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Behavioral and Brain Sciences

Grounding quantum probability in psychological mechanism

Bradley C. Love

Published May 14, 2013• 2 citations
Publisher

Abstract

Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) provide a compelling case that quantum probability (QP) theory is a better match to human judgment than is classical probability (CP) theory. However, any theory (QP, CP, or other) phrased solely at the computational level runs the risk of being underconstrained. One suggestion is to ground QP accounts in mechanism, to leverage a wide range of process-level data.

DOI
10.1017/s0140525x12003147

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This comment suggests that Pothos & Busmeyer (P&B) do not provide an intuitive rational foundation for quantum probability (QP) theory to parallel standard logic and classical probability (CP) theory. In particular, the intuitive foundation for standard logic, which underpins CP, is the elimination of contradictions - that is, believing p and not-p is bad. Quantum logic, which underpins QP, explicitly denies non-contradiction, which seems deeply counterintuitive for the macroscopic world about which people must reason. I propose a possible resolution in situation theory.

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Pothos & Busemeyer (P&B) provide a compelling case that quantum probability (QP) theory is a better match to human judgment than is classical probability (CP) theory. However, any theory (QP, CP, or other) phrased solely at the computational level runs the risk of being underconstrained. One suggestion is to ground QP accounts in mechanism, to leverage a wide range of process-level data.
Classical (Bayesian) probability (CP) theory has led to an influential research tradition for modeling cognitive processes. Cognitive scientists have been trained to work with CP principles for so long that it is hard even to imagine alternative ways to formalize probabilities. However, in physics, quantum probability (QP) theory has been the dominant probabilistic approach for nearly 100 years. Could QP theory provide us with any advantages in cognitive modeling as well? Note first that both CP and QP theory share the fundamental assumption that it is possible to model cognition on the basis of formal, probabilistic principles. But why consider a QP approach? The answers are that (1) there are many well-established empirical findings (e.g., from the influential Tversky, Kahneman research tradition) that are hard to reconcile with CP principles; and (2) these same findings have natural and straightforward explanations with quantum principles. In QP theory, probabilistic assessment is often strongly context- and order-dependent, individual states can be superposition states (that are impossible to associate with specific values), and composite systems can be entangled (they cannot be decomposed into their subsystems). All these characteristics appear perplexing from a classical perspective. However, our thesis is that they provide a more accurate and powerful account of certain cognitive processes. We first introduce QP theory and illustrate its application with psychological examples. We then review empirical findings that motivate the use of quantum theory in cognitive theory, but also discuss ways in which QP and CP theories converge. Finally, we consider the implications of a QP theory approach to cognition for human rationality.
The Potential of Quantum Probability for Modeling Cognitive Processes Emmanuel M. Pothos (e.m.pothos@swansea.ac.uk) Department of Psychology, Swansea University, SA2 8PP, UK Jerome R. Busemeyer (jbusemey@indiana.edu), Richard M. Shiffrin (shiffrin@indiana.edu), Jennifer S. Trueblood (jstruebl@indiana.edu) Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University, Bloomington 47468, USA. Zheng Wang (wang.1243@osu.edu) Ohio State University, School of Communication, Columbus 43210, USA. Reinhard K. Blutner (reinhard@blutner.de) Institute of Logic, Language, and Computation, University of Amsterdam, 1090 GE Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Harald Atmanspacher (atmanspacher@collegium.ethz.ch) Department of Theory and Data Analysis, IGPP, D-79098 Freiburg, Germany. Keywords: Quantum probability, formal approaches, decision making, conceptual combination General Background and Speakers Quantum probability (QP) theory is a theory for how to assign probabilities to observables. In the context of physics, it has been successfully employed by researchers for over 100 years and has been the basis for some of the most impressive discoveries of the human mind (e.g., the transistor, and so the microchip, and the laser). But the applicability of QP theory is not limited to physical phenomena and, indeed, there has been growing interest in exploring the potential of QP theory in areas as diverse as economics (Baaquie, 2004), information theory (e.g., Grover, 1997), and psychology. We are interested in the latter objective. Probabilistic approaches to cognition have been recently enjoying considerable success (e.g., Griffiths et al., 2010). This is perhaps unsurprising. Several (if not most) aspects of cognitive processing involve inference about quantities which cannot be determined with certainty. Thus, probability theory seems an ideal tool for formalizing uncertainty in cognitive processes and describing the mechanisms which allow humans to be successful in an uncertain world. The question then becomes to identify the probabilistic framework which is most suitable for modeling particular aspects of cognition. Cognitive scientists have widely employed classical probability theory and there is no doubt that such approaches can be incredibly successful for particular problems (e.g., Oaksford & Chater, 2007). But is Bayesian probability always the most suitable probabilistic framework for describing cognitive processes? Human inference often appears to violate fundamental laws of classical probability. For example, in the famous Linda problem of Tversky and Kahneman (1983) participants consider as more likely a conjunctive statement than a corresponding single premise one (i.e., Probability (AB this is the conjunction fallacy). In one-shot prisoner’s dilemma games, naive participants choose to defect knowing their opponent defects, they choose to also defect knowing their opponent cooperates, but they reverse their judgment and choose to cooperate when their opponent’s action is unknown (Shafir & Tversky, 1992). This result is also hard to reconcile with classical probability theory, it violates the sure thing principle and the law of total probability. Findings such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle provide the motivation for exploring probabilistic frameworks alternative to classic probability theory. QP theory is mostly consistent with classical probability theory, but for a crucial difference. In classical probability theory Probability (AB Busemeyer, Wang, & Townsend, 2006; Pothos & Busemeyer, 2009), these properties of QP theory can lead to successful and simple QP models for empirical findings, such as the conjunction fallacy and the violation of the sure thing principle. Finally, QP theory remains suitable for describing cognition without involving any claim that the brain is a quantum computer. Rather, we adopt what is a standard approach in cognitive science and ask: 'does quantum probability theory produce results which predict human behavior well?’ The application of QP theory in cognition holds a lot of promise. The main objective of this symposium is to present the key ideas to the cognitive science community and summarize progress with QP theory cognitive models. What
This comment suggests that Pothos & Busmeyer (P&B) do not provide an intuitive rational foundation for quantum probability (QP) theory to parallel standard logic and classical probability (CP) theory. In particular, the intuitive foundation for standard logic, which underpins CP, is the elimination of contradictions - that is, believing p and not-p is bad. Quantum logic, which underpins QP, explicitly denies non-contradiction, which seems deeply counterintuitive for the macroscopic world about which people must reason. I propose a possible resolution in situation theory.