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Lecture notes in physics

Experimental and philosophical foundations of the formalism of stochastic quantum mechanics

Franklin E. Schroeck

Published Jan 1, 1987• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/3-540-17894-5_399

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Quantum mechanics comes in a variety of different forms and formalisms. There is wave mechanics, matrix mechanics, Dirac's version of quantum mechanics, von Neumann's version of quantum mechanics. The philosopher of physics has to ask not only what quantum mechanics means, but also what it is. Orthodoxy in the philosophy of physics treats quantum mechanics as the general theory of microphysics which takes Hilbert space as its state space and which associates observables with certain special operators on that space. This amounts to a decision as to what quantum mechanics is. However it is a far from arbitrary decision. For the Hilbert space, or von Neumann, formalism summarizes and captures everything that is in the other versions of quantum mechanics, without any of the dubious mathematics of, for example, Dirac's version. Contemporary philosophers of physics take a very formal view of what quantum mechanics is, a view which has many advantages and some disadvantages. Whatever the disadvantages of focussing on the formalism of quantum mechanics - and it may lead to losing sight of the ‘physics' and possibly to a bias against Bohrian Copenhagenism - it is certainly true that the literate philosopher of physics must have some acquaintance with Hilbert space. There are in fact several topics we have to deal with, though we deal with them only very cursorily. (This chapter is no substitute for Jauch's classic text Foundations of Quantum Mechanics .)

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When investigating various interpretations of quantum mechanics one notices that each interpretation contains an element which escapes a complete and full description. This element is always associated with the stochasticity of the individual event in the quantum measurement process. It appears that the implications of this limit to any description of the world has not been sufficiently appreciated with notable exceptions of, for example, Heisenberg, Pauli and Wheeler. If we assume that a deeper foundation of quantum mechanics is possible, the question arises which features such a philosophical foundation might have. It is suggested that the objective randomness of the individual quantum event is a necessity of a description of the world in view of the significant influence the observer in quantum mechanics has. It is also suggested that the austerity of the Copenhagen interpretation should serve as a guiding principle in a search for deeper understanding. In recent years, a significant increase of interest in the foundations of quantum mechanics can be observed. This increase is certainly related to the immense progress made during the last two decades in experiments with individual quantum systems. This technological progress has made it possible to really perform more and more of the famous gedanken experiments which were so important in the early days of the theory. Not only did these experiments confirm the theory in every detail, they also opened up avenues for new experimental directions which might even lead some day to new technology. While such applications are certainly still far away, areas like quantum cryptography[1], quantum computation[2] and interaction-free measurement[3], just to name a few examples, certainly deserve the attention they receive. All this activity has also drawn more attention to the problems of understanding and interpreting quantum mechanics. It seems that there, a definitive consensus has not yet been reached. As witnesses quote authorities like Feynman as saying[4]: I think can safely say that nobody today understands quantum mechanics, whereby he apparently included himself, or like Roger Penrose[5], who describes his opinion remarking that while the theory agrees incredibly well with experiment and while it is of profound mathematical beauty, it makes absolutely no sense. Why did even physicists who have contributed so significantly to quantum theory Feynman was even rewarded the Nobel Prize for one of its mathematical formulations choose such emphatic and strong formulations? Why is it that the average physicist hears very little about such problems during his/her education? Why is the comprehension of the theory very often focused on formalism while questions that probe for deeper meaning are usually not tackled? To take a closer look at the situation, let us turn to a brief analysis of the interpretation of quantum mechanics. We note that there are at least two levels of interpreting a formalism, a physical theory. The first, basic, level supplies the rules that determine which element of the formalism corresponds to which measurable quantity or to which observable fact in a concrete experimental situation. Theses rules are a large, mostly not explicated but only implicit, set of instructions. These instructions concern the manner of working with the statements of the theory in order to obtain predictions for future experiments or events, and they concern the instructions on how to proceed in experiment in order to demonstrate or test a theoretical
Quantum mechanics comes in a variety of different forms and formalisms. There is wave mechanics, matrix mechanics, Dirac's version of quantum mechanics, von Neumann's version of quantum mechanics. The philosopher of physics has to ask not only what quantum mechanics means, but also what it is. Orthodoxy in the philosophy of physics treats quantum mechanics as the general theory of microphysics which takes Hilbert space as its state space and which associates observables with certain special operators on that space. This amounts to a decision as to what quantum mechanics is. However it is a far from arbitrary decision. For the Hilbert space, or von Neumann, formalism summarizes and captures everything that is in the other versions of quantum mechanics, without any of the dubious mathematics of, for example, Dirac's version. Contemporary philosophers of physics take a very formal view of what quantum mechanics is, a view which has many advantages and some disadvantages. Whatever the disadvantages of focussing on the formalism of quantum mechanics - and it may lead to losing sight of the ‘physics' and possibly to a bias against Bohrian Copenhagenism - it is certainly true that the literate philosopher of physics must have some acquaintance with Hilbert space. There are in fact several topics we have to deal with, though we deal with them only very cursorily. (This chapter is no substitute for Jauch's classic text Foundations of Quantum Mechanics .)