This paper examines the transformation which occurs in Heisenberg's understanding of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics between 1926 and 1928. After his initial but unsuccessful attempt to construct new quantum concepts of space and time, in 1927 Heisenberg presented an operational definition of concepts such as ‘position’ and ‘velocity’. Yet, after discussions with Bohr, he came to the realisation that classical concepts such as position and momentum are indispensable in quantum mechanics in spite of their limited applicability. This transformation in Heisenberg's thought, which centres on his theory of meaning, marks the critical turning point in his interpretation of quantum mechanics.
This paper examines the transformation which occurs in Heisenberg's understanding of indeterminacy in quantum mechanics between 1926 and 1928. After his initial but unsuccessful attempt to construct new quantum concepts of space and time, in 1927 Heisenberg presented an operational definition of concepts such as ‘position’ and ‘velocity’. Yet, after discussions with Bohr, he came to the realisation that classical concepts such as position and momentum are indispensable in quantum mechanics in spite of their limited applicability. This transformation in Heisenberg's thought, which centres on his theory of meaning, marks the critical turning point in his interpretation of quantum mechanics.
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.
In this paper, I argue that Heisenberg's mature philosophy of quantum mechanics must be understood in the context of his epistemological project to reinterpret and redefine Kant's notion of the a priori. After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a ‘practical’ transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as ‘practically a priori’, in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of ‘objective reality’, though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense. We cannot avoid using classical concepts in the description of experiments in quantum theory, despite the fact that there are limits to their applicability. Such concepts are, for Heisenberg, historically contingent, yet indispensable in our time, because we have no other language through which we can describe and conceive of the interaction between ‘object’ and ‘measuring device’.
Following the view of several leading quantum-information theorists, this paper argues that quantum phenomena, including those exhibiting quantum correlations (one of their most enigmatic features), and quantum mechanics may be best understood in quantum-informational terms. It also argues that this understanding is implicit already in the work of some among the founding figures of quantum mechanics, in particular W. Heisenberg and N. Bohr, half a century before quantum information theory emerged and confirmed, and gave a deeper meaning to, to their insights. These insights, I further argue, still help this understanding, which is the main reason for considering them here. My argument is grounded in a particular interpretation of quantum phenomena and quantum mechanics, in part arising from these insights as well. This interpretation is based on the concept of reality without realism, RWR (which places the reality considered beyond representation or even conception), introduced by this author previously, in turn, following Heisenberg and Bohr, and in response to quantum information theory.
The centenary of quantum mechanics brings into focus the question of the accuracy of established terminology for describing the radical transformations that occurred. Critical analysis reveals that the term “quantum revolution” fosters a simplified perception of a single, pivotal turn in physics during the 1920s and 1930s and provides a superficial account of the actual changes over the past 100 years. This article critically re-examines the established term “quantum revolution” from the perspective of its conceptual limitations in describing the real changes of the last century. Arguments are presented for its partial replacement with the more flexible concept of “revolutionary transformations in quantum theory and its interpretations”, which emphasises the processual and multifaceted nature of these changes. The methodological foundation of this research is the distinction between two types of interpretations of quantum theory: “pragmatic” interpretations, which focus on connecting the formalism with experiment, and “explanatory” interpretations, which aim to form conceptions of quantum reality. The application of the concept of a quantum revolution is justified for the pragmatic interpretation, which was formed in 1925–1927 and later became established as the orthodox view, but not for interpretations of the explanatory type. Three initial strategies for preserving classical language in the description of quantum phenomena are identified: classical realism, quantum dualism, and instrumentalism. The analysis addresses persistent historiographical myths surrounding the Copenhagen interpretation – namely, that it is inherent in the postulates of quantum theory, and that it is inherently instrumentalist and subjectivist. A distinction is shown between the orthodox (pragmatic) and the Copenhagen (explanatory) interpretations. Particular attention is paid to the realistic turn in explanatory interpretations (1952–1958), largely associated with the later works of Heisenberg. It is concluded that the development of quantum theory is characterised not by a single revolution, but by a series of transformations of varying revolutionary intensity, many of which occurred in parallel and are still far from complete.
Abstract Heisenberg introduced his famous uncertainty relations in a seminal 1927 paper entitled The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and Mechanics . He motivated his arguments with a gedanken experiment, a gamma ray microscope to measure the position of a particle. A primary result was that, due to the quantum nature of light, there is an inherent uncertainty in the determinations of the particle’s position and momentum dictated by an indeterminacy relation, δ q δ p ∼ h . Heisenberg offered this demonstration as ‘a direct physical interpretation of the [quantum mechanical] equation pq − qp = − i ℏ ’ but considered the indeterminacy relation to be much more than this. He also argued that it implies limitations on the very meanings of position and momentum and emphasised that these limitations are the source of the statistical character of quantum mechanics. In addition, Heisenberg hoped but was unable to demonstrate that the laws of quantum mechanics could be derived directly from the uncertainty relation. In this paper, we revisit Heisenberg’s microscope and argue that the Schrödinger equation for a free particle does indeed follow from the indeterminacy relation together with reasonable statistical assumptions.
This book deals with the 'crisis of objectivity' and the 'crisis of realism' which overtook physics when Heisenberg and Bohr consciously rejecting the intentionality-structure of classical physics, gave physics a new form and a new philosophy. The new physics was called quantum mechanics and the new philosophy was called complimentarity. Using the method 'analysis of horizons,' the author attempts to disentangle the epistemological and ontological pesuppositions of Heisenberg's view of complementarity. A similar analysis of Bohr's view of complimentarity reveals a remarkable contrast in basic philosophy between the two founders of quantum physics. The author distinguishes various kinds of objectivity and realism and discusses critically the different aspects of the crisis that emerges in the quantum theory of measurement, the indeterminacy relations and in the statistical and causal structure of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg's formulation of the crisis is reduced to the underlying presuppositions of his thought. These presuppositions are criticised and shown to be defective. A more nuanced epistemological analysis reveals that quantum mechanics answers in a specially beautiful way to the full exigencies of the human mind and its knowledge of concrete reality.