Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Lecture notes in electrical engineering

Automatic Security Analysis for Group Key Exchange Protocol: A Case Study in Burmester-Desmedt Protocol

Ren Chunyang, Wang Hongyuan, Zhang Zijian, Liao Lejian

Published Jan 1, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-26007-0_3

Related papers

Computationally sound symbolic security reduction analysis of the group key exchange protocols using bilinear pairings

Zijian Zhang, Liehuang Zhu, Lejian Liao +1 more

Information Sciences•May 6, 2012•11 citations

Analysis and Improvement of an Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol

Jiaxin Pan, Libin Wang, Changshe Ma

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 2011•3 citations

Member Tampering Attack on Burmester-Desmedt Group Key Exchange Protocol and Its Countermeasure

Da‐Zhi Sun, Yangguang Tian

With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis.

Mathematics•Oct 8, 2022•3 citations

Security Analysis on a Group Key Transfer Protocol Based on Secret Sharing

Mijin Kim, Namje Park, Dongho Won

Lecture notes in electrical engineering•Aug 19, 2013•1 citation

A generalization of Burmester-Desmedt GKE based on a non-abelian finite group action

Daniel Camazón Portela, Álvaro Otero Sánchez, Juan Antonio López Ramos

The advent of large-scale quantum computers implies that our existing public-key cryptography infrastructure has become insecure. That means that the privacy of many mobile applications involving dynamic peer groups, such as multicast messaging or pay-per-view, could be compromised. In this work we propose a generalization of the well known group key exchange protocol proposed by Burmester and Desmedt to the non-abelian case by the use of finite group actions and we prove that the presented protocol is secure in Katz and Yung's model.

arXiv:2412.00387•Nov 30, 2024•0 citations

Key agreement protocols and their security analysis: Extended Abstract

Simon Blake-Wilson⋆⋆, Don B. Johnson, Alfred Menezes

Lecture notes in computer science•Jan 1, 1997•596 citations
With the rapid development of cloud computing and mobile networks, more and more application scenarios require a secret group key for secure communication. Group Key Exchange (GKE) protocol provides a secret group key for three or more members. Burmester and Desmedt presented an influential GKE protocol, which has a broadcast version and a cyclic version. In this paper, we investigate the security weaknesses of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We report that both the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol suffer member tampering attacks if the two members that belong to both group A and group B are corrupted. That is, two corrupted members can add some unknowing members of group A to group B and trick the legal members of group B to believe that these unknowing members share the secret group key with them after a protocol run. Furthermore, to defeat the member tampering attack, we propose digital signature-based improvements on the broadcast version and the cyclic version of the Burmester-Desmedt protocol. We hope our research results will encourage the development of more robust and effective GKE protocols that stand rigorous security analysis.
The advent of large-scale quantum computers implies that our existing public-key cryptography infrastructure has become insecure. That means that the privacy of many mobile applications involving dynamic peer groups, such as multicast messaging or pay-per-view, could be compromised. In this work we propose a generalization of the well known group key exchange protocol proposed by Burmester and Desmedt to the non-abelian case by the use of finite group actions and we prove that the presented protocol is secure in Katz and Yung's model.