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Optics Communications

Eavesdropping on secure quantum telephone protocol with dishonest server

Mosayeb Naseri

Published May 24, 2009• 14 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.optcom.2009.05.012

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In this paper a scheme for quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) network is proposed with a sequence of polarized single photons. The single photons are prepared originally in the same state |0〉 by the servers on the network, which will reduce the difficulty for the legitimate users to check eavesdropping largely. The users code the information on the single photons with two unitary operations which do not change their measuring bases. Some decoy photons, which are produced by operating the sample photons with a Hadamard, are used for preventing a potentially dishonest server from eavesdropping the quantum lines freely. This scheme is an economical one as it is the easiest way for QSDC network communication securely.
Fairness is an important standard needed to be considered in a secure quantum key agreement (QKA) protocol. However, it found that most of the quantum key agreement protocols in the travelling model are not fair, i.e., some of the dishonest participants can collaborate to predetermine the final key without being detected. Thus, how to construct a fair and secure key agreement protocol has obtained much attention. In this paper, a new fair multiparty QKA protocol that can resist the collusive attack is proposed. More specifically, we show that in a client-server scenario, it is possible for the clients to share a key and reveal nothing about what key has been agreed upon to the server. The server prepares quantum states for clients to encode messages to avoid the participants' collusive attack. This construction improves on previous work, which requires either preparing multiple quantum resources by clients or two-way quantum communication. It is proven that the protocol does not reveal to any eavesdropper, including the server, what key has been agreed upon, and the dishonest participants can be prevented from collaborating to predetermine the final key.
We propose in this paper a novel deterministic protocol using particular maximally entangled states of polarized photons for a genuine bidirectional secure communication setup. We further propose a plausible experimental setup for such a protocol using currently available optical technology which liberates two communicating party from sharing identical apparatus. We note that security of the protocol is promised by the monogamous nature of maximally entangled states. We discuss the security of our protocol in the light of some simple eavesdropping scenarios.