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Physical Review A

Reexamining the assumption that elements of reality can be Lorentz invariant

Oliver Cohen, Basil J. Hiley

Published Jul 1, 1995• 11 citations
Publisher

Abstract

We examine a gedanken experiment described by Hardy, which purports to prove that the ``elements of reality'' corresponding to Lorentz-invariant observables cannot themselves be Lorentz invariant without violating quantum mechanics. We consider a number of criticisms of this proof and show that these criticisms are not convincing. We demonstrate that the contradiction, which arises in the gedanken experiment and forms the basis of Hardy's proof, has nothing to do with realism, but is a consequence of the well-known noncovariance of the reduction postulate. A reexamination of the gedanken experiment, using a more appropriate formalism, helps to clarify its implications. We conclude with a brief appraisal of realist interpretations of quantum mechanics in the relativistic domain.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.52.76

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Cambridge University Press eBooks•Aug 31, 2016•1 citation
We examine a gedanken experiment described by Hardy, which purports to prove that the ``elements of reality'' corresponding to Lorentz-invariant observables cannot themselves be Lorentz invariant without violating quantum mechanics. We consider a number of criticisms of this proof and show that these criticisms are not convincing. We demonstrate that the contradiction, which arises in the gedanken experiment and forms the basis of Hardy's proof, has nothing to do with realism, but is a consequence of the well-known noncovariance of the reduction postulate. A reexamination of the gedanken experiment, using a more appropriate formalism, helps to clarify its implications. We conclude with a brief appraisal of realist interpretations of quantum mechanics in the relativistic domain.
The concept of ``elements of reality" is analyzed within the framework of quantum theory. It is shown that elements of reality fail to fulfill the product rule. This is the core of recent proofs of the impossibility of a Lorentz-invariant interpretation of quantum mechanics. A generalization and extension of the concept of elements of reality is presented. Lorentz-invariance is restored by giving up the product rule. The consequences of giving up the ``and" rule, which must be abandoned together with the product rule, are discussed.
This thesis addresses some of the consequences of giving quantum mechanics a realist interpretation. We consider three main topics: wave-particle duality, locality, and Lorentz invariance. First we show that classical particles alone or classical waves alone cannot explain all single particle quantum phenomena. Then we consider the possibility that a quantum particle is composed of a particle and a wave, both being taken to exist objectively. We are able to demonstrate the reality of empty waves (that is, waves without a particle) if we make three realist motivated assumptions. The main part of this thesis concerns locality. In 1964 Bell demonstrated that a local realist interpretation of quantum mechanics is not possible by deriving a set of inequalities that apply to two particle systems. More recently Greenberger, Home, and Zeilinger have demonstrated this for systems with more than two particles without the need for inequalities. We present a new way to derive Bell inequalities for two particles and show how this can be extended to systems with more than two particles. A number of proposals for experiments to test local realism are put forward. In particular, we show how it is possible to demonstrate the nonlocality of a single photon. A new demonstration of Bell's theorem is presented for two particles but without inequalities. A realizable quantum optical version is proposed and inequalities are proposed which would be required in a non-ideal experiment. Finally, the question of Lorentz invariance is considered. We define a condition for the existence of elements of reality and a condition for the Lorentz invariance of these elements of reality. Then we show that, by considering a particular gedanken experiment, we obtain a contradiction demonstrating that Lorentz-invariant realistic interpretations of quantum theory are not possible.
The compatibility of special relativity and Quantum Mechanics has been questioned by several authors. The origin of this tension can be traced back mainly to the introduction of the measurement processes and the corresponding wave function reduction, which play a crucial role in Quantum Mechanics. We approach this problem with the help of a recent proposal for a model of Quantum Mechanics, where the measurement is explicitly described as a specific stochastic process. This implements ordinary Quantum Mechanics, where measurement and reduction are treated as phenomenological events of unknown origin without any physical justification. To state clearly the question in general, we first discuss and establish the effect of a Lorentz transformation on a generic wave function in space-time. Alongside the analysis we formulate the relativistic version of the model. We then consider few thought experiments in order to analyze to what extent Quantum Mechanics follows relativistic invariance and find the specific critical points where non invariance possibly occurs. The analysis can shade light to the interpretation of the existing experimental observations.
I begin with some reminiscences of my delayed appreciation of the significance of John Bell'swork. Preparatory remarks on my general perspective concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics are presented. I argue against the conflation of hyperplane dependence with frame dependence, which occurs occasionally; and that the ‘elements of reality’ of Hardy's famous gedankenexperiment can retain their Lorentz invariance, i.e., their frame independence, if one recognizes the hyperplane dependence of their localization, which follows. Finally, I criticize a view of the nature of Lorentz transformations presented by Asher Peres and co-workers which conflicts with the view employed here. Initial Reactions to Bell's Work Like many others in the physics community, I was late to come to an appreciation of the significance of John Bell's papers on the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). But unlike many of those, my indifference to Bell was not due to a dismissive attitude to foundational studies per se or to an intransigent commitment to some version of Copenhagenism. In 1971, for example, I was very much involved in the international conference on QM foundations at my home institution, where Bell presented the paper “On the hypothesis that the Schrödinger equation is exact,” published later as [1], but I paid minimal attention to his presentation. The cause of this poor judgment (as I eventually came to realize it was) was that I was already convinced that the Schrödinger equation was not exact in the sense Bell meant, but must be augmented with primordial state reductions. I was among those who, in the words of Bob Wald, as reported by Roger Penrose [2], were inclined to “take it seriously,” the QM state that is, and, consequently, could not “really believe in it,” i.e., really believe that purely unitary QM is a complete theory. I was delighted when the experimental tests of Bell's inequalities upheld the QM predictions. I was, furthermore, uninterested in hidden variable reconstructions of QM, such as Bohmian mechanics [3] and Many Worlds interpretations [4, 5], that were, in principle, not susceptible to empirical tests of their novel details.