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IEICE Transactions on Communications

Impersonation Attack on a Strong ID-Based Key Distribution

J. HWANG, J. LIM, D. LEE

Published Aug 1, 2008• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Jeong et al. recently have proposed a strong ID-based key distribution scheme in order to achieve security against long-term key reveal and session state reveal attacks. In this letter, we show that, unfortunately, the ID-based key distribution scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack such that anyone can manipulate public transcripts generated by a user to impersonate the original user.

DOI
10.1093/ietcom/e91-b.8.2702

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Jeong et al. recently have proposed a strong ID-based key distribution scheme in order to achieve security against long-term key reveal and session state reveal attacks. In this letter, we show that, unfortunately, the ID-based key distribution scheme is vulnerable to an impersonation attack such that anyone can manipulate public transcripts generated by a user to impersonate the original user.
In 2004, Choi et al. proposed an ID-based authenticated group key agreement. Unfortunately, their protocol was found to be vulnerable to the insider attacks by Zhang, Chen and Shim. To prevent insider attacks, Shim presented a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol. In this letter, we first show that Shim's modification is still insecure against insider attacks. We then present a modification of Choi et al.'s protocol that resists insider attacks. The counter-measure uses an ID-based signature on transcripts in order to bind them in a session. This prevents any replay of transcripts. Especially, by applying ID-based batch verification, the proposed one still consists of two rounds and is computationally efficient.
In 2000, Xu and Tilborg proposed an ID-based conference key distribution scheme which builds on earlier work of Harn and Yang in the 2-party setting. Recently, Jung et al. have discovered security flaws in the Xu-Tilborg scheme and proposed an improvement of this scheme to fix the security flaws. However, Jung et al.'s improvement introduces another security weakness. We demonstrate this by showing that the improved scheme is vulnerable to a parallel session attack mounted by two colluding adversaries. Further, we recommend changes to the scheme that address this vulnerability.
Remote user authentication is an essential part in electronic commerce to identify legitimate users over the Internet. However, how to protect user privacy in the authentication has become an important issue recently. Therefore, many secure authentication schemes with smart cards have been proposed. In this paper, we will analyze the security weaknesses of two recently proposed authentication schemes for preserving user privacy. First, Chang et al. (2011) proposed a robust and efficient remote user authentication scheme to provide user anonymity. However, this scheme fails to protect user privacy in terms of anonymity and traceability. In addition, it is vulnerable to the server counterfeit attack and it does not provide perfect forward secrecy for session keys. Furthermore, if the smart card is lost, it will suffer from the offline password guessing attack as well as the user impersonation attack. Second, Wen and Li (2012) recently presented an improved dynamic ID-based authentication scheme with key agreement. However, this scheme is vulnerable to traceability. In addition, it does not support perfect forward secrecy for session keys. Furthermore, the insecure offline password change phase and online secret renewal phase will result in the denial of service attack.
In 2011, Khan et al. analyzed and improved an enhanced secure dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme to overcome the weakness of Wang et al.’s scheme. In 2013, Young-Hwa An showed that Khan et al.’s scheme is not secure because Khan et al.’s scheme can not resist password guessing attack, forgery attack and does not provide user anonymity. After that he proposed a security improvement of dynamic ID-based remote user authentication scheme with session key agreement to remedy the weakness in Khan et al.’s scheme. Recently, through our study, we have found that Young-Hwa An’s mechanism is not secure enough. There still exists insider user’s attack, anonymity attack and forgery attack.