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NeuroQuantology

Quantum-like Interferences of Experimenter's Mental States: Application to “Paradoxical” Results in Physiology

Francis Beauvais

Published Jun 1, 2013• 6 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Objectives: “Memory of water” experiments (also known as Benveniste’s experiments) were the source of a famous controversy in the contemporary history of sciences. We recently proposed a formal framework devoid of any reference to “memory of water” to describe these disputed experiments. In this framework, the results of Benveniste’s experiments are seen as the consequence of quantum-like interferences of cognitive states. Design: In the present article, we describe retrospectively a series of experiments in physiology (Langendorff preparation) performed in 1993 by Benveniste’s team for a public demonstration. These experiments aimed at demonstrating “electronic transmission of molecular information” from protein solution (ovalbumin) to naive water. The experiments were closely controlled and blinded by participants not belonging to Benveniste’s team. Results: The number of samples associated with signal (change of coronary flow of isolated rodent heart) was as expected; this was an essential result since, according to mainstream science, no effect at all was supposed to occur. However, besides coherent correlations, some results were paradoxical and remained incomprehensible in a classical framework. However, using a quantum-like model, the probabilities of the different outcomes could be calculated according to the different experimental contexts. Conclusion: In this reassessment of an historical series of “memory of water” experiments, quantum-like probabilities allowed modeling these controversial experiments that remained unexplained in a classical frame and no logical paradox persisted. All the features of Benveniste’s experiments were taken into account with this model, which did not involve the hypothesis of “memory of water” or any other “local” explanation. NeuroQuantology | June 2013 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | Page 197-208

DOI
10.14704/nq.2013.11.2.656

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Benveniste’s experiments (also known as “memory of water” or “digital biology” experiments) remain unresolved. In some research areas, which have in common the description of cognition mechanisms and information processing, quantum-like statistical models have been proposed to address problems that were “paradoxical” in a classical frame. Therefore, the outcomes of the cognitive state of the experimenter were calculated for a series of Benveniste’s experiments using a quantum-like statistical model (i.e. a model inspired by quantum physics and taking into consideration superposition of quantum states, non-commutable observables, and contextuality). Not only were the probabilities of “success” and “failure” of the experiments modeled according to their context, but the emergence of a signal from background was also taken into account. For the first time, a formal framework devoid of any reference to “memory of water” or “digital biology” describes all the characteristics of these disputed results. In particular, the difficulties encountered by Benveniste (reproducibility of the experiments, disturbances after blinding) are simply explained in this model without additional ad hoc hypotheses. It is thus proposed that we see Benveniste’s experiments as the result of quantum-like probability interferences of cognitive states.Keywords: Memory of water—quantum cognition—quantum-like probabilities—entanglement—experimenter effect—contextuality —nonlocal interactions

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Benveniste’s experiments – known in the lay press as the “water memory” phenomenon – are generally considered to be a closed case. However, the amount of data generated by twenty years of well-conducted experiments prevents closing the file so simply. An issue, which has been little highlighted so far, merits to be emphasized. Indeed, if Benveniste failed to persuade his peers of the value of his experiments, it was mainly because of a stumbling block, namely the difficulty of convincingly proving the causal relationship between the supposed cause (“informed water”) and the experimental outcomes in different biological models. To progress in the understanding of this phenomenon, we abandon the idea of any role of water in these experiments (“water memory” and its avatars). In other words, we assume that “controls” and “tests” that were evaluated were all physically identical; only their respective designations (labels) differentiated them. Since we state that there is no causal link between labels (“controls” vs. “tests”) and corresponding states of the biological system (no change vs. change), these variables are independent. Therefore, the key question is: “Is it possible to observe a correlation between independent variables that mimics a causal relationship but is itself not causal?” In this article, we show how simple considerations based on probability theory lead to describe non-classical correlations involving the experimenter. This probabilistic modelling allows to propose an alternative explanation to Benveniste’s experiments where water plays no role and where the place of the experimenter is central.

