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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences

Security Analysis of Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on the q-th Root Problem

K.-A. SHIM

Published Jan 1, 2007• 1 citation
Publisher

Abstract

Johnston and Gemmell proposed an authenticated key exchange protocol based on the difficulty of the q-th root problem. They showed that it is provably secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. In this paper we show that the protocol is insecure against an unknown key-share attack and does not achieve forward secrecy.
DOI
10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.1.231

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Authenticated key exchange protocols are a fundamental cryptography building block for establishing a secret shared key among participating parties over an open network model. Mohamed et al. proposed a tightly-secure authenticated key exchange without NAXOS approach based on decision linear problem in order to solve an open problem for designing an authenticated key exchange protocol without using NAXOS trick. Mohamed et al.'s protocol has tight security proof in the eCK model under the random oracle problem and its security claims verified by using the games sequence tool. However, we show that Mohamed et al.'s protocol cannot withstand the key compromise impersonation attacks and man in the middle attacks. Furthermore, Mohamed et al.'s protocol cannot provide an implicit entity authentication property since it is a basic security property for an authenticated key exchange protocol. Therefore, the protocol is not secure in the eCK model.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol provides the opportunity to arrive at a common secret key by exchanging texts over insecure medium without meeting in advance. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is limited to the exchange of key only. Due to lack of authentication of entities, this protocol is vulnerable towards man-in-middle attack and impersonation attack. To eliminate the man-in-middle attack, Nanli[9] presented a research paper on Diffie-Hellma key exchange protocol. It is observed that Nanli‟s protocol, still suffers with impersonation attack. To deal with this vulnerability, an improved key exchange approach based on third party authentication scheme is proposed in this paper.
Abstract An enhanced authentication key exchange protocol was proposed to exchange multiple session keys between two participants at a time. This paper shows that this enhanced protocol is insecure under the known session key attack, known long-term private key attack, signature forgery attack, and replay attack. This paper also proposes an enhanced and secure key agreement protocol for exchanging multiple session keys in one run of the protocol. The protocol is secure against the attacks mentioned above. Besides, a formal proof is given to guarantee the security of the proposed protocol under other potential attacks. Keywords Authentication, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, perfect forward secrecy, session key. 1.
Authenticated key-exchange protocols allow two participants A and B , communicating over a public network and each holding an authentication means to exchange a shared secret value. Methods designed to deal with this cryptographic problem ensure A (resp. B ) that no other participants aside from B (resp. A ) can learn any information about the agreed value and often also ensure A and B that their respective partner has actually computed this value. A natural extension to this cryptographic method is to consider a pool of participants exchanging a shared secret value and to provide a formal treatment for it. Starting from the famous two-party Diffie--Hellman (DH) key-exchange protocol and from its authenticated variants, security experts have extended it to the multiparty setting for over a decade and, in the past few years, completed a formal analysis in the framework of modern cryptography. The present paper synthesizes this body of work on the provably-secure authenticated group DH key exchange.