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Are quantum mechanical transition probabilities classical? A critique of Cartwright's interpretation of quantum theory

Vandana Shiva

Published Jul 1, 1980• 1 citation
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf00413474

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This paper deals with Nancy Cartwright's views on the measurement problem in Quantum Mechanics, as exposed in her book How the Laws of Physics Lie. It will be argued that the fundamental object of Quantum Mechanics is not the transition rate, but the wave function, and that many laws of physics tell undisputable truths. Furthermore the positions she defends about the reduction of the wave packet do not address the fundamental issue, i.e. the duality of a world where quantum and classical objects coexist and interact. I suggest that the main problem with Nancy Cartwright's positions is her difficulty in accepting that the contradiction at the basis of Quantum Mechanics, i.e. the simultaneous corpuscular and wave like nature of quantum objects, is a fact of nature.
We present a critique of the many-world interpretation of quantum mechanics, based on different "pictures" that describe the time evolution of an isolated quantum system. Without an externally imposed frame to restrict these possible pictures, the theory cannot yield non-trivial interpretational statements. This is analogous to Goodman's famous "grue-bleen" problem of language and induction. Using a general framework applicable to many kinds of dynamical theories, we try to identify the kind of additional structure (if any) required for the meaningful interpretation of a theory. We find that the "grue-bleen" problem is not restricted to quantum mechanics, but also affects other theories including classical Hamiltonian mechanics. For all such theories, absent external frame information, an isolated system has no interpretation.