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Physical Review A

Strong versions of Bell’s theorem

Henry Pierce Stapp

Published May 1, 1994• 10 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Technical aspects of a recently constructed strong version of Bell's theorem are discussed. The theorem assumes neither hidden variables nor factorization, and neither determinism nor counterfactual definiteness. It deals directly with logical connections. Hence its relationship with modal logic needs to be described. It is shown that the proof can be embedded in an orthodox modal logic, and hence its compatibility with modal logic assured, but that this embedding weakens the theorem by introducing as added assumptions the conventionalities of the particular modal logic that is adopted. This weakening is avoided in the recent proof by using directly the set-theoretic conditions entailed by the locality assumption.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.49.3182

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Technical aspects of a recently constructed strong version of Bell's theorem are discussed. The theorem assumes neither hidden variables nor factorization, and neither determinism nor counterfactual definiteness. It deals directly with logical connections. Hence its relationship with modal logic needs to be described. It is shown that the proof can be embedded in an orthodox modal logic, and hence its compatibility with modal logic assured, but that this embedding weakens the theorem by introducing as added assumptions the conventionalities of the particular modal logic that is adopted. This weakening is avoided in the recent proof by using directly the set-theoretic conditions entailed by the locality assumption.
Bell's theorem is 50 years old. Still there is a controversy about its implications. Much of it has its roots in confusion regarding the premises from which the theorem can be derived. Some claim that a derivation of Bell's inequalities requires just locality assumption, and nothing more. Violations of the inequalities are then interpreted as ``nonlocality'' or ``quantum nonlocality''. We show that such claims are unfounded and that every derivation of Bell's inequalities requires a premise -- in addition to locality and freedom of choice -- which is either assumed tacitly, or unconsciously, or is embedded in a single compound condition (like Bell's ``local causality''). The premise is equivalent to the assumption of existence of additional variables which do not appear in the quantum formalism (in form of determinism, or joint probability for outcomes of all conceivable measurements, or ``additional causes`'', or ``hidden variables'', ``complete description of the state'' or counterfactual definiteness, etc.). A certain irony is that perhaps the main message of violation of Bell's inequalities is that our notion of locality should be based on an operationally well-defined no-signalling condition, rather than on local causality.
We argue that for the proof of Bell's theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are necessary. The key formula E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ)dλE(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ) dλE(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space ΛΛΛ, usually interpreted as some space of `hidden variables', can be constructed for an arbitrary `field of discourse' using Stone's theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence -- the non-existence of information which suggest a dependence -- of the free decisions of the experimenters from everything else. To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ.E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ) dλ.E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ. This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the consequence of the violation of Bell's inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified, without any loopholes left. We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak (signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.
We formally prove the existence of an enduring incongruence pervading a widespread interpretation of the Bell inequality and explain how to rationally avoid it with a natural assumption justified by explicit reference to a mathematical property of Bell’s probabilistic model. Although the amendment does not alter the relevance of the theorem regarding local realism, it brings back Bell theorem from the realm of philosophical discussions about counterfactual conditionals to the concrete experimental arena.
Experiments motivated by Bell's theorem have led some physicists to conclude that quantum theory is nonlocal. However, the theoretical basis for such claims is usually taken to be Bell's Theorem, which shows only that if certain predictions of quantum theory are correct, and a strong hidden-variable assumption is valid, then a certain locality condition must fail. This locality condition expresses the idea that what an experimenter freely chooses to measure in one spacetime region can have no effect of any kind in a second region situated spacelike relative to the first. The experimental results conform closely to the predictions of quantum theory in such cases, but the most reasonable conclusion to draw is not that locality fails, but rather that the hidden-variable assumption is false. For this assumption conflicts with the quantum precept that unperformed experiments have no outcomes. The present paper deduces the failure of this locality condition directly from the precepts of quantum theory themselves, in a way that generates no inconsistency or any conflict with the predictions of relativistic quantum field theory.