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The European Physical Journal D

Quantum key distribution protocol using dense coding of three-qubit W state

Tzonelih Hwang, Cheng-Chieh Hwang, Chia‐Wei Tsai

Published Feb 1, 2011• 50 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1140/epjd/e2010-10320-y

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Cryptanalysis is an important branch in the study of cryptography, including both the classical cryptography and the quantum one. In this paper we analyze the security of two three-party quantum key distribution protocols (QKDPs) proposed recently, and point out that they are susceptible to a simple and effective attack, i.e., the dense-coding attack. It is shown that the eavesdropper Eve can totally obtain the session key by sending entangled qubits as the fake signal to Alice and performing collective measurements after Alice's encoding. The attack process is just like a dense-coding communication between Eve and Alice, where a special measurement basis is employed. Furthermore, this attack does not introduce any errors to the transmitted information and consequently will not be discovered by Alice and Bob. The attack strategy is described in detail and a proof for its correctness is given. Finally, the root cause of this insecurity and a possible way to improve these protocols are discussed.
The quantum dense-coding (DC) protocol, which has no security feature, deals with the transmission of classical information encoded in a quantum state by using shared entanglement between a single sender and a single receiver. Its appropriate variant has been established as a quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme for shared two-qubit maximally entangled states, with the security proof utilizing the uncertainty relation of complementary observables and the Shor-Preskill entanglement purification scheme. We present the DC-based QKD protocol for higher-dimensional systems and report the lower bounds on the secret key rate, when the shared state is a two-qudit maximally entangled state, and mixtures of maximally entangled states with different ranks. The analysis also includes the impact of noisy channels on the secure key rates, before and after encoding. In both the noiseless and the noisy scenarios, we demonstrate that the key rate as well as the robustness of the protocol against noise increases with the dimension. Further, we prove that the set of useless states in the DC-based QKD protocol is convex and compact.