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Philosophy of Science

On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future

Howard Stein

Published Jun 1, 1991• 260 citations
Publisher

Abstract

It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.

DOI
10.1086/289609

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It has been repeatedly argued, most recently by Nicholas Maxwell, that the special theory of relativity is incompatible with the view that the future is in some degree undetermined; and Maxwell contends that this is a reason to reject that theory. In the present paper, an analysis is offered of the notion of indeterminateness (or “becoming”) that is uniquely appropriate to the special theory of relativity, in the light of a set of natural conditions upon such a notion; and reasons are given for regarding this conception as (not just formally consistent with relativity theory, but also) philosophically reasonable. The bearings upon Maxwell's program for quantum theory are briefly considered.
In a reply to Nicholas Maxwell, Stein has proved that Minkowski spacetime can leave room for the kind of indeterminateness required both by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics and by objective becoming. By examining the consequences of outcome dependence in Bell-type experiments for the co-determinateness of spacelike-related events, I argue that the only becoming relation that is compatible with both causal and noncausal readings of the quantum correlations is the universal relation. This result might also undermine interpretations of quantum mechanics requiring non-epistemically indeterminate states before measurement and hyperplane-dependent wave collapse.
The dissertation is a defense of the following conditional claim: if there are objective collapses of the wavefunction, then the future is genuinely open. Although this is no radically new idea, the strategy I shall use to defend it is a new one. It proceeds in two main steps. First, building upon the recent literature on metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum mechanics, I argue for the view that systems in superposition have be interpreted as objectively indeterminate state of affairs. Second, I propose an alternative way to think of openness, according to which the future is open as of t, if and only if there is an indeterminate state of affair S at t, and S becomes determinate at t? (with t? later than t). To argue for the second step, I will give an analysis of the objective collapses of the wavefunction as the becoming determinate of previously indeterminate systems. Furthermore, in developing my arguments, I will also make some remarks concerning the ontology of objective collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics, the issue of whether metaphysical indeterminacy can be at some derivate level of reality, and the possibility of the openness of the future being an emergent phenomenon.
A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the advent of (special) relativity-with its block-universe picture-as the failure of any indeterministic program in physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should also be regarded as a relative property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.
A long-standing tradition, largely present in both the physical and the philosophical literature, regards the advent of (special) relativity –with its block-universe picture– as the failure of any indeterministic program in physics. On the contrary, in this paper, we note that upholding reasonable principles of finiteness of information hints at a picture of the physical world that should be both relativistic and indeterministic. We thus rebut the block-universe picture by assuming that fundamental indeterminacy itself should as well be regarded as a relational property when considered in a relativistic scenario. We discuss the consequence that this view may have when correlated randomness is introduced, both in the classical case and in the quantum one.
Among the philosophical issues raised by quantum theory, the alleged indeterminism of quantum-physical phenomena, as opposed to the determinism of classical physics, has stood at the center of discussion. There are various other much-debated problems which are directly or indirectly related to this issue or, more generally, the probabilistic character of quantum theory. Less attention has been paid to the questions of the stability of atoms and the specificity of their properties, which quantum theory was primarily designed to resolve. I argue that the indeterminism of quantum theory becomes less intriguing and can be better comprehended when seen in the light of these questions - or briefly, that “stability implies indeterminism, or chance.” Chance, in this respect, appears as an objective and legitimate mode of succession of otherwise stable and discrete well-determined states of certain physical systems.
In Mundy [a] I offered an axiomatic analysis of the physical content of the kinematics of special relativity which suggests that, contrary to common belief, there is no incompatibility between special relativity and spacelike (faster-than-light) causation. An anonymous referee pointed out that this conclusion might have some bearing on problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics such as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen problem, since one line of solution to these problems involves the postulation of spacelike causal processes. The present note will develop this idea.