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IEEE International Conference on Advanced Networks and Telecommunications Systems

A quantum Diffie-Hellman protocol using commuting transformations

Pranav Subramaniam, Abhishek Parakh

Published Dec 1, 2014• 8 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In this paper, a quantum version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is developed using the commutative rotation transformations. Qubits rotated by secret rotation angles and exchanged over a quantum channel are appropriately measured to form a secret shared key. Additional "slack" rotations are used to ensure that measurement of the commutative transformations always result in the same bit value, for legitimate party, in the absence of an eavesdropper. The performance of the quantum protocol is evaluated in terms of the number of exchanges needed for a given key size and the probability of detecting an eavesdropper.

DOI
10.1109/ants.2014.7057257

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In this paper, a quantum version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is developed using the commutative rotation transformations. Qubits rotated by secret rotation angles and exchanged over a quantum channel are appropriately measured to form a secret shared key. Additional "slack" rotations are used to ensure that measurement of the commutative transformations always result in the same bit value, for legitimate party, in the absence of an eavesdropper. The performance of the quantum protocol is evaluated in terms of the number of exchanges needed for a given key size and the probability of detecting an eavesdropper.
In this paper, a quantum version of Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is developed using the commutative rotation transformations. Qubits rotated by secret rotation angles and exchanged over a quantum channel are appropriately measured to form a secret shared key. Additional 'slack' rotations are used to ensure that measurement of the commutative transformations always result in the same bit value, for legitimate party, in the absence of an eavesdropper. The performance of the quantum protocol is evaluated in terms of the number of exchanges needed for a given key size and the probability of detecting an eavesdropper. We also compare the proposed protocol with BB84.
The Diffie–Hellman key exchange plays a crucial role in conventional cryptography, as it allows two legitimate users to establish a common, usually ephemeral, secret key. Its security relies on the discrete-logarithm problem, which is considered to be a mathematical one-way function, while the final key is formed by random independent actions of the two users. In the present work we investigate the extension of Diffie–Hellman key exchange to the quantum setting, where the two legitimate users exchange independent random quantum states. The proposed protocol relies on the bijective mapping of integers onto a set of symmetric coherent states, and we investigate the regime of parameters for which the map behaves as a quantum one-way function. Its security is analyzed in the framework of minimum-error-discrimination and photon-number-splitting attacks, while its performance and the challenges in a possible realization are also discussed.
This paper implements the concepts of perfect forward secrecy and the Diffie-Hellman key exchange using EPR pairs to establish and share a secret key between two non-authenticated parties and transfer messages between them without the risk of compromise. Current implementations of quantum cryptography are based on the BB84 protocol, which is susceptible to siphoning attacks on the multiple photons emitted by practical laser sources. This makes BB84-based quantum cryptography protocol unsuitable for network computing environments. Diffie-Hellman does not require the two parties to be mutually authenticated to each other, yet it can provide a basis for a number of authenticated protocols, most notably the concept of perfect forward secrecy. The work proposed in this paper provides a new direction in utilizing quantum EPR pairs in quantum key exchange. Although, classical cryptography boasts of efficient and robust protocols like the Diffie-Hellman key exchange, in the current times, with the advent of quantum computing they are very much vulnerable to eavesdropping and cryptanalytic attacks. Using quantum cryptographic principles, however, these classical encryption algorithms show more promise and a more robust and secure structure for applications. The unique properties of quantum EPR pairs also, on the other hand, go a long way in removing attacks like eavesdropping by their inherent nature of one particle of the pair losing its state if a measurement occurs on the other. The concept of perfect forward secrecy is revisited in this paper to attribute tighter security to the proposed protocol.
Public key cryptography is extensively used for encryption, signing contracts and secure exchanges over the unreliable network.The findings of Shor in 1994, of a powerful algorithm which was based on quantum mechanics for computing discrete logarithms and factoring large integers sabotaged the security presumptions upon which the currently used public key cryptographic protocols are based, like ElGamal, RSA and ECC.However, few cryptosystems, known as post quantum cryptosystems, while not currently in wide use are considered to be resistant to such attacks.In this paper, a quantum version of ElGamal Cryptosystem is proposed whose security relies on the commutative rotation transformations and measurements in computational basis of qubits.An understanding of the new scheme over the quantum channels is provided.The proposed cryptosystem allows the party to send messages in the form of qubits over a quantum channel.Also the proposed protocol provides an opportunity for two parties to exchange keys which is considered as one of the major concerns while developing post quantum cryptosystems.
This paper proposes a novel cryptographic key exchange protocol inspired by quantum mechanics, specifically leveraging the principles of entanglement to enhance security against eavesdropping attacks. Traditional classical key exchange protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman, are susceptible to compromise due to the inherent vulnerabilities in mathematical computations and key distribution. Our approach introduces a verification step based on a measurement of an entangled state, providing a fundamentally different security model. The shared key is derived from the outcome of this measurement, and any attempt to intercept or manipulate the entangled state during transmission will inevitably introduce detectable errors, thus alerting the legitimate parties. We formalize the protocol with mathematical equations, outlining the key generation process and the eavesdropping detection mechanism. The core of the system relies on the uncertainty principle and the correlated nature of entangled states. This system presents a potential pathway towards more robust key exchange mechanisms, particularly as classical cryptography faces increasing pressure from advancements in computational power. The protocol's security is directly tied to the difficulty of accurately replicating the entangled state and performing the required measurement, offering a defense against sophisticated attacks.