A class of theories alternative to standard quantum mechanics, including that of Ghirardi et al ('GRWP'), postulates that when a quantum superposition becomes amplified to the point that the superposed states reach some level of 'macroscopic distinctness', then some non-quantum-mechanical principle comes into play and realizes one or other of the two macroscopic outcomes. Without specializing to any particular theory of this class, I ask how far such 'macrorealistic' theories are generically constrained, if one insists that the physical reduction process should respect Einstein locality, by the results of existing EPR-Bell experiments. I conclude that provided one does not demand that the prescription for reduction respects Lorentz invariance, at least some theories of this type, while in principle inevitably making some predictions that conflict with those of standard quantum mechanics, are not refuted by any existing experiment.
A class of theories alternative to standard quantum mechanics, including that of Ghirardi et al ('GRWP'), postulates that when a quantum superposition becomes amplified to the point that the superposed states reach some level of 'macroscopic distinctness', then some non-quantum-mechanical principle comes into play and realizes one or other of the two macroscopic outcomes. Without specializing to any particular theory of this class, I ask how far such 'macrorealistic' theories are generically constrained, if one insists that the physical reduction process should respect Einstein locality, by the results of existing EPR-Bell experiments. I conclude that provided one does not demand that the prescription for reduction respects Lorentz invariance, at least some theories of this type, while in principle inevitably making some predictions that conflict with those of standard quantum mechanics, are not refuted by any existing experiment.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time tf---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system B. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system A simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on the premises of local realism. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsifiable by these experiments. We propose macroscopic EPR and GHZ experiments using spins Sθ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations Uθ determining the measurement settings θ are devices that create macroscopic superposition states. For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available, macroscopic realism (MR) posits a predetermined outcome for a measurement Sθ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) posits MR for the system prior to the interaction Uθ. Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after Uθ, at the time tf (when the system is prepared for a final "pointer" measurement), the outcome of Sθ not being changed by interactions that might occur at a remote system B. The premise also posits that if the outcome for SθA of a system A can be predicted by a pointer measurement on a system B defined after the interaction fixing the setting at B, then the outcome for SθA is determined at this time. The GHZ predictions negate dMR but are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises based on wMR for the set-up proposed by Schrödinger, where one measures two complementary spins simultaneously, "one by direct, the other by indirect" measurement. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find similarly that an EPR argument can be based on a weak form of local realism not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell tests.
As contrasted with physicists to idolize Bell's theorem and quantum nonlocality, we argue that quantum mechanics (QM), in reality, respects the principles of a macroscopic realism (PMRs). The current QM to tell us that "... the state of a system can be instantaneously changed by a distant measurement >..." cannot be treated as a physical theory. Its key statements - that the EPR-Bell experiments to violate Bell's inequality verify nonlocality, and nonlocal correlations respect special relativity - are false. Both the EPR-Bell experiments and theorems to support the "non-signalling principle" are based on the implicit assumption that all quantum postulates and, in particular, Born's averaging rule are fully applicable to Cat states. However, this is not the case. Introducing observables (e.g., correlations) for Cat states violates the correspondence principle. Pure (macro- and micro-)Cat states must be governed both by the PMRs and superposition principle. Our (macrorealistic) model of a one-dimensional completed scattering shows how these principles coexist with each other, in the case of a one-electron micro-Cat state.
Introduction The historical development of scientific progress teaches us that every theory that was established and broadly accepted at a certain time was later inevitably replaced by a deeper and more fundamental theory of which the old one remains a special case. One celebrated example is Newtonian (classical) mechanics, which was superseded by quantum mechanics at the beginning of the last century. It is natural to ask whether in a similar manner there could be logically consistent theories that are more generic than quantum theory itself. It could then turn out that quantum mechanics is an effective description of such a theory, only valid within our current restricted domain of experience. At present, quantum theory has been tested against very specific alternative theories that, both mathematically and in their concepts, are distinctly different. Instances of such alternative theories are non-contextual hidden-variable theories [1], local hidden-variable theories [2], crypto-nonlocal hidden-variable theories [3, 4], or some nonlinear variants of the Schrödinger equation [5–8]. Currently, many groups are working on improving experimental conditions to be able to test alternative theories based on various collapse models [9–14]. The common trait of all these proposals is to suppress one or the other counterintuitive feature of quantum mechanics and thus keep some of the basic notions of a classical worldview intact. Specifically, hidden-variable models would allow us to preassign definite values to outcomes of all measurements; collapse models are mechanisms for restraining superpositions between macroscopically distinct states, and nonlinear extensions of the Schrödinger equation may admit more localized solutions for wave-packet dynamics, thereby resembling localized classical particles.
The postulate of the collapse of the wave-function stands between the microscopic, quantum world, and the macroscopic world. Because of this intermediate position, the collapse process cannot be examined with the formalism of the quantum mechanics (QM), neither with that of classical mechanics. This fact makes some physicists propose interpretations of QM, which avoid this postulate. However, the common procedure used in that is making assumptions incompatible with the QM formalism. The present work discusses the most popular interpretations. It is shown that because of such assumptions those interpretations fail, i.e. predict for some experiments results which differ from the QM predictions. Despite that, special attention is called to a proposal of S. Gao, the only one which addresses and tries to solve an obvious and major contradiction. A couple of theorems are proved for showing that the collapse postulate is necessary in the QM. Although non-explainable with the quantum formalism, this postulate cannot be denied, otherwise one comes to conclusions which disagree with the QM. It is also proved here that the idea of “collapse at a distance” is problematic especially in relativistic cases, and is a misunderstanding. Namely, in an entanglement of two quantum systems, assuming that the measurement of one of the systems (accompanied by collapse of that system on one of its states) collapses the other systems, too without the second system being measured, which leads to a contradiction.
Quantum mechanics is an immensely successful theory, occupying a unique position in the history of science. It has solved mysteries ranging from macroscopic superconductivity to the microscopic theory of elementary particles and has provided deep insights into the nature of vacuum on the one hand and the description of the nucleon on the other. Whole new fields such as quantum optics and quantum electronics owe their very existence to this body of knowledge. However, despite the stunning successes of quantum mechanics, there is no general agreement on the conceptual foundations and interpretation of the subject. The theory provides unambiguous information about the outcome of a measurement of a physical object. However, many feel that it does not provide a satisfactory answer to the nature of the “reality” we should attribute to the physical objects between the acts of measurement. The conceptual difficulty comes about because the wave function |ψ〉 is usually given by a coherent superposition of various distinguishable experimental outcomes. If we denote the collection of states that represent the possible outcomes of an experiment by |ψ j 〉, then |ψ〉 = ∑ j c j |ψ j 〉 where c j = 〈ψ j |ψ〉. The probability of the outcome |ψ j 〉 is P j =|c j | 2 . In the process of measurement, the so called collapse of the wave function takes place and a single, definite state |ψ i 〉 of the physical object is chosen. The difficulty comes about in the interpretation of the mechanism by which this definite state is chosen from amongst all the possible outcomes.