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Philosophy of Science

Explanation, Emergence, and Quantum Entanglement

Andreas Hüttemann

Published Jan 1, 2005• 63 citations
Publisher

Abstract

This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with thoroughgoing reductionist explanations. I will distinguish two kinds of microexplanation (or micro-‘reduction’). I will argue that even though quantum entanglement provides an example of the failure of one kind of microexplanation, it does not affect the other. Contrary to a recent paper by Kronz and Tiehen, I claim that the explanation of the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems is just as reductionist as it used to be in classical mechanics.

DOI
10.1086/428075

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This paper tries to get a grip on two seemingly conflicting intuitions about reductionism in quantum mechanics. On one hand it is received wisdom that quantum mechanics puts an end to ‘reductionism’. Quantum entanglement is responsible for such features of quantum mechanics as holism, the failure of supervenience, and emergence. While I agree with these claims, I will argue that it is only part of the story. Quantum mechanics provides us with thoroughgoing reductionist explanations. I will distinguish two kinds of microexplanation (or micro-‘reduction’). I will argue that even though quantum entanglement provides an example of the failure of one kind of microexplanation, it does not affect the other. Contrary to a recent paper by Kronz and Tiehen, I claim that the explanation of the dynamics of quantum mechanical systems is just as reductionist as it used to be in classical mechanics.
Quantum measurement is the most sensitive part of quantum mechanics and physics. Researching it can incite much philosophical debate. One of hot topics currently is reduction. Many people argue that it is received wisdom that quantum measurement puts an end to reductionism. Psychology, emergence and holism are their arguments against reduction. Is reduction really dead? I will not only argue that reduction in quantum measurement is still animate, but also try to put forward some effective means which can eliminate conflict between quantum measurement and reduction.
Abstract Quantum mechanics allegedly supports a holistic metaphysical moral: it is not the case that the intrinsic characters of all entangled wholes supervene on intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal arrangements of proper parts. According to one influential line of reasoning, such holistic supervenience failure follows more or less directly from quantum theory itself. One advertised consequence is the defeat of a natural, broadly reductive worldview commonly linked to Lewis's philosophical doctrine of Humean supervenience. However, the situation is more complicated, in both this and other respects, than it may first appear. This article is an opinionated overview of some especially interesting complications.
We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum entanglement, according to which entangled systems are characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence among the component particles. We compare this coherentist viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement and further articulated.
Since its inception, the intricate mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics has empowered physicists to describe and predict specific physical events known as quantum processes. However, this success in probabilistic predictions has been accompanied by a profound challenge in the ontological interpretation of the theory. This interpretative complexity stems from two key aspects. Firstly, quantum mechanics is a fundamental theory that, so far, is not derivable from any more basic scientific theory. Secondly, it delves into a realm of invisible phenomena that often contradicts our intuitive and commonsensical notions of matter and causality. Despite its notorious difficulties of interpretation, the most widely accepted set of views of quantum phenomena has been known as the Copenhagen interpretation since the beginning of quantum mechanics. According to these views, the correct ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics is incompatible with ontological realism in general and with philosophical materialism in particular. Anti-realist and anti-materialist interpretations of quantum matter have survived until today. This paper discusses these perspectives, arguing that materialistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are compatible with its mathematical formalism, while anti-realist and anti-materialist views are based on wrong philosophical assumptions. However, although physicalism provides a better explanation for quantum phenomena than idealism, its downward reductionism prevents it from accounting for more complex forms of matter, such as biological or sociocultural systems. Thus, the paper argues that neither physicalism nor idealism can explain the universe. I propose then a non-reductionistic form of materialism called inclusive materialism. The conclusion is that the acknowledgment of the qualitative irreducibility of ontological emergent levels above the purely physical one does not deny philosophical materialism but enriches it.
Ever since the advent of quantum mechanics, it has been clear that the atoms composing matter do not obey Newton's laws. Instead, their behavior is described by the Schroedinger equation. Surprisingly though, until recently, no clear explanation was given for why everyday objects, which are merely collections of atoms, are observed to obey Newton's laws. It would seem that, if quantum mechanics explains all the properties of atoms accurately, they, too, should obey quantum mechanics. This reasoning led some scientists to believe in a distinct macroscopic, or ``big and complicated,'' world in which quantum mechanics fails and classical mechanics takes over, although there has never been experimental evidence for such a failure. Even those who insisted that Newtonian mechanics would somehow emerge from the underlying quantum mechanics as the system became increasingly macroscopic were hindered by the lack of adequate experimental and theoretical tools. In the last decade, however, this quantum-to-classical transition has become accessible to experimental study and quantitative description, and the resulting insights are the subject of this article.