We present a formulation of quantum mechanics based on a logic representing some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process. With such an approach, we make no direct mention of quantum states, and thus avoid the problems associated to this rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some characteristics that any model (and hence any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its prediction and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, no model can lead to the prediction with certainty of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. As a consequence, we finally show that all the models of our logic make exactly the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or not.
We present a formulation of quantum mechanics based on a logic representing some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process. With such an approach, we make no direct mention of quantum states, and thus avoid the problems associated to this rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some characteristics that any model (and hence any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its prediction and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, no model can lead to the prediction with certainty of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. As a consequence, we finally show that all the models of our logic make exactly the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or not.
We introduce a logic modelling some aspects of the behaviour of the measurement process, in such a way that no direct mention of quantum states is made, thus avoiding the problems associated to this rather evasive notion. We then study some properties of the models of this logic, and deduce some characteristics that any model (and hence, any formulation of quantum mechanics compatible with its predictions and relying on a notion of measurement) should verify. The main results we obtain are that in the case of a Hilbert space of dimension at least 3, using a strengthening of the Kochen-Specker theorem, we show that no model can lead to the certain prediction of more than one atomic outcome. Moreover, if the Hilbert space is finite dimensional, then we are able to precisely describe the structure of the predictions of any model of our logic. In particular, we show that all the models of our logic do exactly make the same predictions regarding whether a given sequence of outcomes is possible or not, so that quantum mechanics can be considered complete as long as the possibility of outcomes is considered.
Understanding the core content of quantum mechanics requires us to disentangle the hidden logical relationships between the postulates of this theory. Here we show that the mathematical structure of quantum measurements, the formula for assigning outcome probabilities (Born's rule) and the post-measurement state-update rule, can be deduced from the other quantum postulates, often referred to as unitary quantum and the assumption that ensembles on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are characterised by finitely many parameters. This is achieved by taking an operational approach to physical theories, and using the fact that the manner in which a physical system is partitioned into subsystems is a subjective choice of the observer, and hence should not affect the predictions of the theory. In contrast to other approaches, our result does not assume that measurements are related to operators or bases, it does not rely on the universality of quantum mechanics, and it is independent of the interpretation of probability.
Understanding the core content of quantum mechanics requires us to disentangle the hidden logical relationships between the postulates of this theory. Here we show that the mathematical structure of quantum measurements, the formula for assigning outcome probabilities (Born's rule) and the post-measurement state-update rule, can be deduced from the other quantum postulates, often referred to as "unitary quantum mechanics", and the assumption that ensembles on finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces are characterized by finitely many parameters. This is achieved by taking an operational approach to physical theories, and using the fact that the manner in which a physical system is partitioned into subsystems is a subjective choice of the observer, and hence should not affect the predictions of the theory. In contrast to other approaches, our result does not assume that measurements are related to operators or bases, it does not rely on the universality of quantum mechanics, and it is independent of the interpretation of probability.
Quantum mechanics is based on Schrodinger’s wave function with linear superposition of vectors in a Hilbert space. Due to superposition, multiple physical states are considered simultaneously for the same time point, but when the corresponding quantum mechanical experiments are realized, there is only one outcome and not a superposition of pointer positions. This observation characterizes the quantum mechanical measurement problem, which for about a century found multiple interpretations, which can be classified as potentiality, as proposed by Heisenberg, or as real physical entities, for instance fields. Potentialities are yet inexistent in reality and unobservable in the present, since they represent a possible future. Thus, they can only be an intra-mental representation of a future process and not a physical extra-mental process ongoing in the present. There is coexistence of a physical object observable in reality and a mental prediction by an observer concerning the future behavior of this object. The characterization of quantum mechanical formalism by some physicists corresponds to a prediction and therefore to a mental representation of the future behavior of elementary particles and not to a description of an ongoing extra-mental process. Prediction in life and science has some characteristics, which resemble the measurement problem, since it undergoes a “multiple to one” reduction of mental potentialities to only one observable real outcome. Besides quantum mechanics, such reductions can also be found with many kinds of predictions, in classical physics for regular and irregular dynamical processes and in humans for programming future actions. Superposition in classical physics only concerns variable effects, but in quantum mechanics includes variable effects and non-localizable causes. Quantum mechanics, interpreted as prediction of future outcomes with multiple potentialities but only one realization, would resemble the general prediction problem in life and science and thereby loos its weird aspects.
Within the last decade, significant progress has been made towards a consistent and complete reformulation of the Copenhagen interpretation (an interpretation consisting in a formulation of the experimental aspects of physics in terms of the basic formalism; it is consistent if free from internal contradiction and complete if it provides precise predictions for all experiments). The main steps involved decoherence (the transition from linear superpositions of macroscopic states to a mixing), Griffiths histories describing the evolution of quantum properties, a convenient logical structure for dealing with histories, and also some progress in semiclassical physics, which was made possible by new methods. The main outcome is a theory of phenomena, viz., the classically meaningful properties of a macroscopic system. It shows in particular how and when determinism is valid. This theory can be used to give a deductive form to measurement theory, which now covers some cases that were initially devised as counterexamples against the Copenhagen interpretation. These theories are described, together with their applications to some key experiments and some of their consequences concerning epistemology.
A new formulation of quantum mechanics is developed which does not require the concept of the wave-particle duality. Rather than assigning probabilities to outcomes, probabilities are instead assigned to entire fine-grained histories. The formulation is fully relativistic and applicable to multi-particle systems. It shall be shown that this new formulation makes the same experimental predictions as quantum field theory, but without having to rely upon the notion of a system evolving in a superposition of quantum states until collapsed by an observation. It is thus free from the problem of deciding what exactly constitutes an observation (the measurement problem) and may therefore be applied just as readily to the macroscopic world as to the microscopic.