The hidden variable theorem due to von Neumann is deduced in a physically transparent manner. As a result it is clear that the theorem is correct only if one requires that these hidden variables merely enlarge the set of observables employed at present in quantum mechanics. The theorem cannot be interpreted to mean that one cannot introduce such additional variables in order (1) to specify a state with classical completeness and (2) to define the usual observables as statistical parameters.
The hidden variable theorem due to von Neumann is deduced in a physically transparent manner. As a result it is clear that the theorem is correct only if one requires that these hidden variables merely enlarge the set of observables employed at present in quantum mechanics. The theorem cannot be interpreted to mean that one cannot introduce such additional variables in order (1) to specify a state with classical completeness and (2) to define the usual observables as statistical parameters.
It is shown that, although correct mathematically, the celebrated 1932 theorem of von Neumann which is often interpreted as proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" in Quantum Mechanics, is in fact based on an assumption which is physically not reasonable. Apart from that, the alleged conclusion of von Neumann proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" was already set aside in 1952 by the counterexample of the possibility of a physical theory, such as given by what is usually called the "Bohmian Mechanics". Similar arguments apply to other two well known mathematical theorems, namely, of Gleason, and of Kochen and Specker, which have often been seen as equally proving the impossibility of the existence of "hidden variables" in Quantum Mechanics.
Introduction To know the quantum mechanical state of a system implies, in general, only statistical restrictions on the results of measurements. It seems interesting to ask if this statistical element be thought of as arising, as in classical statistical mechanics, because the states in question are averages over better defined states for which individually the results would be quite determined. These hypothetical ‘dispersion free’ states would be specified not only by the quantum mechanical state vector but also by additional ‘hidden variables’ – ‘hidden’ because if states with prescribed values of these variables could actually be prepared, quantum mechanics would be observably inadequate. Whether this question is indeed interesting has been the subject of debate. The present paper does not contribute to that debate. It is addressed to those who do find the question interesting, and more particularly to those among them who believe that ‘the question concerning the existence of such hidden variables received an early and rather decisive answer in the form of von Neumann's proof on the mathematical impossibility of such variables in quantum theory.’ An attempt will be made to clarify what von Neumann and his successors actually demonstrated. This will cover, as well as von Neumann's treatment, the recent version of the argument by Jauch and Piron, and the stronger result consequent on the work of Gleason. It will be urged that these analyses leave the real question untouched.
In his book \textit{The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics}, published in 1932, J. von Neumann performed an analysis of the consequences of introducing hidden parameters (hidden variables) into quantum mechanics. He showed that hidden variables cannot be incorporated into the existing theory of quantum mechanics without major modifications, and concluded that if they did exist, the theory would have already failed in situations where it has been successfully applied. von Neumann left open the possibility that the theory is not complete, and his analysis for internal consistency is the best that can be done for a self-referenced logical system (Gödel's theorem). This analysis had been taken as an ``incorrect proof" against the existence of hidden variables. von Neumann's so-called proof isn't even wrong as such a proof does not exist. One of the earliest attempts at a hidden variable theory was by D. Bohm, and because there were no experimental consequences, W. Pauli referred to it as an ``uncashable check." To our knowledge, a successful hidden variable extension to quantum mechanics with testable consequences has not yet been produced, suggesting that von Neumann's analysis is worthy of rehabilitation, which we attempt to provide in a straightforward manner.
This article reviews the history of J. von Neumann’s analysis of hidden variables in quantum mechanics and the subsequent analysis by others. In his book The Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, published in 1932, von Neumann performed an analysis of the consequences of introducing hidden parameters (hidden variables) into quantum mechanics. He arrived at two principal conclusions: first, hidden variables cannot be incorporated into the existing theory of quantum mechanics without major modifications, and second, if they did exist, the theory would have already failed in situations where it has been successfully applied. This analysis has been taken as an “incorrect proof” against the existence of hidden variables, possibly due to a mistranslation of the German word prufen. von Neumann’s so-called proof isn’t even wrong as such a proof does not exist, but it is an examination of the limitations imposed by internal consistency of the Hilbert space formulation of the theory. One of the earliest attempts to eliminate uncertainty, by D. Bohm, requires a major modification of quantum mechanics (observables are not represented by Hermitian operators), which supports von Neumann’s first principal conclusion. However, testing the Bohm theory requires constructing a physically impossible initial state. As such, the theory has no experimental consequences, so W. Pauli referred to it as an “uncashable check”. As there are no observable consequences, the Bohm theory is possibly a counterexample to von Neumann’s second conclusion that hidden variables in particular would have already led to a failure of the theory.
Abstract Hidden variables are hypothetical parameters that, if known, would deterministically specify quantum measurement outcomes, aiming to restore determinism and causality typical of classical mechanics. This work provides a modern and pedagogical exposition of John von Neumann’s 1932 proof on the incompatibility of hidden variables with quantum mechanics. We detail his two main conclusions: (1) dispersion-free ensembles (as defined within the framework of hidden variable theories) are incompatible with quantum mechanics; and (2) the quantum state provides a complete description of physical reality. We critically analyze the key assumptions in von Neumann’s proof, highlighting later challenges—particularly John Bell’s critique and the development of contextual hidden-variable theories by Kochen and Specker. This discussion clarifies von Neumann’s historical role as a pioneer in this debate, while showing how modern hidden-variable theories, such as Bohmian mechanics, remain compatible with quantum predictions. Conversion tables are included between this article’s notation and von Neumann’s original book.
In this paper I provide a detailed history of von Neumann’s “No Hidden Variables” theorem, and I argue it is a demonstration that his axiomatization mathematically captures a salient feature of the statistical interpretation (namely, that hidden variables are incompatible). I show that this reading of von Neumann’s theorem is obvious once one recalls several contextual factors of his work. First, his axiomatization was what I call a Hilbert-style axiomatic completion; indeed, it developed from work initiated by Hilbert (and Nordheim). Second, it was responsive to specific mathematical and theoretical problems faced by Dirac and Jordan’s statistical transformation theory (then called ‘quantum mechanics’). Third, the axiomatization was essentially completed already in his 1927 papers, at least concerning the status of hidden variables, and this would have been obvious to the audience for those papers. Thus, the theorem’s statement and proof were only necessary when the material was presented for a general mathematical audience, i.e., in his 1932 Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics . With this reading in mind, his claim that quantum mechanics was in “compelling logical contradiction with causality” appears as a straightforward consequence of his theorem. I conclude by reassessing the theorem’s broader historical and scientific significance.