We propose a new interpretation of objective probability in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set-up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the 'distance' (in terms of physical resources) between a physical state and another, and (3) the size of the set of time-complexity functions that are compatible with the physical resources required to reach a physical state from another. This view (a) exorcises 'ignorance' from statistical physics, and (b) underlies a new interpretation to non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
We propose a new interpretation of objective probability in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set-up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the 'distance' (in terms of physical resources) between a physical state and another, and (3) the size of the set of time-complexity functions that are compatible with the physical resources required to reach a physical state from another. This view (a) exorcises 'ignorance' from statistical physics, and (b) underlies a new interpretation to non-relativistic quantum mechanics.
We propose a new interpretation of objective deterministic chances in statistical physics based on physical computational complexity. This notion applies to a single physical system (be it an experimental set--up in the lab, or a subsystem of the universe), and quantifies (1) the difficulty to realize a physical state given another, (2) the `distance' (in terms of physical resources) of a physical state from another, and (3) the size of the set of time--complexity functions that are compatible with the physical resources required to reach a physical state from another. This view (a) exorcises "ignorance" from statistical physics, and (b) underlies a new interpretation to non--relativistic quantum mechanics.
In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs.
The article discusses approaches to understanding the nature of probability in mathematics and physics with the consequences of these approaches, as well as the difficulties that arise. The ontological status of probability is discussed. It is shown that probability theory, contrary to R. Mises, should be classified as a mathematical science, using the definition formulated by A.N. Kolmogorov. The application of this definition in practice is provided within the framework of the classical approach, provided that the connection with physical reality is defined through the concept of equal opportunity. To do this, the concepts of simple and complex events are introduced, and the method of decomposing complex events into simple ones is explained. The point of view is substantiated, according to which a mathematical probability determined and related to physical reality in this way can be considered an objective probability, that is, existing independently of any tests. Various interpretations of quantum mechanics and approaches to understanding probability are also revealed. It is shown that in physics today the existing approaches to understanding the nature of probability contradict each other. In the Bohm interpretation, probability is an analogue of the classical approach – statistical objective probability, which has a mathematical formalization, and in quantum Bayesianism, probability quantifies the degree of reliability and depends on the subject conducting the experiment. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics tries to eliminate the difficulties associated with combining the wave and corpuscular properties of light and electron beams into a single picture by giving the ontological status of probability, which leads to the problem of understanding physical reality. The article argues for the need for a new connection between the mathematical description of probability and physical reality. The empirical (frequency) approach of R. Mises is analyzed, which causes a lot of criticism, as it does not have a clear consistent formalization. The article argues that this approach is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. The probability given by M. Born in the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics is also considered, which formulates a new definition of probability, which does not exclude the difficulties associated with the physical interpretation of probability. Born’s approach is based on the classical approach and is reduced to a formal axiomatic definition, which assumes the interpretation of probability as a mathematical construct. The connection of probability with physical reality and the consistency of the statistical method of finding probability values remain unresolved problems, which creates a dualism of understanding probability: in mathematics – one thing, in physics – another. If in the mathematical approach, the solution of these problems is carried out through the connection of probability with physical properties, then in quantum mechanics, in the Copenhagen interpretation, problems persist, which is caused by giving the wave function an ontological status.
In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of strange quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread way of speaking in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a wave which provides statistical information about outcomes that, in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs.
We investigate epistemologically the meaning of probability as implied in quantum physics in connection with a proposed direct interpretation of the state function and of the related quantum theoretical quantities in terms of physical systems having physical properties, through an extension of meaning of the notion of physical quantity to complex mathematical expressions not reductible to simple numerical values. We show how the changes occurred in the implication of probabilities in quantum physics, from a penetration tool (probability as statistics and frequencies of occurencies of events) to a theoretical concept (probability given by a physically aimed at «amplitude of probability») actually make this view a somewhat «natural» one.
Abstract Some of the most compelling examples of the existence of truly objective probabilities come from physics, in particular quantum physics and statistical mechanics. So it is crucial to the overall success of HOC that it be compatible with the objective probabilities found in these theories. First, objective probabilities in classical (Boltzmannian) statistical mechanics (SM) are discussed. It is shown that HOC does capture the central probabilistic postulates of SM, and indeed that it may do so in two distinct ways. Second, objective probabilities in standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM), the context in which the notion that fundamental physics is at bottom chancy first became widely accepted, are discussed. It is shown that HOC is especially apt for capturing the probabilities of QM; other accounts may do equally well (though some clearly do not), but none can do the job better.