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Lecture notes in computer science

Efficient Secure Two-Party Exponentiation

Ching-Hua Yu, Sherman S. M. Chow, Kai-Min Chung, Feng-Hao Liu

Published Jan 1, 2011• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-19074-2_2

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Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows participating parties to jointly compute a function over their inputs while keeping them private. In particular, MPC based on additive secret sharing has been widely studied as a tool to obtain efficient protocols secure against a dishonest majority, including the important two-party case. In this paper, we propose a two-party protocol for an exponentiation functionality based on an additive secret sharing scheme. Our proposed protocol aims to securely compute a public base exponentiation ax mod p for an odd prime p, where the exponent x ∈ ℤp is a (shared) secret and the base a ∈ ℤp is public. Our protocol is based on a new simple but efficient approach involving quotient transfer that allows the parties to perform the most expensive part of the computation locally, but requires the base a ∈ ℤp to be a quadratic residue. To address scenarios where the base does not fulfill this, we combine our exponentiation protocol with a new efficient modulus conversion protocol which might be of independent interest. Even taking into account a potential modulus conversion, our exponentiation protocol only requires 3 rounds and 4 invocations of multiplication.
We revisit the problem of constructing efficient secure two-party protocols for the problems of setintersection and set-union, focusing on the model of malicious parties. Our main results are constantround protocols that exhibit linear communication and a (practically) linear number of exponentiations with simulation based security. In the heart of these constructions is a technique based on a combination of a perfectly hiding commitment and an oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation protocol. Our protocols readily transform into protocols that are UC-secure, and we discuss how to perform these transformations. Keywords: Secure two-party computation, Simulation-based security, Set-intersection, Set-union, Oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation.
We present the first two-round, two-party general function evaluation protocol that is secure against honest-but-curious adaptive corruption of both parties. In addition, the protocol is incoercible for one of the parties, and fully leakage tolerant. It requires a global (non-programmable) reference string and is based on one way functions and general-purpose indistinguishability obfuscation with sub-exponential security, as well as augmented non-committing encryption. A Byzantine version of the protocol, obtained by applying the Canetti et al. [STOC 02] compiler, achieves UC security with comparable efficiency parameters, but is no longer incoercible.