Phenomenological Realism, Superconductivity and Quantum Mechanics
Towfic Shomar
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of theories and their fit with nature, while the real practices of the scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 'phenomenological realism': theories are merely tools to construct other theories and models, including phenomenological models; phenomenological models are the vehicles of representation. The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from the pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific realism which can overcome the problem generated by the argument from scientific revolutions, and which depend on the scientific practice. The realist tried to overcome this problem by suggesting various types of theory dichotomy. I claim that different types of dichotomy presented by realists did not overcome the problem, these dichotomies cut through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy between high level theoretical abstractions and low-level theoretical representations. I claim that theoretical work in physics have two distinct types depending on the way they are built these are: theoretical models which built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models which are built depending on a bottom-up approach, this dichotomy cuts the division along a horizontal line between low and high level theory. I present two case studies. One from superconductivity where I contrast the BCS theory of superconductivity with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. I show how in that field of physics the historical developments favoured phenomenological models over high-level theoretical abstraction. I show how the BCS theory of superconductivity was constructed, and why it was accepted as the fundamental theory of superconductivity, and how later failed to account for new kinds of superconductors. I contrast that with the building of the widely accepted phenomenological model of superconductivity. The other case study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate. I think that the main difference between Bohr and Einstein was their position from how theoretical work ought to be conducted in physics. Einstein always sought the mathematical clarity and simplicity, he adopted a top-down approach toward theoretical work, while Bohr insisted on a bottom-up approach. (author)
•Feb 1, 2013•5 citations