Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Physics A Mathematical and Theoretical

Completeness, supervenience and ontology

Tim Maudlin

Published Mar 7, 2007• 167 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen raised the issue of the completeness of the quantum description of a physical system. What they had in mind is whether or not the quantum description is informationally complete, in that all physical features of a system can be recovered from it. In a collapse theory such as the theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, the quantum wavefunction is informationally complete, and this has often been taken to suggest that according to that theory the wavefunction is all there is. If we distinguish the ontological completeness of a description from its informational completeness, we can see that the best interpretations of the GRW theory must postulate more physical ontology than just the wavefunction.

DOI
10.1088/1751-8113/40/12/s16

Related papers

Studies on A. Einstein. B. Podolsky and N. Rosen argument that “quantum mechanics is not a complete theory,” III: Illustrative examples and applications

Ruggero María Santilli

In the preceding Papers I and II of this series, we have presented a review and upgrade of basic mathematical, physical and chemical methods, and provided a confirmation of the apparent proof of the EPR argument [1] that extended particles within physical media (interior dynamical problems) admit classical counterparts [9], while Einstein’s determinism appears to be progressively verified with the increase of the density of the medium [10]. In this third and final paper of the series, we shown that the EPT argument in general, and Einstein’s determinism in particular, appear to be progressively verified in the structure of mesons, baryon, nuclei, and molecular bonds while being fully verified at the limit of gravitational collapse. We additionally show, apparently for the first time, the validity of the EPR final statement to the effect that the wavefunction [of quantum mechanics] does not provide a complete description of the physical reality” since the covering isowavefunctions of hadronic mechanics provide an otherwise impossible representation of all characteristics of various physical and chemical interior systems existing in nature.

Ratio mathematica•Jun 1, 2020•0 citations

Completeness Revisited: A Temporal Resolution of the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen Argument

Daniel Baker

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) argument was originally posed as a challenge to the completeness of quantum mechanics, rather than its empirical adequacy. While subsequent developments—most notably Bell’s theorem and experimental tests of nonlocal correlations— have constrained classes of hidden-variable theories, they have not resolved the underlying on- tological question raised by EPR: whether the quantum state exhausts physical reality. In this paper, we revisit the EPR criterion of completeness from the perspective of a temporally grounded physical framework, the Temporal Inertia Framework (TIF). We argue that the orig- inal EPR dilemma rests on an implicit assumption that physical reality must be specified on spacelike hypersurfaces, an assumption shared by both EPR and Bohr. By relaxing this assump- tion and allowing physical correlations to arise from shared temporal structure rather than local spatial variables or superluminal influence, one may satisfy the EPR realism criterion without violating relativistic causality or Bell-type constraints. Quantum mechanics is thus interpreted as operationally complete but ontologically incomplete, with quantum indeterminacy emerging from dynamical interactions with a proposed underlying temporal structure.

•Jan 27, 2026•0 citations

Can the World be Only Wavefunction?

Tim Maudlin

Abstract A common understanding of both the many-worlds theory and the original version of the GRW theory holds that they are ontologically monistic, postulating only the existence of the wavefunction and nothing else. Sometimes an appeal to Occam's razor is used to promote this as a boon for these theories. But without more detailed argumentation, it is hard to see how such an austere ontology can make comprehensible contact with the experimental facts that inspired the development of quantum theory in the first place, or indeed with our whole pre-theoretical picture of the physical world.

•Jun 24, 2010•75 citations

The Collapse of the Quantum State

Jeffrey Alan Barrett

Abstract We consider Wigner’s proposal for solving the quantum measurement problem. His solution involves a strong mind-body dualism, but it is also possible to provide a purely physical collapse solution to the quantum measurement problem. To this end, we consider the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics and three ways one might interpret it: GRWr, GRWm, and GRWf. These ways of interpreting the theory differ in the metaphysical commitments one makes and, hence, in how one explains one’s measurement records and hence one’s experience. This provides an introduction to the notions of an empirical ontology and a primitive ontology. We consider some of the comparative virtues and vices of the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics.

•Dec 26, 2019•0 citations

Studies on A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen argument that “quantum mechanics is not a complete theory,” II: Apparent confirmation of the EPR argument

Ruggero María Santilli

In1935, A.Einsteinexpressedhishistoricalview, jointly with B.Podolsky and N. Rosen, that quantum mechanics could be “completed” into a form recovering classical determinism at least under limit conditions (EPR argument). In the preceding Paper I, we have outlined the basic methods underlying the “completion” of quantum mechanics into hadronic mechanics for the representation of extended particles within physical media. In this Paper II, we study the isosymmetries for interior dynamical systems; we confirm the 1998 apparent proof that interior dynamical systems admit a classical counterpart; we confirm the 2019 apparent proof that Einstein’s determinism is progressively approached for extended particles in the interior of hadrons, nuclei and stars, while being fully achieved in the interior of gravitational collapse; and we show for the first time that the recovering of Einstein’s determinism in interior systems implies the removal of quantum mechanical divergencies. In the subsequent Paper III, we present a number of illustrative examples and novel applications in mathematics, physics and chemistry.

