Europhysics Letters (EPL)

Counterfactual attack on counterfactual quantum key distribution

Sheng Zhang, Jian Wnang, Chao Jing Tang

Published May 1, 2012• 15 citations

Abstract

\n It is interesting that counterfactual quantum cryptography protocols allow two remotely separated parties to share a secret key without transmitting any signal particles. Generally, these protocols, expected to provide security advantages, base their security on a translated no-cloning theorem. Therefore, they potentially exhibit unconditional security in theory. In this letter, we propose a new Trojan horse attack, by which an eavesdropper Eve can gain full information about the key without being noticed, to real implementations of a counterfactual quantum cryptography system. Most importantly, the presented attack is available even if the system has negligible imperfections. Therefore, it shows that the present realization of counterfactual quantum key distribution is vulnerable.\n

DOI: 10.1209/0295-5075/98/30012

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