Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

Journal of Physics Conference Series

Analysis of non locality proofs in Quantum Mechanics

Giuseppe Nisticò

Published Feb 8, 2012• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Two kinds of non-locality theorems in Quantum Mechanics are taken into account: the theorems based on the criterion of reality and the quite different theorem proposed by Stapp. In the present work the analyses of the theorem due to Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger, based on the criterion of reality, and of Stapp’s argument are shown. The results of these analyses show that the alleged violations of locality cannot be considered definitive.

DOI
10.1088/1742-6596/343/1/012088

Related papers

Non-local Character of Quantum Mechanics: 20 Years Later

Tomasz Bigaj

In this tribute to Henry P. Stapp, I outline the historical development of the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics starting from the EPR argument through Bell’s theorem up to Stapp’s own contributions. My focus is on Stapp’s 1997 proof of quantum non-locality that uses the logic of counterfactuals. On the basis of my own version of the proof presented in 2010, I give its informal analysis, emphasizing the role of Einstein’s criterion of reality in the derivation. I conclude that the proof achieves its objective, and I briefly point at its significance for the philosophical mind-body problem.

Activitas Nervosa Superior•Apr 16, 2019•2 citations

A logical analysis of Stapp's non-locality theorem

Giusepp Nisticò

According to an argument proposed by Stapp, Quantum Mechanics violates the Locality Principle if the two hypotheses of {\sl Free Choices} and {\sl No backward-in-time influence} are assumed to hold, without the need of introducing hidden variables or criteria of reality. We develop an approach that endows the new hypotheses with a logico-mathematical formulation which allow us to perform an analysis of Stapp's argument, based on ordinary, not counterfactual, logic. According to our results, the analyzed argument is not able to conclude that Quantum Mechanics violates the Locality Principle.

arXiv:1111.5121•Nov 22, 2011•0 citations

Locality of quantum mechanics and the interpretation of the EPR criterion of reality

Nisticò, Giuseppe, Angela Sestito

We prove that by adopting a strict interpretation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen criterion of reality, the proofs of the known non-locality theorems fail in showing that quantum mechanics violates the principle of locality and reality.

arXiv:1002.0715•Feb 3, 2010•0 citations

Locality and the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger Theorem

A. Fahmi, Golshani, M.

In all local realistic theories worked out till now, locality is considered as a basic assumption. Most people in the field consider the inconsistency between local realistic theories and quantum mechanics to be a result of non-local nature of quantum mechanics. In this Paper, we derive the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger type theorem for particles with instantaneous (non-local) interactions at the hidden-variable level. Then, we show that the previous contradiction still exists between quantum mechanics and non-local hidden variable models.

arXiv:quant-ph/0608049•Aug 6, 2006•1 citation

Counterfactuals and non-locality of quantum mechanics

Tomasz Bigaj

In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.

•May 1, 2002•1 citation

Counterfactual Logic and the Hardy Paradox: Remarks on Shimony and Stein's Criticism of Stapp's Proof

Tomasz Bigaj

This is an extended critique of comments made by Abner Shimony and Howard Stein on Henry Stapp’s proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics. Although I claim that ultimately Stapp’s proof does not establish its purported conclusion, yet Shimony and Stein’s criticism contains a number of weak points, which need to be clarified.

•May 1, 2004•2 citations
Two kinds of non-locality theorems in Quantum Mechanics are taken into account: the theorems based on the criterion of reality and the quite different theorem proposed by Stapp. In the present work the analyses of the theorem due to Greenberger, Horne, Shimony and Zeilinger, based on the criterion of reality, and of Stapp’s argument are shown. The results of these analyses show that the alleged violations of locality cannot be considered definitive.
In this tribute to Henry P. Stapp, I outline the historical development of the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics starting from the EPR argument through Bell’s theorem up to Stapp’s own contributions. My focus is on Stapp’s 1997 proof of quantum non-locality that uses the logic of counterfactuals. On the basis of my own version of the proof presented in 2010, I give its informal analysis, emphasizing the role of Einstein’s criterion of reality in the derivation. I conclude that the proof achieves its objective, and I briefly point at its significance for the philosophical mind-body problem.
According to an argument proposed by Stapp, Quantum Mechanics violates the Locality Principle if the two hypotheses of {\sl Free Choices} and {\sl No backward-in-time influence} are assumed to hold, without the need of introducing hidden variables or criteria of reality. We develop an approach that endows the new hypotheses with a logico-mathematical formulation which allow us to perform an analysis of Stapp's argument, based on ordinary, not counterfactual, logic. According to our results, the analyzed argument is not able to conclude that Quantum Mechanics violates the Locality Principle.
In all local realistic theories worked out till now, locality is considered as a basic assumption. Most people in the field consider the inconsistency between local realistic theories and quantum mechanics to be a result of non-local nature of quantum mechanics. In this Paper, we derive the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger type theorem for particles with instantaneous (non-local) interactions at the hidden-variable level. Then, we show that the previous contradiction still exists between quantum mechanics and non-local hidden variable models.
In the paper the proof of the non-locality of quantum mechanics, given recently by H. Stapp and D. Bedford, and appealing to the GHZ example, is analyzed. The proof does not contain any explicit assumption of realism, but instead it uses formal methods and techniques of the Lewis calculus of counterfactuals. To ascertain the validity of the proof, a formal semantic model for counterfactuals is constructed. With the help of this model it can be shown that the proof is faulty, because it appeals to the unwarranted principle of Elimination of Eliminated Conditions (EEC). As an additional way of showing unreasonableness of the assumption (EEC), it is argued that yet another alleged and highly controversial proof of non-locality of QM, using the Hardy example, can be made almost trivial with the help of (EEC). Next the question is considered whether the validity of the proof in the GHZ case can be restored by adopting the assumption of partial realism. It is argued that although this assumption makes the crucial step of the original reasoning valid, it nevertheless renders another important transition unjustified, therefore the entire reasoning collapses.