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Secure Storage of Cryptographic Keys within Random Volumetric Materials

Roarke W. Horstmeyer, Benjamin Judkewitz, Ivo M. Vellekoop, Changhuei Yang

Published Jan 1, 2013• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We present a device to optically access gigabits of random keys stored within an object’s microscopic randomness. We demonstrate how this device may allow two parties to securely communicate without digitally saving any sensitive information.
DOI
10.1364/cleo_at.2013.af1h.6

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We describe an encrypted communication principle that forms a secure link between two parties without electronically saving either of their keys. Instead, random cryptographic bits are kept safe within the unique mesoscopic randomness of two volumetric scattering materials. We demonstrate how a shared set of patterned optical probes can generate 10 gigabits of statistically verified randomness between a pair of unique 2 mm(3) scattering objects. This shared randomness is used to facilitate information-theoretically secure communication following a modified one-time pad protocol. Benefits of volumetric physical storage over electronic memory include the inability to probe, duplicate or selectively reset any bits without fundamentally altering the entire key space. Our ability to securely couple the randomness contained within two unique physical objects can extend to strengthen hardware required by a variety of cryptographic protocols, which is currently a critically weak link in the security pipeline of our increasingly mobile communication culture.
We are developing a high density, high speed optical memory, using rare-earth doped hole- burning materials. These materials are theoretically capable of achieving storage densities of 1000 Gigabits/cm3 at input/output (I/O) rates of several gigabits/sec. One remarkable attribute of this storage concept is that both the temporal and spatial information encoded on a laser beam can be stored. Because both the temporal and spatial information can be stored, digital data can be recorded serially as a data or packet stream as well as holographically using the page format. During the past year we have achieved a breakthrough in demonstrating random access holographic data storage at high frame rates. Five hundred holograms were stored and retrieved with very good fidelity at 30 Hz (video rate). Each holographic image with 512 multiplied by 488 pixels could be randomly accessed during the storage and retrieval process. This frame rate is the highest demonstrated frame rate for any optical technique. This breakthrough was achieved through the invention of a memory architecture that allows multiple holographic frames to be stored without any mechanical beam scanning. In this new architecture multiplexing of 500 holograms was achieved by stepping the laser frequency over a range covered by high speed acousto-optic modulators (AOM).
The hallmark of the information age is the ease with which information is stored, accessed, and shared throughout the globe. This is enabled, in large part, by the simplicity of duplicating digital information without error. Unfortunately, an ever-growing consequence is the global threat to security and privacy enabled by our digital reliance. Specifically, modern secure communications and authentication suffer from formidable threats arising from the potential for copying of secret keys stored in digital media. With relatively little transfer of information, an attacker can impersonate a legitimate user, publish malicious software that is automatically accepted as safe by millions of computers, or eavesdrop on countless digital exchanges. To address this vulnerability, a new class of cryptographic devices known as physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are being developed. PUFs are modern realizations of an ancient concept, the physical key, and offer an attractive alternative for digital key storage. A user derives a digital key from the PUF’s physical behavior, which is sensitive to physical idiosyncrasies that are beyond fabrication tolerances. Thus, unlike conventional physical keys, a PUF cannot be duplicated and only the holder can extract the digital key. However, emerging machine learning (ML) methods are remarkably adept at learning behavior via training, and if such algorithms can learn to emulate a PUF, then the security is compromised. Unfortunately, such attacks are highly successful against conventional electronic PUFs. Here, we investigate ML attacks against a nonlinear silicon photonic PUF, a novel design that leverages nonlinear optical interactions in chaotic silicon microcavities. First, we investigate these devices’ resistance to cloning during fabrication and demonstrate their use as a source of large volumes of cryptographic key material. Next, we demonstrate that silicon photonic PUFs exhibit resistance to state-of-the-art ML attacks due to their nonlinearity and finally validate this resistance in an encryption scenario.
Abstract The primary objective of postquantum cryptography (also known as quantum‐resistant cryptography) is to develop the cryptographic systems that need to be robust against both quantum and classical computers, and can also interoperate with the existing communications protocols and networks. In an Internet of Things (IoT) environment, the communicated messages contain sensitive information that are transmitted over an open channel, where message integrity and data privacy become challenging tasks. Although several traditional cryptographic security protocols can be applied for IoT security and data privacy, such as authentication, access control, key agreement, and digital signature, but they are not resilient against quantum attacks. To overcome these issues, in this article, we first present an advanced and efficient construction of postquantum lattice‐based signcryption scheme, and then apply the constructed lattice‐based signcryption in IoT applications, where data sensed by the deployed IoT smart devices is securely stored at the cloud, via the gateway nodes (aggregators). The data stored at the cloud servers cannot be even modified by them due to the involved signatures generated by the aggregators. The formal security analysis shows the robustness of our designed lattice‐based signcryption scheme. Other detailed information security analysis and a performance analysis with the traditional number‐theoretical based public key cryptosystems show the efficacy, and significantly better security and functionality features of the proposed scheme under the lattice‐based postquantum context.