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Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics

Against the empirical viability of the Deutsch–Wallace–Everett approach to quantum mechanics

Richard Dawid, Karim P. Y. Thébault

Published Jun 11, 2014• 36 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsb.2014.05.005

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It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make adequate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, and that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has recently developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this note I outline some concerns about the Deutsch argument, as presented by Wallace, and about related proposals by Hilary Greaves. In particular, I argue that the argument is circular, at a crucial point.

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It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can't make sense of probability at all, or it can't explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In particular, he has stressed its reliance on the distinguishing symmetry of the Everett view, viz., that all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as equally real. The argument thus tries to make a virtue of what has usually been seen as the main obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett world. In this note I outline some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace argument, and to related proposals by Hilary Greaves about the epistemology of Everettian QM. (In the latter case, my arguments include an appeal to an Everettian analogue of the Sleeping Beauty problem.) The common thread to these objections is that the symmetry in question remains a very significant obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett interpretation.

arXiv:quant-ph/0604191•Apr 26, 2006•93 citations
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make adequate sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two senses: either it cannot make sense of probability at all, or cannot explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, and that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has recently developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In this note I outline some concerns about the Deutsch argument, as presented by Wallace, and about related proposals by Hilary Greaves. In particular, I argue that the argument is circular, at a crucial point.
Following the work of D. Deutsch, D. Wallace has proposed a derivation of the Born rule in the context of the Everett interpretation. However, it seems to require a genuine uncertainty of the observers, which is difficult to justify in this deterministic framework. H. Greaves proposed another point of view, which does not imply any uncertainty of the observers, but renders the Deutsch-Wallace derivation pointless. I will propose a slightly different framework (without any uncertainty of the observers), which consists in interpreting directly the squared modulus of the amplitudes as proportions of worlds (without supposing that any counting of discrete worlds can be defined); it requires to examine the principles of rationality associated with the notion of proportion of observers in thought experiments involving non-quantum fission of the observers. I will then analyse the role of the Deutsch-Wallace derivation in this framework, which consists in an ordering of the rationality principles in the quantum splitting case (distinguishing the primitive principles from the derived ones).
It is often objected that the Everett interpretation of QM cannot make sense of quantum probabilities, in one or both of two ways: either it can't make sense of probability at all, or it can't explain why probability should be governed by the Born rule. David Deutsch has attempted to meet these objections. He argues not only that rational decision under uncertainty makes sense in the Everett interpretation, but also that under reasonable assumptions, the credences of a rational agent in an Everett world should be constrained by the Born rule. David Wallace has developed and defended Deutsch's proposal, and greatly clarified its conceptual basis. In particular, he has stressed its reliance on the distinguishing symmetry of the Everett view, viz., that all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are treated as equally real. The argument thus tries to make a virtue of what has usually been seen as the main obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett world. In this note I outline some objections to the Deutsch-Wallace argument, and to related proposals by Hilary Greaves about the epistemology of Everettian QM. (In the latter case, my arguments include an appeal to an Everettian analogue of the Sleeping Beauty problem.) The common thread to these objections is that the symmetry in question remains a very significant obstacle to making sense of probability in the Everett interpretation.