While classically cryptography is concerned with the problem of private communication among two entities, say players, in modern cryptography multi-player protocols play an important role.And among these, it is probably fair to say that secret sharing, and its stronger version verifiable secret sharing (VSS), as well as multi-party computation (MPC) belong to the most appealing and/or useful ones.The former two are basic tools to achieve better robustness of cryptographic schemes against malfunction or misuse by "decentralizing" the security from one single to a whole group of individuals (captured by the term threshold cryptography).The latter allows-at least in principle-to execute any collaboration among a group of players in a secure way that guarantees the correctness of the outcome but simultaneously respects the privacy of the participants.In this work, we study three aspects of secret sharing, VSS and MPC, which we denote by fundamentals, generality, and efficiency.By fundamentals we mean the quest for understanding why a protocol works and is secure in abstract (and hopefully simple) mathematical terms.By generality we mean generality with respect to the underlying mathematical structure, in other words, minimizing the mathematical axioms required to do some task.And efficiency of course deals with the improvement of protocols with respect to some meaningful complexity measure.We briefly summarize our main results.(1) We give a complete characterization of blackbox secret sharing in terms of simple algebraic conditions on the integer sharing coefficients, and we propose a black-box secret sharing scheme with minimal expansion factor.Note that, in contrast to the classical field-based secret sharing schemes, a black-box secret sharing scheme allows to share a secret sampled from an arbitrary Abelian group and requires only black-box access to the group operations and to random group elements.Such a scheme may be very useful in the construction of threshold cryptosystems based on groups with secret order (like RSA).(2) We show that without loss of efficiency, MPC can be based on arbitrary finite rings.This is in sharp contrast to the literature where essentially all MPC protocols require a much stronger mathematical structure, namely a field.Apart from its theoretical value, this can lead to efficiency improvements since it allows a greater freedom in the (mathematical) representation of the task that needs to be securely executed.(3) We propose a unified treatment of perfectly secure linear VSS and distributed commitments (a weaker version of the former), and we show that the security of such a scheme can be reduced to a linear algebra condition.The security of all known schemes follows as corollaries whose proofs are pure linear algebra arguments, in contrast v to some hybrid arguments used in the literature.(4) We construct a new unconditionally secure VSS scheme with minimized reconstruction complexity in the setting of a dishonest minority.This improves on the reconstruction complexity of the previously best known scheme without affecting the (asymptotic) complexity of the sharing phase.In the context of MPC with pre-processing, our scheme allows to improve the computation phase of earlier protocols without increasing the complexity of the pre-processing.(5) Finally, we consider commitment multiplication proofs, which allow to prove a multiplicative relation among three commitments, and which play a crucial role in computationally secure MPC.We study a non-interactive solution which works in a distributed-verifier setting and essentially consists of a few executions of Pedersen's VSS.We simplify and improve the protocol, and we point out a (previously overlooked) property which helps to construct non-interactive proofs of partial knowledge in this setting.This allows for instance to prove the knowledge of ℓ out of m given secrets, without revealing which ones.We also construct a noninteractive distributed-verifier proof of circuit satisfiability, which-in principle-allows to prove anything that can be proven without giving away the proof.
This work proposes a [Formula: see text]-dimensional quantum multi-secret sharing scheme with a cheat-detection mechanism. The dealer creates multiple secrets and distributes the shares of these secrets using multi-access structures and a monotone span program. The dealer detects the cheating of each participant using the black box’s cheat-detection mechanism. To detect the participants’ deceit, the dealer distributes secret shares’ shadows derived from a randomly invertible matrix [Formula: see text] to the participants, stored in the black box. The black box identifies the participant’s deceitful behavior during the secret recovery phase. Only honest participants authenticated by the black box acquire their secret shares to recover the multiple secrets. After the black box cheating verification, the participants reconstruct the secrets by utilizing the unitary operations and quantum Fourier transform. The proposed protocol is reliable in preventing attacks from eavesdroppers and participants. The scheme’s efficiency is demonstrated in different noise environments: dit-flip noise, [Formula: see text]-phase-flip noise and amplitude-damping noise, indicating its robustness in practical scenarios. The proposed protocol provides greater versatility, security and practicality.
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for computing a minimum-sized generating set of solvable black-box groups. Next, we consider the class Γd of black-box groups, where every non-abelian composition factor is isomorphic to a subgroup of the symmetric group Sd for a fixed d. We design polynomial-time quantum algorithms to compute the direct product decomposition of abelian factor groups and solve the constructive membership problem for factor groups of groups from Γd. With the help of these algorithms, we design a quantum algorithm for computing a chief series of black-box groups from Γd. Using the chief series, we construct a polynomial-time quantum algorithm for computing minimum generating sets of black-box groups from Γd. Finally, we show that the minimum generating set problem for general black-box groups is in NP∩coAM.
We first study the problem of doing Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) information theoretically secure for a general access structure.We do it in the model where private channels between players and a broadcast channel is given, and where an active, adaptive adversary can corrupt any set of players not in the access structure.In particular, we consider the complexity of protocols for this problem, as a function of the access structure and the number of players.For all access structures where VSS is possible at all, we show that, up to a polynomial time black-box reduction, the complexity of adaptively secure VSS is the same as that of ordinary secret sharing (SS), where security is only required against a passive, static adversary.Previously, such a connection was only known for linear secret sharing and VSS schemes.We then show an impossibility result indicating that a similar equivalence does hot hold for Multiparty Computation (MPC): we show that even if protocols are given black-box access for free to an idealized secret sharing scheme secure for the access structure in question, it is not possible to handle all relevant access structures efficiently, not even if the adversary is passive and static.In other words, general MPC can only be black-box reduced efficiently to secret sharing if extra properties of the secret sharing scheme used (such as linearity) are assumed.