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Philosophy of Science

Causation, Robustness, and EPR

Richard Healey

Published Jun 1, 1992• 26 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In his recent work, Michael Redhead (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990) has introduced a condition he calls robustness which, he argues, a relation must satisfy in order to be causal. He has used this condition to argue further that EPR-type correlations are neither the result of a direct causal connection between the correlated events, nor the result of a common cause associated with the source of the particle pairs which feature in these events. Andrew Elby (1992) has used this same condition as a premise in an independent argument for the conclusion that EPR-type correlations cannot be causally explained (except, perhaps, by a nonlocal hidden variable theory). I wish to argue here that robustness is itself too fragile a notion to support such conclusions.

DOI
10.1086/289668

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In his recent work, Michael Redhead (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990) has introduced a condition he calls robustness which, he argues, a relation must satisfy in order to be causal. He has used this condition to argue further that EPR-type correlations are neither the result of a direct causal connection between the correlated events, nor the result of a common cause associated with the source of the particle pairs which feature in these events. Andrew Elby (1992) has used this same condition as a premise in an independent argument for the conclusion that EPR-type correlations cannot be causally explained (except, perhaps, by a nonlocal hidden variable theory). I wish to argue here that robustness is itself too fragile a notion to support such conclusions.
It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90's saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalized PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR corrleations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC.
There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one, concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correlations in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment, and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments. But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work, it is only in the last two decades that it has become recognizably and explicitly a debate about causal inference in the quantum realm. The bulk of this paper is devoted to a review of three influential arguments in the philosophical literature that aim to show that causal models for the EPR correlations are impossible, due to Bas Van Fraassen, Daniel Hausman and Huw Price. I contend that all these arguments are inconclusive since they contain premises or presuppositions that are false, unwarranted, or at least controversial. Five different common cause models are outlined that seem perfectly viable for the EPR correlations. These models are then employed to illustrate various difficulties with the premises and presuppositions underlying Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and Price’s arguments. In all these cases it is argued that the difficulties cut deep against these authors’ own theories of causation and causal inference. My conclusions are that causal models for the EPR correlations remain viable, that philosophical work is still required to assess their relative virtues, and that in any case the mere theoretical conceivability and empirical possibility of these models sheds doubts over Van Fraassen’s, Hausman’s and (important elements in) Price’s theories of causation and causal inference.
This Ph.D. thesis is about causality in Quantum Mechanics, namely about the possibility to provide a causal explanation for quantum Einstein – Podolsky – Rosen (EPR) correlations.The well-known interpretation of the Bell’s Theorem by Bastian Van Fraassen, who inferred that quantum correlations cannot be embedded in any causal model, compels us to suppose that microscopic nature cannot have a causal structure and that causality is an anthropological concept.However, this interpretation is not commonly accepted and this doctoral thesis is the first general overview of some recent works about causal explanation for EPR correlations. Particularly, it analyses the possible causal explanations for the EPR/Bohm experiments by means of the Hans Reichenbach’s model, by means of backward causation models, and by means of models that imply a direct causal link. In order to do it, it pays particular attention to the Relativistic space-time features and it considers the studies in the History of Philosophy about the link between causal arrow and temporal arrow. Moreover, this work aims to endorse the idea that the best way to explain EPR/Bohm correlations causally is to adopt an indeterministic non-Reichenbachian common cause model, particularly Cartwright’sgeneral forksmodel.My conclusion is that causal models for quantum correlations remain viable, and that there is no contrast between genuinely indeterministic interpretation of Quantum Theory and causal explanation, with the philosophical implication that the Causal Realism is still acceptable.
Bell's Theorem demonstrates that factorizable theories for the EPR experiment (EPR) cannot reproduce the quantum correlations. Factorizability is motivated by various locality conditions. So to understand the nature of nonlocality in EPR, we first need to understand the conceptual relations between factorizability, these various locality conditions and the nature of the quantum correlations. That is the main focus of my thesis. My main conclusion is that these conceptual relations are more subtle than the literature has usually suggested. Chapter 1 is a general introduction. In Chapter 2, I review the general framework of factorizable stochastic theories for EPR. I argue that factorizability can be motivated by various locality conditions, even in theories that admit time-dependent states and take the measurement interactions to be neither instantaneous, nor simultaneous. In Chapter 3, I focus on Cartwright' s (1989) and Humphreys' (1989) theories of probabilistic causation for singular events, which are based on modifications of traditional causal linear modelling. I argue (against Cartwright) that local models for EPR in the framework of these theories are committed to factorizability; and so they cannot reproduce the EPR correlations. In Chapter 4, I turn to Stochastic-Einstein Locality (SEL). Hellman (1982) proposed that SEL with some provisos characterizes the No-Superluminal-Action (NSA) of the Special Theory of Relativity (STR), and he argued that SEL is not violated in EPR. Butterfield (1994) proposed that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) characterizes the lack of superluminal Lewisian causation, and he argued that SEL is violated in EPR. I argue that SEL (without Hellman's provisos) is motivated by NSA and spatiotemporal separability. Thus, the violation of SEL might arise from the failure of spatiotemporal separability. And this failure is compatible with NSA and superluminal Lewisian causation. Accordingly, Hellman's and Butterfield's views need not be in tension. In Chapter 5, I focus on the implications for nonlocality of Jarrett's (1984) analysis of factorizability into "locality" and "completeness". I argue that although this analysis cannot distinguish between failures of factorizability which are compatible with STR and those which are not, it is significant for clarifying the implications of Bell's theorem for nonlocality. In Chapter 6, I qmsider three arguments that are intended to deny superluminal causal propagation in EPR, and a fourth argument that is intended to establish the opposite conclusion. I argue that in various ways these arguments have gone wrong. Three of these argument rely on implicit assumptions that have been overlooked. Accordingly, two of them reached a reasonable conclusion, i.e. the failure of separability, for the wrong reasons; whereas the third reached a wrong conclusion, i.e. that the failure of the contiguity of causal processes explains the failure of factorizability in EPR. The fourth relies on a wrong assumption, and thus it reaches a too strong conclusion, that the EPR correlations require superluminal action. My main conclusion is that the quantum correlations require nonseparability . In Chapter 7, I focus on decision theory in the context of EPR. In both EPR and the famous Newcomb's problem (NewProb), there are unscreenable-off correlations. I argue that NewProb can be related to EPR, in the sense that a NewProb can be realized by that experiment.