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International Conference on Intelligent Networking and Collaborative Systems (INCoS)

On the Security of a Multi-use CCA-Secure Proxy Re-encryption Scheme

Jindan Zhang, Xu An Wang

Published Sep 1, 2012• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

In proxy re-encryption (PRE), a semi-trusted proxy can convert a cipher text originally intended for Alice into one which can be decrypted by Bob, while the proxy can not know the corresponding plaintext. PREcan be classified as single-use PRE and multi-use PRE according to the times the cipher text can be transformed. In multi-use PRE schemes, the cipher text can be transformed from A to B and to C and so on. In CCS'09 (post session), Wan get al. proposed a multi-use unidirectional CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme. Unfortunately, we show their proposal is not CCA-secure in the corresponding security models by giving concrete attacks.

DOI
10.1109/incos.2012.53

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In proxy re-encryption (PRE), a semi-trusted proxy can convert a cipher text originally intended for Alice into one which can be decrypted by Bob, while the proxy can not know the corresponding plaintext. PREcan be classified as single-use PRE and multi-use PRE according to the times the cipher text can be transformed. In multi-use PRE schemes, the cipher text can be transformed from A to B and to C and so on. In CCS'09 (post session), Wan get al. proposed a multi-use unidirectional CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme. Unfortunately, we show their proposal is not CCA-secure in the corresponding security models by giving concrete attacks.
In proxy re-encryption (PRE), a semi-trusted proxy can convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into one which can be decrypted by Bob, while the proxy cannot know the corresponding plaintext. PRE can be classified as single-use PRE and multi-use PRE according to the times the ciphertext can be transformed. In multi-use PRE schemes, the ciphertext can be transformed from A to B and to C and so on. In CCS’09 (post session), Wang et al. proposed a multi-use unidirectional CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme. Unfortunately, we show their proposal is not CCA-secure in the corresponding security models by giving concrete attacks. In 2010, Ren et al. proposed a hierarchical identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme without random oracles, and claimed their scheme was also multi-use and CCA-secure, we also show their scheme is not secure.
In proxy re-encryption (PRE), a semi-trusted proxy can convert a cipher text originally intended for Alice into one which can be decrypted by Bob, while the proxy can not know the underlying plaintext. In multi-use PRE schemes, the cipher text can be transformed from Alice to Bob and to Charlie and so on. Due to its cipher text transformation property, it is difficult to achieve chosen cipher text security for PRE, especially for multi-use PRE. IBE is a new kind of public-key encryption where the recipient's public key is an arbitrary string that represents the recipient's identity. Identity based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) is a primitive combing the feature of IBE and PRE. Recently Wang et al. proposed a multi-use unidirectional CCA-secure identity based proxy re-encryption (IBPRE) scheme. Unfortunately, we show their proposal is not CCA-secure in the corresponding security models by giving concrete attacks.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) can be classified as single-hop PRE and multi-use PRE according to the times which the ciphertext is transformed. Finding a unidirectional, multi-use, and chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) secure PRE is presented as an open problem by Canetti et al. Wang claimed to resolve this problem by proposing the first multi-use CCAsecure unidirectional PRE scheme. But we found that different with single-hop PRE, multi-use PRE without randomize encrypt key in its re-encryption algorithm could be vulnerable to attack. A new type attack to multi-use CCA-secure PRE named proxy bypass attack is proposed with a concrete attacks on Wang-MultiUse-PRE scheme. This attack is also effective for other multi-use scheme. At last we propose an improvement for Multi-Use-PRE to resist proxy bypass attack by randomize re-encryption algorithm.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) has recently become a hot topic in cryptography research field. PRE can be classified as single-hop PRE and multi-use PRE according to the times the cipher text can be transformed. Finding a unidirectional, multi-use, and chosen cipher text attack (CCA) secure PRE is presented as an open problem by Green et al. Wang claimed to resolve this problem by proposing the first multi-use CCA-secure unidirectional PRE scheme. But we found that different with single-hop PRE, multi-use PRE without randomize encrypt key in its encryption algorithm could be vulnerable to attack. A new type attack to multi-use CCA-secure PRE named proxy bypass attack is proposed with a concrete attacks on Wang-Multi-Use-IB-PRE scheme. This attack is also effective for other multi-use scheme. At last we propose an improvement for Multi-Use-IB-PRE to resist proxy bypass attack by randomize re-encryption algorithm.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) allows a ciphertext computed under Alice's public key to be transformed to those which can be decrypted by Bob. In PKC'08, Libert and Vergnaud proposed the first unidirectional RCCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model. They left the open problem of constructing unidirectional CCA-secure PRE scheme in the standard model open. Until recently, this open problem was solved by Weng et al. and Shao et al. independently. In this paper, based on Shao et al.'s proposal, we give a new efficient CCA-secure PRE scheme without random oracles and prove its security.
In an identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can convert a ciphertext under Alice's public identity into a ciphertext for Bob.The proxy does not know the secret key of Alice or Bob, and also does not know the plaintext during the conversion.In identity-based proxy re-encryption, the collusion of the proxy and a delegatee may result in the decryption of ciphertext for delegator.In this paper, we present a new scheme which can avoid the collusion of proxy and delegatee.Our scheme improves the scheme of Chu and Tzeng while inheriting all useful properties such as unidirectionality and non-interactivity.In our scheme, we get the security by using added secret parameter and change the secret key and re-encryption key.Our sheme is secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attack (CCA) and collusion attack in the standard model.