Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant's defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This first article of a two-part series argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical (unobservable) objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck's constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the observables of quantum mechanics as empirically real even though they are transcendentally (i.e., pre-observationally) ideal.
Quantum indeterminism seems incompatible with Kant's defense of causality in his Second Analogy. The Copenhagen interpretation also takes quantum theory as evidence for anti-realism. This first article of a two-part series argues that the law of causality, as transcendental, applies only to the world as observable, not to hypothetical (unobservable) objects such as quarks, detectable only by high energy accelerators. Taking Planck's constant and the speed of light as the lower and upper bounds of observability provides a way of interpreting the observables of quantum mechanics as empirically real even though they are transcendentally (i.e., pre-observationally) ideal.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Abstract: In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
Quantum theory, particularly with its concepts of indeterminacy and superposition, demands of philosophers of science a profound review and a complete redefinition of the foundation of the notion of representation. This review has significant implications for assessing the Kantian heritage, especially for those among us who recognize the advances of the transcendental approach over realist and empiricist perspectives in epistemology. Kant endeavored to establish a foundation for the notion of representation consistent with the physics of his time. Today, as inheritors of Kant’s legacy in the philosophy of science, we face the challenge of establishing a new foundation for the idea of representation that aligns with the principles of contemporary science. In his Progress of Metaphysics, as well as in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant distinguishes between analogical (symbolic) schematism and real (transcendental) schematism. My aim in this work is to explore the notion of analogical schematism for evaluating the content of extra-empirical concepts in contemporary physical theories, where intuition proves to be intrinsically indeterminate.
Kant’s philosophy of science has been applied to quantum physics since the time when Niels Bohr formulated his interpretation of quantum physics. In recent years various Kantian interpretations of quantum physics have been put forward. One aspect that still needs further exploration is what a Kantian approach to the epistemic status of quantum entities would entail. In this paper a new kind of judgment consistent with Kant’s system, called a transcendental judgment, able to account for the real existence of quantum entities in the pre-measurement phase is discussed. The advantage of this kind of judgment is that it allows for a fine-tuning of the Kantian system to account for the discovery of quantum entities that are known to exist but whose existence can epistemologically not be accounted for in traditional Kantian philosophy. With this new kind of judgment, a wider range of possible judgments becomes available which can determine the epistemological status of concepts/ideas/theories quite carefully, discriminating between different kinds of knowledge claims.
In this thesis I confront the problem of indeterminism in quantum physics. The first pioneers accepted indeterminism as part of their Copenhagen interpretation and it was incorporated in Von Neumann's formulation (as the "projection postulate"). But how deep does this indeterminism go? With the arrival of quantum physics, the idea that the world is fundamentally deterministic has been shattered. Redhead's work showed that the experimental confirmation of the violation of Bell's inequality means that determinism has broken down; he even formulated a version of the Bell inequality that is not dependent on local hidden variables and showed that the violation thereof negates even what might be called "stochastic" determinism - at least in the framework of the Lorentzian space-time manifold (Redhead 1987:83, 103). With the acceptance of non-determinism as part of our world, we are confronted with the question: How can the possibility of non-determinism be explained and how can it be reconciled with determinism in one coherent conceptualization of the world? I use the philosophy of science that Immanuel Kant developed in the Critique of the Power of Judgment to develop an answer to these questions. In this part of his philosophy of science Kant is concerned with the possibility and conceivability of a spontaneous (albeit effective) causality in nature's producing its products. Kant developed the idea of this causality in analogy to the achievement of human ends, conceptualizing it as a capacity that non-extended wholes and parts have to be realized as parts forming an aggregated whole in nature. An important feature of my approach is that I develop a new interpretation of Kant's philosophy as presented in his well-known Critique of Pure Reason. In contrast with the two-object and twoaspect views in Kantian interpretation, I argue that the noumenal realm refers to an ontologically distinct realm outside nature, problematically assumed. This agrees with Kant's view in the Critique of the Power of Judgment where it is conceptualized as the substratum of nature and forms a central part of his philosophy of science. It is only when the noumenal (supersensible) realm is conceptualized in this manner that spontaneous causality becomes not only logically possible, but also conceivable within the framework of his philosophy. In my Kantian interpretation of quantum physics his concept of nature is taken as referring to the "classical realm" (where the theories of relativity would apply). His non-extended wholes and parts, which belong to the supersensible realm, find application in superpositions of states, which I argue belong to an ontologically distinct realm - the pre-measurement "quantum realm". Since the classical and quantum realms are taken as ontologically distinct realms, there is no contradiction in ascribing two heterogeneous laws, namely of deterministic and spontaneous causality (which is manifest in the reduction of the wave packet), to these realms which are combined in one description in quantum mechanics. In my view spontaneous causality grounds a non-spatiotemporal potentiality which explains why superpositions of states have the ability to collapse to reduced states. I develop these ideas in the framework of the various interpretations of quantum mechanics.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.