Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

International Journal of Theoretical Physics

Dynamical interpretation for the quantum-measurement projection postulate

Rouslan L. Stratonovich, V. P. Belavkin

Published Nov 1, 1996• 10 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1007/bf02302442

Related papers

Quantum mechanics without the projection postulate and its realistic interpretation

Dennis Dieks

Foundations of Physics•Nov 1, 1989•80 citations

Selection Postulates and Probability Rules in the Problem of Quantum Measurement

Alexander D Panov

Various approaches to quantum measurement problem within the framework of usual unitary quantum dynamics are considered. It is argued that neither decoherence theory nor many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics do provide ultimate solution of the measurement problem: they cannot solve the problem of an alternative selection within the framework of unitary quantum dynamics. It is argued that the selection postulate in quantum theory is a very fundamental entity tightly connected with the nature of mathematics and with the nature of the mind, while the probability rules are more technical things admitting various approaches based on various sets of axioms. Key Words: quantum measurement problem, projection postulate,

NeuroQuantology•Aug 22, 2008•0 citations

Interpretations of quantum measurement without the collapse postulate

Dipankar Home, M. A. B. Whitaker

Physics Letters A•Mar 1, 1988•14 citations

Dynamical Model of Quantum Measurement

Jose L. Balduz

•Jan 1, 1995•1 citation

The Projection Postulate as a Fortuitous Approximation

Paul Teller

If we take the state function of quantum mechanics to describe belief states, arguments by Stairs and Friedman-Putnam show that the projection postulate may be justified as a kind of minimal change. But if the state function takes on a physical interpretation, it provides no more than what I call a fortuitous approximation of physical measurement processes, that is, an unsystematic form of approximation which should not be taken to correspond to some one univocal “measurement process” in nature. This fact suggests that the projection postulate does not provide a proper locus for interpretive investigation. Readers will also find section 3's analysis of fortuitous approximations of independent interest and presented without the perils of quantum mechanics.

Philosophy of Science•Sep 1, 1983•33 citations

The Projection Postulate and Bohr's Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Paul Teller

Why does Bohr nowhere discuss the projection postulate? He has the courtesy to cast at least a few disparaging words at some other notions for which he has no use, such as quantum logic. But he will not even admit the projection postulate as a subject for discussion. Another way to raise the puzzle is to point out that, although Bohr has a lot to say about measurement, he won't even recognize the existence of what has come to be called the “problem of measurement”. I have exaggerated slightly. We have one relevant comment, in the report of the discussion after Bohr's talk at the 1938 Warsaw conference: Professor Bohr wished to say, relative to the question propounded by the president, that the duality he noticed in the interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics was, in his opinion, a question of choosing the most adequate description of the experiment.

PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association•Jan 1, 1980•14 citations
Various approaches to quantum measurement problem within the framework of usual unitary quantum dynamics are considered. It is argued that neither decoherence theory nor many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics do provide ultimate solution of the measurement problem: they cannot solve the problem of an alternative selection within the framework of unitary quantum dynamics. It is argued that the selection postulate in quantum theory is a very fundamental entity tightly connected with the nature of mathematics and with the nature of the mind, while the probability rules are more technical things admitting various approaches based on various sets of axioms. Key Words: quantum measurement problem, projection postulate,
If we take the state function of quantum mechanics to describe belief states, arguments by Stairs and Friedman-Putnam show that the projection postulate may be justified as a kind of minimal change. But if the state function takes on a physical interpretation, it provides no more than what I call a fortuitous approximation of physical measurement processes, that is, an unsystematic form of approximation which should not be taken to correspond to some one univocal “measurement process” in nature. This fact suggests that the projection postulate does not provide a proper locus for interpretive investigation. Readers will also find section 3's analysis of fortuitous approximations of independent interest and presented without the perils of quantum mechanics.
Why does Bohr nowhere discuss the projection postulate? He has the courtesy to cast at least a few disparaging words at some other notions for which he has no use, such as quantum logic. But he will not even admit the projection postulate as a subject for discussion. Another way to raise the puzzle is to point out that, although Bohr has a lot to say about measurement, he won't even recognize the existence of what has come to be called the “problem of measurement”. I have exaggerated slightly. We have one relevant comment, in the report of the discussion after Bohr's talk at the 1938 Warsaw conference: Professor Bohr wished to say, relative to the question propounded by the president, that the duality he noticed in the interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics was, in his opinion, a question of choosing the most adequate description of the experiment.