Practical application of the generalized Bell's theorem in the so-called key distribution process in cryptography is reported. The proposed scheme is based on the Bohm's version of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedanken experiment and Bell's theorem is used to test for eavesdropping.
Ekert has described a cryptographic scheme in which Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs of particles are used to generate identical random numbers in remote places, while Bell's theorem certifies that the particles have not been measured in transit by an eavesdropper. We describe a related but simpler EPR scheme and, without invoking Bell's theorem, prove it secure against more general attacks, including substitution of a fake EPR source. Finally we show our scheme is equivalent to the original 1984 key distribution scheme of Bennett and Brassard, which uses single particles instead of EPR pairs.
When elementary quantum systems, such as polarized photons, are used to transmit digital information, the uncertainty principle gives rise to novel cryptographic phenomena unachievable with traditional transmission media, e.g. a communications channel on which it is impossible in principle to eavesdrop without a high probability of disturbing the transmission in such a way as to be detected. Such a quantum channel can be used in conjunction with ordinary insecure classical channels to distribute random key information between two users with the assurance that it remains unknown to anyone else, even when the users share no secret information initially. We also present a protocol for coin-tossing by exchange of quantum messages, which is secure against traditional kinds of cheating, even by an opponent with unlimited computing power, but ironically can be subverted by use of a still subtler quantum phenomenon, the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox.
This Colloquium examines the field of the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) gedanken experiment, from the original paper of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen, through to modern theoretical proposals of how to realize both the continuous-variable and discrete versions of the EPR paradox. The relationship with entanglement and Bell's theorem are analyzed, and the progress to date towards experimental confirmation of the EPR paradox is summarized, with a detailed treatment of the continuous-variable paradox in laser-based experiments. Practical techniques covered include continuous-wave parametric amplifier and optical fiber quantum soliton experiments. Current proposals for extending EPR experiments to massive-particle systems are discussed, including spin squeezing, atomic position entanglement, and quadrature entanglement in ultracold atoms. Finally, applications of this technology to quantum key distribution, quantum teleportation, and entanglement swapping are examined.
The peculiar properties of quantum mechanics enable possibilities not allowed by classical physics. In particular, two parties can generate a random, secret key at a distance, even though an eavesdropper can do anything permitted by the laws of physics. Measuring the quantum properties of the signals generating the key, would ultimately change them, and thus reveal the eavesdropper’s presence. This exchange of a random, secret key is known as quantum cryptography.\n\nQuantum cryptography can be, and has been proven unconditionally secure using perfect devices. However, when quantum cryptography is implemented, one must use components available with current technology. These are usually imperfect. Although the security of quantum cryptography has been proven for components with certain imperfections, the question remains: can quantum cryptography be implemented in a provable, unconditionally secure way, using components available with current technology? This thesis contains both a theoretical, and an experimental contribution to the answer of this question. On the experimental side, components used in, and complete quantum cryptography systems have been carefully examined for security loopholes. In particular, it turned out that two commercial quantum cryptography systems contained loopholes, which would allow an eavesdropper to capture the full secret key, without exposing her presence. Furthermore, this detector control attack could be implemented with current technology. The attack is applicable against a variety of quantum cryptography implementations and protocols.\n\nThe theoretical contribution consists of security proofs for quantum cryptography in a very general setting. Precisely, the security is proven with arbitrary individual imperfections in the source and detectors. These proofs should make it possible to use a wide array of imperfect devices in implementations of quantum cryptography.\n\nFinally, a secure detection scheme is proposed, immune to the detector control attack and compatible with those security proofs. Therefore, if this scheme is implemented correctly, it offers provable security.
Cryptography is used for the secure communication in which two parties are involved. The most popular cryptographic issue is the transmission of confidential messages. The privacy is maintained using the cryptographic protocol. The security of quantum cryptography relies more on physics including quantum mechanics and statistics rather than on solving mathematical problems. A well-known application of quantum cryptography is quantum key distribution (QKD) that is used to establish communication by generating cryptographic keys. Moreover, it is based on the Heisenberg uncertainty principle that ensures the security and prevents from eavesdropping. Basically, quantum cryptography with faint laser pulses, polarization coding, phase coding, and frequency coding have been discussed.