Feynman introduces the concept of negative probability in the context of Young's double-slit experiment and in doing so sheds a new light on the problem. However, there are, as Feynman notes, conceptual problems as well as insights associated with this point of view. The micromaser which-path (Welcher-Weg) detector eliminates these conceptual difficulties. We also emphasize that the concept of negative probability yields useful insight into the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) problem.
Feynman introduces the concept of negative probability in the context of Young's double-slit experiment and in doing so sheds a new light on the problem. However, there are, as Feynman notes, conceptual problems as well as insights associated with this point of view. The micromaser which-path (Welcher-Weg) detector eliminates these conceptual difficulties. We also emphasize that the concept of negative probability yields useful insight into the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) problem.
In this paper we attempt to establish a theory of negative (quasi) probability distributions from fundamental principles and apply it to the study of the double-slit experiment in quantum mechanics. We do so in a way that preserves the main conceptual issues intact but allow for a clearer analysis, by representing the double-slit experiment in terms of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and show that the main features of quantum systems relevant to the double-slit are present also in the Mach-Zehnder. This converts the problem from a continuous to a discrete random variable representation. We then show that, for the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, negative probabilities do not exist that are consistent with interference and which-path information, contrary to what Feynman believed. However, consistent with Scully et al.'s experiment, if we reduce the amount of experimental information about the system and rely on counterfactual reasoning, a joint negative probability distribution can be constructed for the Mach-Zehnder experiment.
We always have had a great deal of difficulty in understanding the world view that quantum mechanics represents. At least I do, because I'm an old enough man that I haven't got to the point that this stuff is obvious to me … It has not yet become obvious to me that there is no real problem. I cannot define the real problem, therefore I suspect there is no real problem, but I'm not sure there's no real problem. Richard Feynman Max Born and quantum probabilities In this chapter, we will take a short break from our survey of successful applications of quantum mechanics to take a closer look at the foundations of this great edifice of modern physics. In a sense, we are now disobeying Feynman's warning about the results of the double slit experiment of chapter 1. We shall now ask Feynman's ‘forbidden’ question ‘But how can it be like that?’ Nobody disputes that quantum mechanics has been magnificently successful, enabling us to make correct quantitative calculations of atomic and nuclear effects. But there is a great divergence of opinion about the implications of quantum mechanics for the nature of matter, and indeed, of reality itself. To avoid becoming embroiled in a purely philosophical mire, we will focus on two famous paradoxes. The first of these is the ‘Einstein–Podolsky-Rosen’ paradox, named after its originators Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen, and usually abbreviated by the initials ‘EPR’. The second paradox is named after ‘Schrödinger's cat’.
This article presents a general discussion of several aspects of our present understanding of quantum mechanics. The emphasis is put on the very special correlations that this theory makes possible: They are forbidden by very general arguments based on realism and local causality. In fact, these correlations are completely impossible in any circumstance, except for very special situations designed by physicists especially to observe these purely quantum effects. Another general point that is emphasized is the necessity for the theory to predict the emergence of a single result in a single realization of an experiment. For this purpose, orthodox quantum mechanics introduces a special postulate: the reduction of the state vector, which comes in addition to the Schrödinger evolution postulate. Nevertheless, the presence in parallel of two evolution processes of the same object (the state vector) may be a potential source for conflicts; various attitudes that are possible to avoid this problem are discussed in this text. After a brief historical introduction, recalling how the very special status of the state vector has emerged in quantum mechanics, various conceptual difficulties are introduced and discussed. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) theorem is presented with the help of a botanical parable, in a way that emphasizes how deeply the EPR reasoning is rooted into what is often called “scientific method.” In another section the Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger argument, the Hardy impossibilities, as well as the Bell–Kochen–Specker theorem are introduced in simple terms. The final two sections attempt to give a summary of the present situation: One section discusses nonlocality and entanglement as we see it presently, with brief mention of recent experiments; the last section contains a (nonexhaustive) list of various attitudes that are found among physicists, and that are helpful to alleviate the conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that argues for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics as a description of physical reality has been put to rest by John Bell’s famous theorem, which inspired numerous experimental tests and brought about further affirmations of quantum reality. Nevertheless, in his writings and public presentations, Richard Feynman never acknowledged the significance of Bell’s contribution to the resolution of the EPR paradox. In this paper, we discuss several variants of the Bell inequalities (including one that was specifically espoused by Feynman), and explore the ways in which they demolish the arguments in favor of local hidden-variable theories. We also examine the roots of Feynman’s attitude toward Bell’s theorem in the context of Feynman’s special perspective on quantum mechanics.
A quantised version of Wheeler-Feynman time symmetric absorber theory sheds new light on an old problem at present experiencing a revival of interest. Some photon correlation experiments, when interpreted in terms of quantum electrodynamics, lead to conceptual difficulties of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen type. The results imply that one has to abandon either the concept of strict causality, which would make conventional quantum electrodynamics self-inconsistent, or the concept of an objective reality independent of the observer, which has far-reaching philosophical consequences. In terms of absorber theory, on the other thand, there is no need to abandon objective reality and, in fact, such an experiment is directly interpretable as an example of the manifestation of the future on the past, which is the important distinguishing feature of absorber theory.
As currently understood since its discovery, the bare Klein-Gordon theory consists of negative quantum probabilities which are considered to be physically meaningless if not outright obsolete. Despite this annoying setback, these negative probabilities are what led the great Paul Dirac in 1928 to the esoteric discovery of the Dirac Equation. The Dirac Equation led to one of the greatest advances in our understanding of the physical world. In this reading, we ask the seemingly senseless question, “Do negative probabilities exist in quantum mechanics?” In an effort to answer this question, we arrive at the conclusion that depending on the choice one makes of the quantum probability current, one will obtain negative probabilities. We thus propose a new quantum probability current of the Klein-Gordon theory. This quantum probability current leads directly to positive definite quantum probabilities. Because these negative probabilities are in the bare Klein-Gordon theory, intrinsically a result of negative energies, the fact that we here arrive at a theory with positive probabilities, means that negative energy particles are not to be considered problematic as is the case in the bare Klein-Gordon theory. From an abstract—objective stand-point; in comparison with positive energy particles, the corollary is that negative energy particles should have equal chances to exist. As to why these negative energy particles do not exist, this is analogous to asking why is it that Dirac’s antimatter does not exist in equal proportions with matter. This problem of why negative energy particles do not exist in equal proportions with positive energy particles is a problem that needs to be solved by a future theory.