Cromwell's rule (also known as the zero priors paradox) refers to the constraint of classical probability theory that if one assigns a prior probability of 0 or 1 to a hypothesis, then the posterior has to be 0 or 1 as well (this is a straightforward implication of how Bayes's rule works). Relatedly, hypotheses with a very low prior cannot be updated to have a very high posterior without a tremendous amount of new evidence to support them (or to make other possibilities highly improbable). Cromwell's rule appears at odds with our intuition of how humans update probabilities. In this work, we report two simple decision making experiments, which seem to be inconsistent with Cromwell's rule. Quantum probability theory, the rules for how to assign probabilities from the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, provides an alternative framework for probabilistic inference. An advantage of quantum probability theory is that it is not subject to Cromwell's rule and it can accommodate changes from zero or very small priors to significant posteriors. We outline a model of decision making, based on quantum theory, which can accommodate the changes from priors to posteriors, observed in our experiments.
Decoders for quantum error correction (QEC) experiments rely on detector error models (DEMs), which encode, for each error, its probability and the detectors and logical observables it flips. Here we show that estimating DEM event probabilities from experimental syndromes is feasible, avoids independent device benchmarking, and produces useful decoder priors for estimating and reducing decoded logical error probabilities. We evaluate our methods using open-source data from surface-code memory experiments performed on Google's Willow chip, and we carry out analogous surface-code experiments on IBM's \texttt{ibm\_miami} processor. Despite the different physical error scales of the Google and IBM devices, in both cases our estimated DEMs improve logical error probabilities relative to baseline device-informed DEMs, typically at the
5%−10% level and with larger gains in some IBM cases, without additional calibration circuits, decoder fine-tuning, or supervised fitting to logical outcomes.
BosonSampling and Random Circuit Sampling are important both as a theoretical tool for separating quantum and classical computation, and as an experimental means of demonstrating quantum speedups. Prior works have shown that average-case hardness of sampling follows from certain unproven conjectures about the hardness of computing output probabilities, such as the Permanent-of-Gaussians Conjecture (PGC), which states that
e−nlogn−n−O(logn) additive-error estimates to the output probability of most random BosonSampling experiments are #P-hard. Prior works have only shown weaker average-case hardness results that do not imply sampling hardness. Proving these conjectures has become a central question in quantum complexity. In this work, we show that
e−nlogn−n−O(nδ) additive-error estimates to output probabilities of most random BosonSampling experiments are #P-hard for any
δ>0, exponentially improving on prior work. In the process, we circumvent all known barrier results for proving PGC. The remaining hurdle to prove PGC is now “merely” to show that the
O(nδ) in the exponent can be improved to
O(logn). We also obtain an analogous result for Random Circuit Sampling. We then show, for the first time, a hardness of average-case classical sampling result for BosonSampling, under an anticoncentration conjecture. Specifically, we prove the impossibility of multiplicative-error sampling from random BosonSampling experiments with probability
1−2−O~(N1/3) for input size N, unless the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses. This exponentially improves upon the state-of-the-art. To do this, we introduce new proof techniques which tolerate exponential loss in the worst-to-average-case reduction. This opens the possibility to show the hardness of average-case sampling without ever proving PGC.