Fair Computation with Rational Players

Arpita Maitra, Goutam Paul, Asim Kumar Pal

Li Tao, Yilei Wang

Sourya Joyee De, Asim K. Pal

Steven Gordon, Jonathan I. Katz

Liu Rong-fe

Exciting rational secure multiparty computation goes less to discuss asynchronous channel,we realize it on asynchronous channel by using Chinese reminder theorem. Using the way of uncertain rounds,rational players don't which round is the last round. Through tit for tat mechanism and dynamical add / remove,rational players have not any motivation to deviate from the specified protocol,if someone deviate from it,then his utility yields less than follow it,so we realize any number of players' fair rational secure multiparty computation. Furthermore,we analyze the scheme's fairness from the perspective of game theory. Finally,some advantages of our scheme are demonstrated further by comparing the exiting schemes with the type of communication channel,consists of players,interactive round and other requests.

Arpita Maitra, Goutam Paul, Asim Kumar Pal

A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) showed that fairness, in general, is impossible to achieve in case of two-party computation if one of them is malicious. Later, Gordon et al. (STOC 2008) observed that there exist some functions for which fairness can be achieved even though one of the two parties is malicious. One of the functions considered by Gordon et al. is exactly the millionaires ’ problem (Yao, FOCS 1982) or, equivalently, the ‘greater-than’ function. Interestingly, Gordon et al. (JACM, 2011) showed that any function over polynomial-size domains which does not contain an “embedded XOR ” can be converted into the greater than function. In the same paper, they also demonstrated feasibility for certain functions that do contain an embedded XOR. In this paper, we revisit both the classes of two-party computation under rational players for the first time. We show that Gordon’s protocols no longer remain fair when the players are rational. Further, we design two protocols, one without embedded XOR (the greater-than function) and the other with embedded XOR, and show that with rational players, our protocols achieve fairness under suitable choice of parameters.