Henry Stapp attempts to resolve the Cartesian dilemma by introducing what the author would characterize as an ontological dualism between mind and matter. His model for mind comes from William James` description of conscious events and for matter from Werner Heisenberg`s ontological model for quantum events (wave function collapse). His demonstration of the isomorphism between the two types of events is successful, but in the author`s opinion fails to establish a monistic, scientific theory. The author traces Stapp`s failure to his adamant rejection of arbitrariness, or `randomness`. This makes it impossible for him (or for Bohr and Pauli before him) to understand the power of Darwin`s explanation of biology, let along the triumphs of modern `neo-Darwinism`. The author notes that the point at issue is a modern version of the unresolved opposition between Leucippus and Democritus on one side and Epicurus on the other. Stapp`s views are contrasted with recent discussions of consciousness by two eminent biologists: Crick and Edelman. They locate the problem firmly in the context of natural selection on the surface of the earth. Their approaches provide a sound basis for further scientific work. The author briefly examines the connection between this scientific (rather than ontological) framework and the new fundamental theory based on bit-strings and the combinatorial hierarchy.
Henry Stapp attempts to resolve the Cartesian dilemma by introducing what the author would characterize as an ontological dualism between mind and matter. His model for mind comes from William James description of conscious events and for matter from Werner Heisenbergs ontological model for quantum events (wave function collapse). His demonstration of the isomorphism between the two types of events is successful, but in the authors opinion fails to establish a monistic, scientific theory. The author traces Stapps failure to his adamant rejection of arbitrariness, or randomness. This makes it impossible for him (or for Bohr and Pauli before him) to understand the power of Darwins explanation of biology, let along the triumphs of modern neo-Darwinism. The author notes that the point at issue is a modern version of the unresolved opposition between Leucippus and Democritus on one side and Epicurus on the other. Stapps views are contrasted with recent discussions of consciousness by two eminent biologists: Crick and Edelman. They locate the problem firmly in the context of natural selection on the surface of the earth. Their approaches provide a sound basis for further scientific work. The author briefly examines the connection between this scientific (rather than ontological) framework and the new fundamental theory based on bit-strings and the combinatorial hierarchy.
For many years, Henry Stapp and I have been working separately and independently on mind-centered interpretations of quantum theory. In this review, I discuss his work and contrast it with my own. There is much that we agree on, both in the broad problems we have addressed and in some of the specific details of our analyses of neural physics, but ultimately we disagree fundamently in our views on mind, matter, and quantum mechanics. In particular, I discuss our contrasting opinions about the nature and randomness of quantum events, about relativity theory, and about the many-minds idea. I also suggest that Stapp's theories are inadequately developed.
Contemporary physics finds itself pondering questions about mind and consciousness, an uncomfortable area for theorists. But historically, key figures at the founding of quantum theory assumed that reality was composed of two parts, mind and matter, which interacted with each other according to some new laws that they specified. This departure from the prior (classical-physicalist) assumption that mind was a mere side effect of brain activity was such a startling proposal that it basically split physics in two, with one camp insisting that mind will ultimately be explained via physical processes in the brain and the other camp embracing mind as innate in creation and the key to understanding reality in its completeness. Henry Stapp made important contributions toward a coherent explanation by advocating John von Neumann’s orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics. von Neumann postulated that at its basis, quantum mechanics requires both a psychological and physical component. He was left, however, with a dualist view in which the psychological and physical aspects of QM remained unresolved. In this article, the relevant issues are laid out with the aim of finding a nondual explanation that allows mind and matter to exist as features of the same universal consciousness, in the hope that the critical insights of Planck, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, von Neumann, and Stapp will be recognized and valued, with the aim of an expanded physics that goes beyond physicalist dogma.
Henry Stapp is well known for his advanced views of Quantum Physics and particularly for development of the view that the mind of the observer is intimately involved in the collapse of the wave function when an observation is made. He expands this view to a cosmic mind conceptualization that, in common with much of Quantum Physics, seems to challenge the bounds of rational logic. My own work has been in developing an Emergent Aspect Dualism of the nature of the universe that attempts to build a coherent philosophy of the mental and quantal complexities on an entirely rational basis. Yet, there are numerous points of contact between the two philosophies in the dual aspects of the nature of mind, the interrogative nature of consciousness, the elimination of the physical collapse of the wavefunction, and the creative emergence of the physical complexity of the universe. Where the philosophies diverge is in conceptualizing the existence of a cosmic mind underlying the organization of the physical universe; for Emergent Aspect Dualism the only form of cosmic mind could be the universe itself, operating at a cosmic time scale.
The Heisenberg–James–Stapp (quantum mechanical) mind model is surveyed and criticized briefly. The criticism points out that the model, while being essentially consistent concerning (human) consciousness, fundamentally lacks the evolutional point of view both onto- and phylogenetically. Ethology and other than Jamesian psychology is quoted and a quantum mechanical theoretical scheme is suggested to essentially extend Stapp’s frame in an evolutionary context. It is proposed that its central supposition, spontaneous quantum measurement can be better utilized in an investigation of the origin of the “subjective” process, having come about concomitantly with the chemistry of the origin of life. We dwell on its applicability at this latter process, at its heart standing, it is supposed, the endophysical nonlinear “self-measurement” of (quantum mechanically describable) matter, and so our investigation is extended to this primeval phenomenon. It is suggested that the life phenomenon is an indirect C* → (W*) → C* quantum algebraic process transition, where the (W*) system would represent the living state. Summarized also are our previous results on an internalized, “reversed”, time process, introduced originally by Gunji, which is subordinated to the external “forwards” time evolution, driving towards symmetry by gradual space-mappings, where the original splitting-up must have come about in a spontaneous symmetry breaking nonlinear “self-measurement” of matter in an endophysical World.
In our description of nature the purpose is not to disclose the real essence of phenomena but only to track down as far as possible relations between the multifold aspects of our experience." -Niels Bohr (1934, p.18) "The conception of the objective reality of the elementary particles has evaporated not into the cloud of some new reality concept, but into the transparent clarity of a mathematics that represents no longer the behavior of the particles but our knowledge of this behavior." -Werner Heisenberg (1958, p. 95.) "In short, orthodox quantum mechanics is Cartesian dualistic at the pragmatic/operational level, but mentalistic on the ontological level." -Henry Stapp (2009, p. 8).