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Optics Communications

Quantum key distribution protocols with six-photon states against collective noise

Xiao‐Ming Xiu, Li Dong, Yajun Gao, Feng Chi

Published Jul 24, 2009• 40 citations
Publisher
DOI
10.1016/j.optcom.2009.07.012

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In this paper, we show that there are instances where eavesdropping causes noise reduction for a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol. To witness these phenomena, we investigate a fault-tolerant six-state QKD protocol over a collective unitary noise channel. In this protocol, legitimate users send and receive two-qubit states that belong to the noiseless subspace being robust against collective unitary errors. We examine eavesdropper's intercept/resend and entangling probe attacks on this protocol. In general, the collective unitary noises lessen the probability that legitimate users share a random bit with the QKD protocol. However, we show that eavesdropping enlarges that probability in some specific scenarios although the effects of the collective unitary noise channel are strong enough. These phenomena make the legitimate users difficult to distinguish between noises and eavesdropper's malicious acts by monitoring the probability that they share the same random key.
We investigate the effect of collective-rotation noise on the security of the six-state quantum key distribution. We study the case where the eavesdropper, Eve, performs an intercept-resend attack on the quantum communication between Alice, the sender, and Bob, the receiver. We first derive the collective-rotation noise model for the six-state protocol and then parameterize the mutual information between Alice and Eve. We then derive quantum bit error rate for three intercept-resend attack scenarios. We observe that the six-state protocol is robust against intercept-resend attacks on collective rotation noise channels when the rotation angle is kept within certain bounds.
The security analysis of the Ekert 1991 (E91), Bennett 1992 (B92), six-state protocol, Scarani–Acín–Ribordy–Gisin 2004 (SARG04) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols, and their variants have been studied in the presence of collective-rotation noise channels. However, besides the Bennett–Brassard 1984 (BB84) being the first proposed, extensively studied, and essential protocol, its security proof under collective-rotation noise is still missing. Thus, we aim to close this gap in the literature. Consequently, we investigate how collective-rotation noise channels affect the security of the BB84 protocol. Mainly, we study scenarios where the eavesdropper, Eve, conducts an intercept-resend attack on the transmitted photons sent via a quantum communication channel shared by Alice and Bob. Notably, we distinguish the impact of collective-rotation noise and that of the eavesdropper. To achieve this, we provide rigorous, yet straightforward numerical calculations. First, we derive a model for the collective-rotation noise for the BB84 protocol and parametrize the mutual information shared between Alice and Eve. This is followed by deriving the quantum bit error rate (QBER) for two intercept-resend attack scenarios. In particular, we demonstrate that, for small rotation angles, one can extract a secure secret key under a collective-rotation noise channel when there is no eavesdropping. We observe that noise induced by rotation of 0.35 radians of the prepared quantum state results in a QBER of 11%, which corresponds to the lower bound on the tolerable error rate for the BB84 QKD protocol against general attacks. Moreover, a rotational angle of 0.53 radians yields a 25% QBER, which corresponds to the error rate bound due to the intercept-resend attack. Finally, we conclude that the BB84 protocol is robust against intercept-resend attacks on collective-rotation noise channels when the rotation angle is varied arbitrarily within particular bounds.