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Optics and Spectroscopy

Eavesdropping attack with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer

C. -M. Kim, Y. -W. Kim, Ingyoung Kim, Y. J. Park

Published Jul 1, 2007• 0 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We introduce a new sophisticated attack with a Hong-Ou-Mandel interferometer against quantum key distribution (QKD) and apply the attack to the QKD protocol with blind polarization. We also discuss how efficient our attack protocol is to ping-pong type protocols.
DOI
10.1134/s0030400x07070132

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Security of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol recently proposed by Boström and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)]] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the ping-pong protocol is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60%. Our scheme induces 50% losses, which, however, can be hidden in the channel losses if one replaces the original lossy channel with a less lossy one. Finally, a possible improvement of the ping-pong protocol security is proposed.