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Archive for History of Exact Sciences

The Early Axiomatizations of Quantum Mechanics: Jordan, von Neumann and the Continuation of Hilbert's Program

JAN LACKI

Published Jan 1, 2000• 54 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/pl00007551

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In this paper I provide a detailed history of von Neumann’s “No Hidden Variables” theorem, and I argue it is a demonstration that his axiomatization mathematically captures a salient feature of the statistical interpretation (namely, that hidden variables are incompatible). I show that this reading of von Neumann’s theorem is obvious once one recalls several contextual factors of his work. First, his axiomatization was what I call a Hilbert-style axiomatic completion; indeed, it developed from work initiated by Hilbert (and Nordheim). Second, it was responsive to specific mathematical and theoretical problems faced by Dirac and Jordan’s statistical transformation theory (then called ‘quantum mechanics’). Third, the axiomatization was essentially completed already in his 1927 papers, at least concerning the status of hidden variables, and this would have been obvious to the audience for those papers. Thus, the theorem’s statement and proof were only necessary when the material was presented for a general mathematical audience, i.e., in his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics . With this reading in mind, his claim that quantum mechanics was in “compelling logical contradiction with causality” appears as a straightforward consequence of his theorem. I conclude by reassessing the theorem’s broader historical and scientific significance.

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Hilberts idea of a physical axiomatics: the analytical apparatus of quantum mechanics

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We discuss the Hilbert program for the axiomatization of physics in the context of what Hilbert and von Neumann came to call the analytical apparatus and its conditions of reality.We suggest that the idea of a physical logic is the basis for a physical mathematics and we use quantum mechanics as a paradigm case for axiomatics in the sense of Hilbert.Finite probability theory requires finite derivations in the measurement theory of QM and we give a polynomial formulation of local complementation for the metric induced on the topology of the Hilbert space.The conclusion hints at a constructivist physics.

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Hilbert's idea of a physical axiomatics: the analytical apparatus of quantum mechanics

Yvon Gauthier

We discuss the Hilbert program for the axiomatization of physics in the contextof\nwhat Hilbert and von Neumann came to call the analytical apparatus and\nitsconditions of reality. We suggest that the idea of a physical logic is the\nbasisfor a physical mathematics and we use quantum mechanics as a paradigm case\nforaxiomatics in the sense of Hilbert. Finite probability theory requires\nfinitederivations in the measurement theory of QM and we give a polynomial\nformulationof local complementation for the metric induced on the topology of\nthe Hilbertspace. The conclusion hints at a constructivist physics.

Journal of Physical Mathematics•Jan 1, 2010•2 citations
In this paper I provide a detailed history of von Neumann’s “No Hidden Variables” theorem, and I argue it is a demonstration that his axiomatization mathematically captures a salient feature of the statistical interpretation (namely, that hidden variables are incompatible). I show that this reading of von Neumann’s theorem is obvious once one recalls several contextual factors of his work. First, his axiomatization was what I call a Hilbert-style axiomatic completion; indeed, it developed from work initiated by Hilbert (and Nordheim). Second, it was responsive to specific mathematical and theoretical problems faced by Dirac and Jordan’s statistical transformation theory (then called ‘quantum mechanics’). Third, the axiomatization was essentially completed already in his 1927 papers, at least concerning the status of hidden variables, and this would have been obvious to the audience for those papers. Thus, the theorem’s statement and proof were only necessary when the material was presented for a general mathematical audience, i.e., in his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics . With this reading in mind, his claim that quantum mechanics was in “compelling logical contradiction with causality” appears as a straightforward consequence of his theorem. I conclude by reassessing the theorem’s broader historical and scientific significance.
We discuss the Hilbert program for the axiomatization of physics in the context of what Hilbert and von Neumann came to call the analytical apparatus and its conditions of reality.We suggest that the idea of a physical logic is the basis for a physical mathematics and we use quantum mechanics as a paradigm case for axiomatics in the sense of Hilbert.Finite probability theory requires finite derivations in the measurement theory of QM and we give a polynomial formulation of local complementation for the metric induced on the topology of the Hilbert space.The conclusion hints at a constructivist physics.
We discuss the Hilbert program for the axiomatization of physics in the contextof\nwhat Hilbert and von Neumann came to call the analytical apparatus and\nitsconditions of reality. We suggest that the idea of a physical logic is the\nbasisfor a physical mathematics and we use quantum mechanics as a paradigm case\nforaxiomatics in the sense of Hilbert. Finite probability theory requires\nfinitederivations in the measurement theory of QM and we give a polynomial\nformulationof local complementation for the metric induced on the topology of\nthe Hilbertspace. The conclusion hints at a constructivist physics.