Modern physical theories are deterministic in the sense that once we know the current state of the world, we can, in principle, predict all the future states. This was true for classical (pre-quantum) theories, this is true for modern quantum physics. On the other hand, we all know that we can make decision that change the state of the world -- even if, for most of us, a little bit. This intuitive idea of free will permeates all our life, all our activities -- and it seems to contradict the determinism of modern physics. It is therefore desirable to incorporate the idea of free will into physical theories. In this paper, we show that in quantum physics, free will leads to nonconservation of energy. This nonconservation is a microscopic purely quantum effect, but it needs to be taken into account in future free-will quantum theories.
Modern physical theories are deterministic in the sense that once we know the current state of the world, we can, in principle, predict all the future states. This was true for classical (pre-quantum) theories, this is true for modern quantum physics. On the other hand, we all know that we can make decision that change the state of the world -- even if, for most of us, a little bit. This intuitive idea of free will permeates all our life, all our activities -- and it seems to contradict the determinism of modern physics. It is therefore desirable to incorporate the idea of free will into physical theories. In this paper, we show that in quantum physics, free will leads to nonconservation of energy. This nonconservation is a microscopic purely quantum effect, but it needs to be taken into account in future free-will quantum theories.
Many practical systems are non-deterministic, in the sense that available information about the initial states and control values does not uniquely determine the future states. For some such systems, it is important to take quantum effects into account. For that, we need to develop non-deterministic versions of quantum physics. In this paper, we show that for non-deterministic versions of quantum physics, we cannot require superposition principle -- one of the main fundamental principles of modern quantum mechanics. Specifically, while we can consider superpositions of states corresponding to the same version of the future dynamics, it is not consistently possible to consider superpositions of states corresponding to different versions of the future.
Most modern physical theories are formulated in terms of differential equations. As a result, if we know exactly the current state of the world, then this state uniquely determines all the future events - including our own future behavior. This determination seems to contradict the intuitive notion of a free will, according to which we are free to make decisions - decisions which cannot be determined based on the past locations and velocities of the elementary particles. In quantum physics, the situation is somewhat better in the sense that we cannot determine the exact behavior, but we can still determine the quantum state, and thus, we can determine the probabilities of different behaviors - which is still inconsistent with our intuition. This inconsistency does not mean, of course, that we can practically predict our future behavior; however, in view of many physicists and philosophers, even the theoretical inconsistency is somewhat troubling. Some of these researchers feel that it is desirable to modify physical equations in such a way that such a counter-intuitive determination would no longer be possible. In this paper, we analyze the foundations for such possible theories, and show that on the level of simple mechanics, the formalization of a free will requires triple interactions - while traditional physics is based on pairwise interactions between the particles.
If the concept of “free will” is reduced to that of “choice” all physical world share the latter quality. Anyway the “free will” can be distinguished from the “choice”: The “free will” involves implicitly certain preliminary goal, and the choice is only the mean, by which it can be achieved or not by the one who determines the goal. Thus, for example, an electron has always a choice but not free will unlike a human possessing both. Consequently, and paradoxically, the determinism of classical physics is more subjective and more anthropomorphic than the indeterminism of quantum mechanics for the former presupposes certain deterministic goal implicitly following the model of human freewill behavior.The choice is usually linked to very complicated systems such as human brain or society and even often associated with consciousness. In its background, the material world is deterministic and absolutely devoid of choice. However, quantum mechanics introduces the choice in the fundament of physical world, in the only way, in which it can exist: All exists in the “phase transition” of the present between the uncertain future and the well-ordered past. Thus the present is forced to choose in order to be able to transform the coherent state of future into the well-ordering of past. The concept of choice as if suggests that there is one who chooses. However quantum mechanics involves a generalized case of choice, which can be called “subjectless”: There is certain choice, which originates from the transition of the future into the past. Thus that kind of choice is shared of all existing and does not need any subject: It can be considered as a low of nature.There are a few theorems in quantum mechanics directly relevant to the topic: two of them are called “free will theorems” by their authors, Conway and Kochen, and according to them: “Do we really have free will, or, as a few determined folk maintain, is it all an illusion? We don’t know, but will prove in this paper that if indeed there exist any experimenters with a modicum of free will, then elementary particles must have their own share of this valuable commodity” “The import of the free will theorem is that it is not only current quantum theory, but the world itself that is non-deterministic, so that no future theory can return us to a clockwork universe”.Those theorems can be considered as a continuation of the so-called theorems about the absence of “hidden variables” in quantum mechanics.
