that causal nonseparability is seen as pointing towards novel objective features of nature.It was first defended that a scientific realist approach towards the process matrix formalism, which is an operational theory generalising quantum mechanics, was as much legitimate as any possible antirealist reading, contrary to certain views found in the literature. The reason is that operational formalisms are ontologically and epistemically neutral.From there, the theoretical concepts of interest, namely causal nonseparability and its model-independent counterpart called noncausality, were analysed in more details, in order to highlight in what sense they are distinct from the standard notions of quantum nonseparability and nonlocality in quantum mechanics.The discussion then focused on noncausality. It was argued that noncausality has a strong connection with a notion of temporal nonlocality. In the same way that Bell nonlocality is given different underlying explanations depending on the details of the chosen quantum mechanics' account, noncausality pointing towards temporal nonlocality can be given a variety of underlying descriptions depending on the exact way to interpret the process matrix formalism.The last chapter focused precisely on this particular point, namely on the various ways to understand process matrices and causal nonseparability in a realist context. In order to explore the potential impact of causal nonseparability on spacetime,we shifted from the notion of (indefinite) causal structure to (indefinite) spatiotemporal ones. This shift was allowed under a set of reasonable assumptions regarding the properties of a physical spacetime manifold and the connection between an operational and relativistic notions of causal relations.While different readings were suggested for indefiniteness of spatiotemporal relations, we insisted in particular on an objective understanding appealing to the concept of metaphysical indeterminacy. It was argued that such an approach could prove useful in a more general theoretical context such as quantum gravity, while being already partly supported in standard quantum mechanics.
The standard interpretation of quantum measurement on entangled systems holds that measuring one particle nonlocally collapses the wavefunction of its spacelike-separated partner. We argue that this conclusion rests on a false presupposition: that subsystems of entangled systems possess independent ontic states. If the global wavefunction is the sole ontic object (ψ-ontic holism), then for entangled systems, there is no "state of B" to be affected by measurement at A. Measurement is a local dynamical process-concretely modeled by continuous spontaneous localization-that destroys one local wavefunction component at the measurement site; the global state factorizes as a consequence, and subsystem ontology emerges for the first time. The transition of the distant particle's reduced density matrix from mixed to pure reflects this emergence of separability, not a physical change at the distant location. The framework satisfies no-signaling and embraces the contextuality required by the Kochen-Specker and GHZ theorems. We are explicit about its relation to Bell's theorem: Bell local causality (factorizability) fails, as it must in any empirically adequate theory, but the failure is confined to outcome independence and is identified with the nonseparability of the global ontic state, while parameter independence-and with it the locality of the dynamics-holds exactly. Decoherence provides the mechanism by which the global wavefunction factorizes and classical separability emerges. The apparent nonlocality of quantum mechanics is thus reinterpreted as nonseparability: the fundamental ontology is holistic, but the dynamics are local.
… there is something in this more than natural, if philosophy could find it out. Shakespeare , Hamlet, Act 2 Scene 2 Introduction The philosophical importance of semiclassical appeals to classical structures in explaining quantum phenomena was first recognized by Robert Batterman (1993; 1995; 2002). More generally, Batterman has argued that when it comes to explaining phenomena in the asymptotic domain between two theories, the fundamental theory describing that domain is often explanatorily deficient, and an adequate explanation must make essential reference to the less fundamental theory. For example, in discussing the relation between classical and quantum mechanics, Batterman writes, “There are many aspects of the semiclassical limit of quantum mechanics that cannot be explained purely in quantum mechanical terms, though they are in some sense quantum mechanical … [T]hese quantum mechanical features require reference to classical properties for their full explanation” (Batterman 2002, pp. 109–10). He has extended these arguments to other theory pairs with singular limits as well, arguing that in optics, for example, one finds explanations of wave-theoretic phenomena that make an essential and ineliminable appeal to ray-theoretic structures such as caustics. More recently, Batterman's arguments have been the subject of considerable criticism from figures such as Clifford Hooker (2004), Michael Redhead (2004), and Gordon Belot (2005). These criticisms have tended to cluster around the following two assumptions: First, in saying that a classical structure (such as a trajectory or caustic) explains , one is thereby committed to the claim that the structure exists .
We analyze the difference between classical mechanics and quantum mechanics. We come to the conclusion that this difference can be found in the nature of the observables that are considered for the physical system under consideration. Classical mechanics can only describe a certain kind of what we called ‘‘classical observable.’’ Quantum mechanics can only describe another kind of observable; it cannot describe, however, classical observables. To perform this analysis, we use a theory where every kind of observable can be treated and which is in a natural way a generalization of both classical and quantum mechanics. If in a study of a physical system in this theory we restrict ourselves to the classical observables, we rediscover classical mechanics as a kind of first study of the physical system, where all the nonclassical properties are hidden. If we find that this first study is too rough we can also study the nonclassical part of the physical system by a theory which is eventually quantum mechanics.