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Objectives: “Memory of water” experiments (also known as Benveniste’s experiments) were the source of a famous controversy in the contemporary history of sciences. We recently proposed a formal framework devoid of any reference to “memory of water” to describe these disputed experiments. In this framework, the results of Benveniste’s experiments are seen as the consequence of quantum-like interferences of cognitive states. Design: In the present article, we describe retrospectively a series of experiments in physiology (Langendorff preparation) performed in 1993 by Benveniste’s team for a public demonstration. These experiments aimed at demonstrating “electronic transmission of molecular information” from protein solution (ovalbumin) to naive water. The experiments were closely controlled and blinded by participants not belonging to Benveniste’s team. Results: The number of samples associated with signal (change of coronary flow of isolated rodent heart) was as expected; this was an essential result since, according to mainstream science, no effect at all was supposed to occur. However, besides coherent correlations, some results were paradoxical and remained incomprehensible in a classical framework. However, using a quantum-like model, the probabilities of the different outcomes could be calculated according to the different experimental contexts. Conclusion: In this reassessment of an historical series of “memory of water” experiments, quantum-like probabilities allowed modeling these controversial experiments that remained unexplained in a classical frame and no logical paradox persisted. All the features of Benveniste’s experiments were taken into account with this model, which did not involve the hypothesis of “memory of water” or any other “local” explanation.
NeuroQuantology | June 2013 | Volume 11 | Issue 2 | Page 197-208
Benveniste’s experiments (also known as “memory of water” or “digital biology” experiments) remain unresolved. In some research areas, which have in common the description of cognition mechanisms and information processing, quantum-like statistical models have been proposed to address problems that were “paradoxical” in a classical frame. Therefore, the outcomes of the cognitive state of the experimenter were calculated for a series of Benveniste’s experiments using a quantum-like statistical model (i.e. a model inspired by quantum physics and taking into consideration superposition of quantum states, non-commutable observables, and contextuality). Not only were the probabilities of “success” and “failure” of the experiments modeled according to their context, but the emergence of a signal from background was also taken into account. For the first time, a formal framework devoid of any reference to “memory of water” or “digital biology” describes all the characteristics of these disputed results. In particular, the difficulties encountered by Benveniste (reproducibility of the experiments, disturbances after blinding) are simply explained in this model without additional ad hoc hypotheses. It is thus proposed that we see Benveniste’s experiments as the result of quantum-like probability interferences of cognitive states.Keywords: Memory of water—quantum cognition—quantum-like probabilities—entanglement—experimenter effect—contextuality —nonlocal interactions
Benveniste’s experiments have been the subject of an international scientific controversy (known as the case of the “memory of water”). We recently proposed to describe these results in a modeling in which the outcome of an experiment is considered personal property (named cognitive state) of the observer and not an objective property of the observed system. As a consequence, the correlations between “expected” results and observed results in Benveniste’s experiments could be considered the consequence of quantum-like interferences of the possible cognitive states of the experimenters/observers. In the present paper, we evidence that small random fluctuations from the environment together with intersubjective agreement force the “expected” results and the observed results experienced by the observers into a noncommuting relationship. The modeling also suggests that experimental systems with enough compliance (e.g., biological systems) are more suitable to evidence quantum-like correlations. No hypothesis related to “memory of water” or other elusive modifications of water structure is necessary. In conclusion, a quantum-like interpretation of Benveniste’s experiments offers a logical framework for these experiments that have remained paradoxical to now. This quantum-like modeling could be adapted to other areas of research for which there are issues of reproducibility of results by other research teams and/or suspicion of nontrivial experimenter effect.
In previous articles , we proposed to describe the results of Benveniste’s experiments using a theoretical framework based on quantum logic. This formalism described all characteristics of these controversial experiments and no paradox persisted. This interpretation supposed to abandon an explanation based on a classical local causality such as the “memory of water hypothesis. In the present article, we describe with the same formalism the cognitive states of different experimenters who interact together. In this quantum - like model, the correlations observe d in Benveniste’s experiments appear to be the consequence of the intersubjective agreement of the experimenters.
Benveniste’s experiments – known in the lay press as the “water memory” phenomenon – are generally considered to be a closed case. However, the amount of data generated by twenty years of well-conducted experiments prevents closing the file so simply. An issue, which has been little highlighted so far, merits to be emphasized. Indeed, if Benveniste failed to persuade his peers of the value of his experiments, it was mainly because of a stumbling block, namely the difficulty of convincingly proving the causal relationship between the supposed cause (“informed water”) and the experimental outcomes in different biological models. To progress in the understanding of this phenomenon, we abandon the idea of any role of water in these experiments (“water memory” and its avatars). In other words, we assume that “control” and “test” conditions to be evaluated were physically identical and differed only by their respective designations. We show in this article how simple probabilistic considerations allow to build a model that accounts for all aspects of Benveniste’s experiments. In this model based on probability amplitudes, constructive and destructive interferences emerge – or not – according to the experimental context. The recording of a statistical regularity shapes the intertwined whole constituted by the probability amplitudes of the states of the experimenter’s cognitive structures and of the experimental system. This model provides an alternative explanation to Benveniste’s experiments where water plays no role and where the place of the experimenter is central.
Background: Benveniste’s biology experiments suggested the existence of molecular-like effects without molecules (“memory of water”). In this article, it is proposed that these disputed experiments could have been the consequence of a previously unnoticed and non-conventional experimenter effect. Methods: A probabilistic modelling is built in order to describe an elementary laboratory experiment. A biological system is modelled with two possible states (“resting” and “activated”) and exposed to two experimental conditions labelled “control” and “test”, but both biologically inactive. The modelling takes into account not only the biological system, but also the experimenters. In addition, an outsider standpoint is adopted to describe the experimental situation. Results: A classical approach suggests that, after experiment completion, the “control” and “test” labels of biologically-inactive conditions should be both associated with “resting” state (i.e. no significant relationship between labels and system states). However, if the fluctuations of the biological system are also considered, a quantum-like relationship emerges and connects labels and system states (analogous to a biological “effect” without molecules). Conclusions: No hypotheses about water properties or other exotic explanations are needed to describe Benveniste’s experiments, including their unusual features. This modelling could be extended to other experimental situations in biology, medicine and psychology.
Benveniste’s experiments – known in the lay press as the “water memory” phenomenon – are generally considered to be a closed case. However, the amount of data generated by twenty years of well-conducted experiments prevents closing the file so simply. An issue, which has been little highlighted so far, merits to be emphasized. Indeed, if Benveniste failed to persuade his peers of the value of his experiments, it was mainly because of a stumbling block, namely the difficulty of convincingly proving the causal relationship between the supposed cause (“informed water”) and the experimental outcomes in different biological models. To progress in the understanding of this phenomenon, we abandon the idea of any role of water in these experiments (“water memory” and its avatars). In other words, we assume that “controls” and “tests” that were evaluated were all physically identical; only their respective designations (labels) differentiated them. Since we state that there is no causal link between labels (“controls” vs. “tests”) and corresponding states of the biological system (no change vs. change), these variables are independent. Therefore, the key question is: “Is it possible to observe a correlation between independent variables that mimics a causal relationship but is itself not causal?” In this article, we show how simple considerations based on probability theory lead to describe non-classical correlations involving the experimenter. This probabilistic modelling allows to propose an alternative explanation to Benveniste’s experiments where water plays no role and where the place of the experimenter is central.