I suppose one could imagine laws of physics which would dictate that a world be exactly so, and not otherwise, allowing no detail to be varied. But what could dictate that those laws of physics be ‘the’ laws of physics? By considering a spectrum of possible laws, one could again consider a spectrum of possible worlds. In fact the laws of physics of our actual world, as presently understood, have no such dictatorial character. So that even with the laws given, a spectrum of different worlds is possible. There are two kinds of freedom. Although the laws say something about how a given state of the world may develop, they say nothing (or anyway very little) about in what state the world should start. So, to begin with, we have freedom as regards ‘initial conditions’. To go on with, the future that can evolve from a given present is not uniquely determined, according to contemporary orthodoxy. The laws list various possibilities, and attach to them various probabilities. The relation between the set of possibilities and the unique actuality which emerges is quite peculiar in modern ‘quantum theory’ – the contemporary all-embracing basic physical theory. The absence of determinism, the probabilistic nature of the assertions of the theory, is already a little peculiar… at least in the light of pre-twentieth-century ‘classical’ physics. But after all everyday life, if not classical physics, prepares us very well for the idea that not everything is predictable, that chance is important.
In classical physics there is, in accordance with common sense, an objective world ‘out there’. That world evolves in a clear and deterministic way, being governed by precisely formulated mathematical equations. This is as true for the theories of Maxwell and Einstein as it is for the original Newtonian scheme. Physical reality is taken to exist independently of ourselves; and exactly how the classical world ‘is’ is not affected by how we might choose to look at it. Moreover, our bodies and our brains are themselves to be part of that world. They, also, are viewed as evolving according to the same precise and deterministic classical equations. All our actions are to be fixed by these equations - no matter how we might feel that our conscious wills may be influencing how we behave. Such a picture appears to lie at the background of most serious 1 philosophical arguments concerned with the nature of reality, of our conscious perceptions, and of our apparent free will. Some people might have an uncomfortable feeling that there should also be a role for quantum theory - that fundamental but disturbing scheme of things which, in the first quarter of this century, arose out of observations of subtle discrepancies between the actual behaviour of the world and the descriptions of classical physics. To many, the term ‘quantum theory’ evokes merely some vague concept of an ‘uncertainty principle’, which, at the level of particles, atoms or molecules, forbids precision in our descriptions and yields merely probabilistic behaviour. Actually, quantum descriptions are very precise, as we shall see, although radically different from the familiar classical ones. Moreover, we shall find, despite a common view to the contrary, that probabilities do not arise at the minute quantum level of particles, atoms, or molecules - those evolve deterministically - but, seemingly, via some mysterious larger-scale action connected with the emergence of a classical world that we can consciously perceive. We must try to understand this, and how quantum theory forces us to change our view of physical reality.
The purpose of this paper is to give a brief survey the implications of the theories of modern physics for the doctrine of determinism. The survey will reveal a curious feature of determinism: in some respects it is fragile, requiring a number of enabling assumptions to give it a fighting chance; but in other respects it is quite robust and very difficult to kill. The survey will also aim to show that, apart from its own intrinsic interest, determinism is an excellent device for probing the foundations of classical, relativistic, and quantum physics. The survey is conducted under three major presuppositions. First, I take a realistic attitude towards scientific theories in that I assume that to give an interpretation of a theory is, at a minimum, to specify what the world would have to be like in order for the theory to be true. But we will see that the demand for a deterministic interpretation of a theory can force us to abandon a naively realistic reading of the theory. Second, I reject the “no laws” view of science and assume that the field equations or laws of motion of the most fundamental theories of current physics represent science’s best guesses as to the form of the basic laws of nature. Third, I take determinism to be an ontological doctrine, a doctrine about the temporal evolution of the world. This ontological doctrine must not be confused with predictability, which is an epistemological doctrine, the failure of which need not entail a failure of determinism. From time to time I will comment on ways in which predictability can fail in a deterministic setting. Finally, my survey will concentrate on the Laplacian variety of determinism according to which the instantaneous state of the world at any time uniquely determines the state at any other time. The plan of the survey is as follows. Section 2 illustrates the fragility of determinism by means of a Zeno type example. Then sections 3 and 4 survey successively the fortunes of determinism in the Newtonian and the special relativistic settings..