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Journal of Discrete Mathematical Sciences and Cryptography

Provably secure key establishment protocol using one-way functions

Mounita Saha, Dipanwita RoyChowdhury

Published Apr 1, 2009• 4 citations
Publisher

Abstract

The design of a secure and efficient key establishment protocol is one of the toughest challenge in communication protocol design. In the literature many key establishment protocols claimed to be secure against some attacks were later shown to be weak against new attacks. In this work, we have identified a class of weakness named as insider-replay in some existing protocols and proposed a design principle to avoid the weakness. Based on the design principle, we have proposed an efficient key establishment protocol. The proposed protocol is shown to be provably secure under formal security model and averts insider-replay. We have also analyzed the efficiency of the proposed protocol in comparison with existing protocols.

DOI
10.1080/09720529.2009.10698224

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The design of a secure and efficient key establishment protocol is one of the toughest challenge in communication protocol design. In the literature many key establishment protocols claimed to be secure against some attacks were later shown to be weak against new attacks. In this work, we have identified a class of weakness named as insider-replay in some existing protocols and proposed a design principle to avoid the weakness. Based on the design principle, we have proposed an efficient key establishment protocol. The proposed protocol is shown to be provably secure under formal security model and averts insider-replay. We have also analyzed the efficiency of the proposed protocol in comparison with existing protocols.
Key establishment protocols are fundamental for establishing secure communication channels over public insecure networks.Security must be given the topmost priority in the design of a key establishment protocol.In this work, we provide a security analysis on two recent key establishment protocols: Harn and Lin's group key transfer protocol and Dutta and Barua's group key agreement protocol.Our analysis shows that both the Harn-Lin protocol and the Dutta-Barua protocol have a flaw in their design and can be easily attacked.The attack we mount on the Harn-Lin protocol is a replay attack whereby a malicious user can obtain the long-term secrets of any other users.The Dutta-Barua protocol is vulnerable to an unknown key-share attack.For each of the two protocols, we present how to eliminate their security vulnerabilities.We also improve Dutta and Barua's proof of security to make it valid against unknown key share attacks.
For a secure communication through the public network, cryptographic encryption must be applied. The key establishment issue is the most important part in cryptographic encryption. Only the legitimate principals who have the key can encrypt messages and decrypt cryptograms. A secure multi-party communication held through the public network can only take place after a multi-party key establishment protocol has been executed. The multi-party key establishment protocol is designed so that the principals can receive a common key and use it to securely exchange the messages.\nIn this thesis, the secure multi-party key establishment protocols are discussed. W e start from investigating properties of two-party key establishment protocols such as motivation of using session key, adversaries in the protocols, attacks of the protocol and security analysis of the protocol. Then we give the requirements of a multi-party key establishment protocol and summarize about what should be considered in designing a multi-party key establishment protocol. After that we review some of the previous proposed multi-party key establishment protocol. The existing multi-party key establishment protocols are either impractical ( not efficient enough) or missing some important security goals such as authentication of principals. Three new protocols are proposed in this thesis. The first protocol addresses how to hold a conference for members of two hierarchical groups in an efficient way. The message broadcasting is used to reduce the cost of secure message transport.\nThe second and the third protocols manage the authentication problem by using a secret sharing scheme. We replace the principal authentication with the group authentication so that the computational overhead and communication overhead will be reduced especially in reuse of the protocol for new communication. Again, message broadcasting is used for replacing the expansive secure communication channel.\nPart of this thesis appeared in ACSC'99(Australian Computer Science Conference) and ACISP'99(Australian Conference of Information Security and Privacy).
One-pass authenticated key establishment (AKE) protocols are arguably better suited to the ID-based environment than their two-pass counterparts. However, there is no ID-based one-pass AKE protocol proposed in the literature with a proof of security in an appropriate model. This paper addresses the current gap by proposing a new ID-based one-pass AKE protocol and proving it secure in a formal model. The security of the new protocol is treated under a model adapted from a formal security model for traditional certificate based AKE protocols. The proof of security is in the random oracle model and is based on the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem. The protocol also turns out to be the most efficient of all the previously known protocols. It can work over a class of asymmetric pairings for better efficiency at higher bit security levels.
How to construct secure key agreement protocol is one of the most challenging problems in information security area.However,most of the current secure protocols can only achieve heuristic security,the security assumptions and efficiencies of these protocols are not perfect.To solve these problems,the authors propose a new 2 rounds two-party authenticated key agreement protocol and point out some principles to construct a secure protocol by analyzing the security properties of the protocol,then prove strictly that the new protocol is secure in eCK model.According to pertinent literature,eCK model provides the strongest definition of security for two party key agreement protocol at present.Performance analysis shows that the protocol has a good balance between computational cost and security assumption.The authors also present a three-round variant of the protocol to realize key conformation property.
A tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol is designed for three entities to communicate securely over an open network particularly with a shared key. Recently, we have improved a one-round tripartite authenticated key agreement protocol proposed by Lin-Li due to its vulnerability to the forging attack in our previous report. However, we have later discovered that both the original Lin-Li's scheme and our previous enhanced protocol are vulnerable to the insider replay attack. Moreover, we have also realized that both protocols have falsely claimed the forward secrecy attribute. In this paper, we will revise our improvements and again secure this protocol against these cryptanalytic attacks while recovering the precious perfect forward secrecy property.
In this thesis we study the problem of secure key establishment, motivated by the construction of secure channels protocols to protect information transmitted over an open network. In the past, the purported security of a key establishment protocol was justified if it could be shown to withstand popular attack scenarios by heuristic analysis. Since this approach does not account for all possible attacks, the security guarantees are limited and often insufficient. \nThis thesis examines the provable security approach to the analysis of key establishment protocols. We present the security models and definitions developed in 2001 and 2002 by Canetti and Krawczyk, critique the appropriateness of the models, and provide several security proofs under the definitions. In addition, we consider the importance of the key compromise impersonation resilience property in the context of these models. We list some open problems that were encountered in the study.