Assume that some businessmen wish to have a meeting. For this to occur, they usuallyhave to meet somewhere. If they cannot meet physically, then they can take part in a video (oraudio) conference to discuss whatever needs to be discussed. But what if their meeting is meant tobe private? In this case they need a cryptographic protocol that allows them to exchange their ideasremotely, while keeping them secure from any potential eavesdropper. In this paper we list all thenecessary requirements that a cryptographic protocol must have in order to allow several businessmento exchange their ideas securely over the Internet. Moreover, and based on the standard taxonomy ofcryptographic protocols, we suggest several approaches on how to design cryptographic protocols thatenable us to achieve our aim. Finally, we propose the design of a protocol that solves the meetingbusinessmen problem.
Assume that some businessmen wish to have a meeting. For this to occur, they usuallyhave to meet somewhere. If they cannot meet physically, then they can take part in a video (oraudio) conference to discuss whatever needs to be discussed. But what if their meeting is meant tobe private? In this case they need a cryptographic protocol that allows them to exchange their ideasremotely, while keeping them secure from any potential eavesdropper. In this paper we list all thenecessary requirements that a cryptographic protocol must have in order to allow several businessmento exchange their ideas securely over the Internet. Moreover, and based on the standard taxonomy ofcryptographic protocols, we suggest several approaches on how to design cryptographic protocols thatenable us to achieve our aim. Finally, we propose the design of a protocol that solves the meetingbusinessmen problem.
Let us assume that some businessmen wish to have a meeting. For this to happen, they usually have to meet somewhere. If they cannot meet physically, then they can take part in a video (or audio) conference to discuss whatever needs to be discussed. But what if their meeting is meant to be private? In this case they need a cryptographic protocol that allows them to exchange their ideas remotely, while keeping them secure from any potential eavesdropper. In this paper we list all the necessary requirements that a cryptographic protocol must have in order to allow several businessmen to exchange their ideas securely over the Internet. Moreover, and based on the standard taxonomy of cryptographic pro- tocols, we suggest several approaches on how to design cryptographic protocols that enable us to achieve our aim. Finally, we propose the design of a protocol that solves the meeting businessmen problem.
Assume that several people wish to have a meeting. For this to happen, they usually have to meet somewhere. If they cannot meet physically, then they can take part in a video (or audio) conference to discuss whatever needs to be discussed. But what if their meeting is meant to be private? In this case they need a cryptographic protocol that allows them to exchange their ideas remotely, while keeping them secure from any potential eavesdropper. In this paper we list all the necessary requirements that a cryptographic protocol must have in order to allow several persons to exchange their ideas securely over the Internet. Moreover, and based on the standard taxonomy of cryptographic protocols, we suggest several approaches on how to design cryptographic protocols that enable us to achieve our aim. Finally, we propose the design of a protocol that solves our problem.
Introduction and motivation We live in time of computers and scientific and technological progress but this time is also marked with many attacks on big Internet companies. So with expand of Internet people start to protect information that they exchange through Internet. In the Internet world it is necessary for systems as Internet banking, Internet shopping or e-commerce to secure private information that are transferred via Internet. This necessity leads to design security improvements of existing protocols and to design and implement cryptographic algorithms (for example protocols as L2TP, Microsoft PPTP, IPSec, SSH or algorithms as DES, Blowfish and others). Consider that we have two banks, bank "Alice" and bank "Bob" and these two banks for business purposes need the private cipher for their communication. They need this cipher to do secret bank operation. So they need the secure way, how to arrange the cip
The design of secure protocols that implement arbitrarily desired functionalities is a major part of modern cryptography. Taking the opposite perspective, the design of any cryptographic scheme may be viewed as the design of a secure protocol for implementing a suitable functionality. Still, we believe that it makes sense to differentiate between basic cryptographic primitives (which involve little interaction) like encryption and signature schemes, on the one hand, and general cryptographic protocols, on the other hand. In this chapter we consider general results concerning secure multi –party computations, where the two –party case is an important special case. In a nutshell, these results assert that one can construct protocols for securely computing any desirable multi–party functionality (see the following terminology). Indeed, what is striking about these results is their generality, and we believe that the wonder is not diminished by the (various alternative) conditions under which these results hold. Our focus on the general study of secure multi–party computation (rather than on protocols for solving specific problems) is natural in the context of the theoretical treatment of the subject matter. We wish to highlight the importance of this general study to practice. Firstly, this study clarifies fundamental issues regarding security in a multi–party environment. Secondly, it draws the lines between what is possible in principle and what is not. Thirdly, it develops general techniques for designing secure protocols. And last, sometimes it may even yield schemes (or modules) that may be incorporated in practical systems.
Two millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not want to find out inadvertently any additional information about each other’s wealth. How can they carry out such a conversation? This is a special case of the following general problem. Suppose m people wish to compute the value of a function f(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xm), which is an integer-valued function of m integer variables xi of bounded range. Assume initially person Pi knows the value of xi and no other x’s. Is it possible for them to compute the value of f , by communicating among themselves, without unduly giving away any information about the values of their own variables? The millionaires’ problem corresponds to the case when m = 2 and f(x1, x2) = 1 if x1 < x2, and 0 otherwise. In this paper, we will give precise formulation of this general problem and describe three ways of solving it by use of one-way functions (i.e., functions which are easy to evaluate but hard to invert). These results have applications to secret voting, private querying of database, oblivious negotiation, playing mental poker, etc. We will also discuss the complexity question “How many bits need to be exchanged for the computation”, and describe methods to prevent participants from cheating. Finally, we study the question “What cannot be accomplished with one-way functions”. Before describing these results, we would like to put this work in perspective by first considering a unified view of secure computation in the next section.
The original cryptographic problem is for Alice and Bob to have a conversation using some insecure communications channel, but preventing Eve both from eavesdropping and in and improper manner tampering with their conversation. This chapter develops the theory of messaging protocols, which is the answer to the original cryptographic problem. The chapter develops a framework for messaging protocols and related security notions. The framework also captures symmetric key channels as a special case. The chapter in particular analyses compositional constructions based on key exchange protocols and channels. The results provides solid solutions for the original cryptographic problem. The chapter also investigates stronger notions of security for messaging protocols, including a design based on role-symmetric key exchange. One important societal goal is to defend against mass surveillance. While cryptography cannot solve this problem on its own, this chapter discusses techniques for preventing messaging protocols from making mass surveillance trivial.