Reply to ?quantum nonlocality without counterfactual definiteness??

Willem M. de Muynck, Willy De Baere

Henry Pierce Stapp

Lev Vaidman A

Abner Shimony, Howard Stein

A 1997 paper by Henry Stapp attempts to achieve a definitive argument for his long-sustained thesis that quantum mechanics implies a nonlocality inconsistent with the locality of relativity theory. His argument assumes both the validity of counterfactual reasoning under certain circumstances and the free choice of performance of experiments, and it specifically refrains from any assumptions about “elements of physical reality” as understood by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen. In Sec. I we drastically condense his argument but retain his central principle of inference, called “LOC2,” which he claims is a consequence of relativistic locality. By careful attention to counterfactual reasoning we then throw doubt upon this claim and hence upon his argument as a whole. In Sec. II we answer Stapp’s reply to our critique of the 1997 paper. Section III is a postscript, commenting briefly on Stapp’s answer to Sec. II.

Henry Pierce Stapp

Tim Maudlin

Blaylock argues that the derivation of Bell’s inequality requires a hidden assumption, counterfactual definiteness, of which Bell was unaware. A careful analysis of Bell’s argument shows that Bell presupposes only locality and the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. Counterfactual definiteness, insofar as it is required, is derived in the course of the argument rather than presumed. Bell’s theorem has no direct bearing on the many worlds interpretation not because that interpretation denies counterfactual definiteness but because it does not recover the predictions of standard quantum mechanics.