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The Computer Journal

A Robust Multi-Party Key Agreement Protocol Resistant to Malicious Participants

Yuh‐Min Tseng

Published May 3, 2005• 33 citations
Publisher

Abstract

By its very nature, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on an authenticated network channel. This paper presents the inability of two famous multi-party key agreement protocols to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on the authenticated network channel. This attack involves a malicious participant disrupting the multi-party key agreement among honest participants. In this case, other honest participants do not correctly agree on a common key. Obviously, the malicious participant cannot obtain the common key either, and the communication confidentiality among participants is not breached. However, in some emergency situations or applications, a multi-party key agreement protocol design that is resistant to malicious participants is useful. Therefore, in this paper, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants is proposed. The proposed robust protocol requires constant rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. Under the assumption of the Decision Diffie–Hellman problem and the random oracle model, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries and malicious participants.

DOI
10.1093/comjnl/bxh111

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By its very nature, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication, so it must rely on an authenticated network channel. This paper presents the inability of two famous multi-party key agreement protocols to withstand malicious participant attacks, even though their protocols are based on the authenticated network channel. This attack involves a malicious participant disrupting the multi-party key agreement among honest participants. In this case, other honest participants do not correctly agree on a common key. Obviously, the malicious participant cannot obtain the common key either, and the communication confidentiality among participants is not breached. However, in some emergency situations or applications, a multi-party key agreement protocol design that is resistant to malicious participants is useful. Therefore, in this paper, a non-authenticated multi-party key agreement protocol resistant to malicious participants is proposed. The proposed robust protocol requires constant rounds to establish a common key. Each participant broadcasts a constant number of messages. Under the assumption of the Decision Diffie–Hellman problem and the random oracle model, we will show that the proposed protocol is provably secure against passive adversaries and malicious participants.
A non-authenticated group key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication,thus it must depend on an authenticated network channel or use another scheme to provide authentication.This paper indicates that Horng's group key agreement protocol which based on the authenticated broadcast channel is unable to withstand the disruption attack of malicious participants in group.This attack leads that other honest participants will not be able to correctly agree on a group key consistently.In this paper,an improved protocol is proposed.The proposed protocol which joins the message authentication method in original protocol can detect the malicious participant.Under the random oracle model,paper proves the proposed protocol can withstand the interrupted attack from malicious participant.
When a group of people want to communicate securely over an open network, they run a conference-key protocol to establish a common conference key K such that all their communications thereafter are encrypted with the key K. In this paper, we propose a provably secure fault-tolerant conference-key agreement protocol under the authenticated broadcast channel model. We show that a passive adversary gets zero knowledge about the conference key established by the honest participants under the assumption of a variant Diffie-Hellman (1976) decision problem. We also show that the honest participants can agree on a common conference key no matter how many participants are malicious. Furthermore, we show that even if the broadcast channel is not authenticated, our protocol is secure against impersonators under the random oracle model.
A non-authenticated group key agreement protocol cannot provide participant and message authentication,thus it must depend on an authenticated network channel or use another scheme to provide authentication.This paper indicates that Burmester et al.'s group key agreement protocol which based on the authenticated broadcast channel is unable to withstand the disruption attack of malicious participants in group.This attack leads that other honest participants will not be able to correctly agree on a group key consistently.In this paper,an improved protocol is proposed.The proposed protocol which joins the message authentication method in original protocol can detect the malicious participant.Under the random oracle model,paper proves the improved protocol can withstand the interrupted attack from malicious participant.
This paper indicates that Burmester et al.'s group key agreement protocol which based on the authenticated broadcast channel is unable to withstand the disruption attack and key-control attack of malicious participants in group.These two attacks lead that other honest participants will compute different session key and other honest participants compute the fixed session key which is determined previously by malicious participants,respectively.In this paper,a fault-tolerant group key agreement(FT-GKA) protocol is proposed.Even if there are malicious participants trying to attack the establishment of a session key,all other honest participants following the proposed protocol are still able to compute the correct session key using the digital signature technology.Paper proves the protocol can withstand the passive attack of adversary under the DDH assumption,and the protocol can withstand the interrupted attack and key-control attack from malicious participants under the DL assumption and the random oracle model.Furthermore,the proposed protocol possesses both constant number of rounds and lower computation overhead.
In this paper, a multi-party key establishment protocol based on the difficulty of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field is proposed with the following features. It requires a constant number (independent of the number of participants) of rounds. All messages have the same constant size. All participants perform a constant number of exponential operations. All participants agree on a key together with two random integers simultaneously. Furthermore, to establish a new key when the set of participants is changed is easy. We also show that this new scheme is secure against passive attacks provided that the Diffie–Hellman key agreement protocol is secure in the sense that the established key is computationally indistinguishable from a random value.
A robust group key agreement protocol (GKA) allows a set of players to establish a shared secret key, regardless of network/node failures. Current constant-round GKA protocols are either efficient and nonrobust or robust but not efficient; assuming a reliable broadcast communication medium, the standard encryption-based group key agreement protocol can be robust against arbitrary number of node faults, but the size of the messages broadcast by every player is proportional to the number of players. In contrast, nonrobust group key agreement can be achieved with each player broadcasting just constant-sized messages. We propose a novel 2-round group key agreement protocol, which tolerates up to T node failures, using O(T)-sized messages for any T. We show that the new protocol implies a fully-robust group key agreement with logarithmic-sized messages and expected round complexity close to 2, assuming random node faults. The protocol can be extended to withstand malicious insiders at small constant factor increases in bandwidth and computation. The proposed protocol is secure under the (standard) Decisional Square Diffie-Hellman assumption.