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International Conference on Security and Cryptography

A PUBLIC RANDOMNESS SERVICE

Michael J. Fischer, Michaela Iorga, René Peralta

Published Jan 1, 2011• 21 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We argue that it is time to design, implement, and deploy a trusted public randomness server on the Internet. NIST plans to deploy a prototype during 2011. We discuss some of the engineering choices that have been made as well as some of the issues currently under discussion.
DOI
10.5220/0003612604340438

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