•Jun 1, 2020•0 citations

Completeness in Physics

Jeremy Dunning-Davies, Richard Lawrence Norman

Here it is intended to raise some questions surrounding the whole notion of completeness in physics. This does, of course, have bearing on issues raised by the well-known paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen.

•Apr 1, 2019•0 citations
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen raised the issue of the completeness of the quantum description of a physical system. What they had in mind is whether or not the quantum description is informationally complete, in that all physical features of a system can be recovered from it. In a collapse theory such as the theory of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, the quantum wavefunction is informationally complete, and this has often been taken to suggest that according to that theory the wavefunction is all there is. If we distinguish the ontological completeness of a description from its informational completeness, we can see that the best interpretations of the GRW theory must postulate more physical ontology than just the wavefunction.
In the preceding Papers I and II of this series, we have presented a review and upgrade of basic mathematical, physical and chemical methods, and provided a confirmation of the apparent proof of the EPR argument [1] that extended particles within physical media (interior dynamical problems) admit classical counterparts [9], while Einstein’s determinism appears to be progressively verified with the increase of the density of the medium [10]. In this third and final paper of the series, we shown that the EPT argument in general, and Einstein’s determinism in particular, appear to be progressively verified in the structure of mesons, baryon, nuclei, and molecular bonds while being fully verified at the limit of gravitational collapse. We additionally show, apparently for the first time, the validity of the EPR final statement to the effect that the wavefunction [of quantum mechanics] does not provide a complete description of the physical reality” since the covering isowavefunctions of hadronic mechanics provide an otherwise impossible representation of all characteristics of various physical and chemical interior systems existing in nature.
The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) argument was originally posed as a challenge to the completeness of quantum mechanics, rather than its empirical adequacy. While subsequent developments—most notably Bell’s theorem and experimental tests of nonlocal correlations— have constrained classes of hidden-variable theories, they have not resolved the underlying on- tological question raised by EPR: whether the quantum state exhausts physical reality. In this paper, we revisit the EPR criterion of completeness from the perspective of a temporally grounded physical framework, the Temporal Inertia Framework (TIF). We argue that the orig- inal EPR dilemma rests on an implicit assumption that physical reality must be specified on spacelike hypersurfaces, an assumption shared by both EPR and Bohr. By relaxing this assump- tion and allowing physical correlations to arise from shared temporal structure rather than local spatial variables or superluminal influence, one may satisfy the EPR realism criterion without violating relativistic causality or Bell-type constraints. Quantum mechanics is thus interpreted as operationally complete but ontologically incomplete, with quantum indeterminacy emerging from dynamical interactions with a proposed underlying temporal structure.
Abstract A common understanding of both the many-worlds theory and the original version of the GRW theory holds that they are ontologically monistic, postulating only the existence of the wavefunction and nothing else. Sometimes an appeal to Occam's razor is used to promote this as a boon for these theories. But without more detailed argumentation, it is hard to see how such an austere ontology can make comprehensible contact with the experimental facts that inspired the development of quantum theory in the first place, or indeed with our whole pre-theoretical picture of the physical world.
Abstract We consider Wigner’s proposal for solving the quantum measurement problem. His solution involves a strong mind-body dualism, but it is also possible to provide a purely physical collapse solution to the quantum measurement problem. To this end, we consider the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics and three ways one might interpret it: GRWr, GRWm, and GRWf. These ways of interpreting the theory differ in the metaphysical commitments one makes and, hence, in how one explains one’s measurement records and hence one’s experience. This provides an introduction to the notions of an empirical ontology and a primitive ontology. We consider some of the comparative virtues and vices of the GRW formulation of quantum mechanics.
In1935, A.Einsteinexpressedhishistoricalview, jointly with B.Podolsky and N. Rosen, that quantum mechanics could be “completed” into a form recovering classical determinism at least under limit conditions (EPR argument). In the preceding Paper I, we have outlined the basic methods underlying the “completion” of quantum mechanics into hadronic mechanics for the representation of extended particles within physical media. In this Paper II, we study the isosymmetries for interior dynamical systems; we confirm the 1998 apparent proof that interior dynamical systems admit a classical counterpart; we confirm the 2019 apparent proof that Einstein’s determinism is progressively approached for extended particles in the interior of hadrons, nuclei and stars, while being fully achieved in the interior of gravitational collapse; and we show for the first time that the recovering of Einstein’s determinism in interior systems implies the removal of quantum mechanical divergencies. In the subsequent Paper III, we present a number of illustrative examples and novel applications in mathematics, physics and chemistry.