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Chinese Physics Letters

Cryptanalysis of an Improved Flexible Ping-Pong Protocol in Perfect and Imperfect Quantum Channels

Zhang Bin-Bin, Wang Da-Qing, Shan-shan Huang, Liu Yu

Published Sep 29, 2009• 3 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We recently proposed a flexible quantum secure direct communication protocol [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 3152]. By analyzing its security in the perfect channel from the aspect of quantum information theory, we find that an eavesdropper is capable of stealing all the information without being detected. Two typical attacks are presented to illustrate this point. A solution to this loophole is also suggested and we show its powerfulness against the most general individual attack in the ideal case. We also discuss the security in the imperfect case when there is noise and loss.

DOI
10.1088/0256-307x/26/10/100305

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We recently proposed a flexible quantum secure direct communication protocol [Chin. Phys. Lett. 23 (2006) 3152]. By analyzing its security in the perfect channel from the aspect of quantum information theory, we find that an eavesdropper is capable of stealing all the information without being detected. Two typical attacks are presented to illustrate this point. A solution to this loophole is also suggested and we show its powerfulness against the most general individual attack in the ideal case. We also discuss the security in the imperfect case when there is noise and loss.
Quantum direct communication (QDC) can bring confidentiality of sensitive information without any encryption. A ping-pong protocol, a well-known example of entanglement-based QDC, offers asymptotic security in a perfect quantum channel. However, it has been shown (Wójcik in Phys Rev Lett 90(15):157901, 2003. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.90.157901 ) that it is not secure in the presence of losses. Moreover, legitimate parities cannot rely on dense information coding due to possible undetectable eavesdropping even in the perfect setting (Pavičić in Phys Rev A 87(4):042326, 2013. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevA.87.042326 ). We have identified the source of the above-mentioned weaknesses in the incomplete check of the EPR pair coherence. We propose an improved version of the control mode, and we discuss its relation to the already-known attacks that undermine the QDC security. It follows that the new control mode detects these attacks with high probability and independently on a quantum channel type. As a result, an asymptotic security of the QDC communication can be maintained for imperfect quantum channels, also in the regime of dense information coding.
Security of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol recently proposed by Boström and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)]] is analyzed in the case of considerable quantum channel losses. The eavesdropping scheme is presented, which reveals that the ping-pong protocol is not secure for transmission efficiencies lower than 60%. Our scheme induces 50% losses, which, however, can be hidden in the channel losses if one replaces the original lossy channel with a less lossy one. Finally, a possible improvement of the ping-pong protocol security is proposed.
We show an eavesdropping scheme on Bostr\UNICODE{0xf6}m-Felbinger communication protocol (called ping-pong protocol) [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] in an ideal quantum channel. A measurement attack can be perfectly used to eavesdrop Alice's information instead of a most general quantum operation attack. In a noisy quantum channel, the direct communication is forbidden. We present a quantum key distribution protocol based on the ping-pong protocol, which can be used in a low noisy quantum channel. And we give a weak upper bound on the bit-error ratio that the detection probability ddd should be lower than 0.11, which is a requirement criterion when we utilize the ping-pong protocol in a real communication.
We introduce an attack scheme for eavesdropping freely the ping-pong quantum communication protocol proposed by Boström and Felbinger [ Phys. Rev. Lett. 89 , 187902 (2002)] in a noise channel. The vicious eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts and measures the travel photon transmitted between the sender and the receiver. Then she replaces the quantum signal with a multi-photon signal in the same state, and measures the returned photons with the measuring basis, with which Eve prepares the fake signal except for one photon. This attack increases neither the quantum channel losses nor the error rate in the sampling instances for eavesdropping check. It works for eavesdropping the secret message transmitted with the ping-pong protocol. Finally, we propose a way for improving the security of the ping-pong protocol.
Ping-Pong quantum communication protocol may be employed to transmit deterministically information, so it has instrigued mang researchers. However, there are drawbacks on the security due to the symmetry of the employed two-way quantum channel. In this paper we propose a new attack strategy to eavesdrop the initially transmitted information based on the techniques of quantum error correction code (QECC). In addition, an attack strategy of Ping-Pong scheme based either entanglement state or nonorthogonal state is proofed and demonstrated, respectively. Furthermore, information obtained by Eve and the possible probability detected by the legitimate communicators are analyzed by employing information theorems. Detail proofs and analysis illustrate all previous Ping-Pong quantum communication schemes are insecure, i.e., the eavesdropper may obtain all available information without being detected.